ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Publication Date: 2018-10-10
    Description: This paper deals with judicial departures in consolidating democracies. It investigates to what extent and under what conditions judges in those contexts are not able to decide on their departures themselves but are rather forced to leave due to pressure from the elected branches. We undertook a cross-regional study of individual judicial departures in six consolidating democracies with elected presidents, three of them located in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay) and three in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Madagascar, and Senegal). We developed a unique data set containing information on 143 high-court judges in office since democratisation. We classified judicial departures as due and undue, and using a survival model we estimated the impact of institutional, political, personal, and contextual factors. The results indicate that undue judicial departures occur regardless of the region, but are most probable under the rule of politically powerful executives, and where there are lower levels of democracy and development.
    Keywords: ddc:300 ; judicial politics ; constitutional court ; supreme court ; judge ; Latin America ; Francophone Africa ; democratisation ; separation of powers
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
    Publication Date: 2018-10-10
    Description: Though an important function of the Latin American senates, the confirmation of presidential nominations has drawn little academic attention. This paper assesses empirically the way in which two Latin American upper chambers - the Argentine and Brazilian senates - made use of their confirmation prerogatives between 1989 and 2003, namely, if one of deference to the executive proposals or a more active role including both consultation and oversight. To do this, the article first analyses all nominations regarding outcome (confirmed, rejected and withdrawn) and length of process. Then, the similarities and differences are used to advance some explanatory hypotheses. Special attention is paid to the impact of political factors, mainly divided government, and institutional features, mainly the senates' internal rules for the organization of the legislative work.
    Description: Obgleich eine wichtige Funktion lateinamerikanischer Senate, hat die Bestätigung der Präsidentennominierung wenig akademische Aufmerksamkeit erhalten. Als ein Beitrag, diese Lücke zu füllen, präsentiert dieses Paper eine empirische Untersuchung darüber, wie zwei lateinamerikanische Senate - die Argentiniens und Brasiliens - zwischen 1989 und 2003 von ihrer Bestätigungsprärogative Gebrauch gemacht haben, namentlich ob sie die Vorschläge der Exekutive lediglich 'abgenickt' haben oder ob sie eine aktivere Rolle mit Konsultationen und Kontrollfunktionen eingenommen haben. Hierfür analysiert der Artikel alle Nominierungen und ihren Verlauf, und vergleicht dann Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen beiden Staaten um Erklärungshypothesen zu formulieren. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit richtet sich dabei auf politische Faktoren (Verhältnis Regierung - Opposition) und institutionelle Aspekte wie das interne Reglement der Senate.
    Keywords: ddc:300 ; Latin American congresses ; Senate ; Argentina ; Brazil ; president-congress relations ; congressional oversight ; senatorial confirmations ; presidential nominations
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Publication Date: 2018-10-10
    Description: This paper assesses the extent to which elected power holders informally intervene in the judiciaries of new democracies, an acknowledged but under-researched topic in studies of judicial politics. The paper first develops an empirical strategy for the study of informal interference based on perceptions recorded in interviews, then applies the strategy to six third-wave democracies, three in Africa (Benin, Madagascar and Senegal) and three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile and Paraguay). It also examines how three conditioning factors affect the level of informal judicial interference: formal rules, previous democratic experience, and socioeconomic development. Our results show that countries with better performance in all these conditioning factors exhibit less informal interference than countries with poorer or mixed performance. The results stress the importance of systematically including informal politics in the study of judicial politics.
    Keywords: ddc:300 ; judicial politics ; constitutional court ; supreme court ; Latin America ; Francophone Africa ; democratization ; separation of powers ; informal politics
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA)
    Publication Date: 2018-10-10
    Description: This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency - meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive - in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system - that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, and typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively all allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies.
    Keywords: ddc:300 ; Argentina ; Brazil ; institutional presidency ; presidential office ; coalition presidentialism ; comparative political institutions
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Publication Date: 2018-10-26
    Description: This article aims to evaluate to what extent the Argentine Senate was able to fulfil its constitutional function of controlling the Executive's prerogative to nominate judges between 1983 and 2006, as well as to examine the factors that influenced the exercise of this role. To do so, the paper focuses on the parliamentary procedure of the proposals submitted by the Executive for the nomination of all federal judges, the members of the so-called 'national justice' of Buenos Aires and those of the Public Ministry. The findings show that the Senate's powers depend on several factors, such as, the institutional resources with which presidents count in this chamber (which includes not only the size of the parliamentary majority but also their power in the Committee of Acuerdos), the category of the position to be filled (whether involving Supreme Court justices or not), presidential ambitions in other policy areas (such as re-election), and the rules regulating the selection and confirmation of candidates (such as the secrecy or publicity of the legislative process).
    Description: Der Artikel analysiert, in welchem Maß der argentinischen Senat zwischen 1983 und 2006 in der Lage gewesen ist, seine verfassungsmäßige Funktion als Kontrollorgan bei der Nominierung von Richtern durch die Exekutive auszuüben. Dabei wird auch nach den Faktoren gefragt, die die Ausübung dieser Rolle beeinflussten. Zu diesem Zweck untersucht die Studie die parlamentarischen Verfahren bei den von der Exekutive unterbreiteten Kandidaten für alle Bundesrichter, die Mitglieder der sogenannten 'nationalen Justiz' von Buenos Aires sowie der Staatsanwaltschaft. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Macht des Senats von einer Reihe von Faktoren abhängt, unter anderem von den institutionellen Ressourcen des Präsidenten in dieser Kammer (was nicht nur die Größe der Parlamentsfraktion umfasst, sondern auch ihre Macht in der Verhandlungskommission), der Art der zu besetzenden Stelle (ob es sich um den Obersten Gerichtshof handelt oder nicht), den Ambitionen des Präsidenten in anderen Politikfeldern (z.B. Wiederwahl) sowie den bestehenden Regeln über Auswahl und Bestätigung von Kandidaten (z.B. ob das Verfahren öffentlich oder nicht-öffentlich erfolgt).
    Keywords: ddc:300 ; judicial appointments ; presidential nominations ; senatorial confirmations ; Argentine Supreme Court ; Argentine lower courts
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: Spanish
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...