ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This essay argues that politically motivated business cycles could persist in a democratic society even if the electorate votes in a rational, fully informed manner, provided that government policymakers have the means to systematically generate macroeconomic fluctuations. This cyclic outcome reflects the pReferences of an electorate that is composed of imperfectly altruistic voters belonging to different overlapping generations. Since each generation has a different horizon over which it would like to have elected politicians provide an optimal economic policy plan, an intergenerational conflict of interests situation arises. This conflict is placed into an explicit political context, whereby cycles become generated under the institutional constraint of periodic elections.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00119690
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