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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider a model where oligopolistic firms create independent divisions or franchises, which subsequently delegate output decisions to managers. We show that the number of firms required to make divisionalization privately profitable is greater in our model than in previous pure divisionalization models. However, in contrast with pure delegation models, we show that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium approaches perfect competition as divisionalization costs tends to zero, even with a small fixed number of firms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2017-05-30
    Description: In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the welfare implications of our analysis and generate policy implications regarding the optimal level of government intervention in the broadcasting industry.
    Keywords: L11 ; L33 ; L82 ; M37 ; ddc:330 ; Quality ; Mixed duopoly ; Advertising ; Media
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 3
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    Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
    Publication Date: 2019-03-22
    Description: Motivated by the fact that some regulations involve extra costs for those firms at a size beyond a critical threshold, this paper contributes to the analysis of the welfare distortions due to these regulations. In the context of a duopoly, our results show that social welfare is not monotonic with the regulatory threshold. In particular, we obtain the paradoxical result that a policy decision of increasing the threshold might involve a dramatic decrease in welfare in some markets. An interesting consequence of this result is that the positive discrimination towards small firms is a rather subtle issue. Our results suggest that the relevant regulatory thresholds should differ across industries. Apparently, this is taken into account in some countries (e.g., USA), but not in many other countries.
    Keywords: L11 ; L13 ; L52 ; ddc:330 ; Duopoly ; welfare ; firm size ; strategic effects
    Repository Name: EconStor: OA server of the German National Library of Economics - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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