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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 2 (1993), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical programming 19 (1980), S. 61-77 
    ISSN: 1436-4646
    Keywords: Optimization ; Nonlinear Programming ; Unconstrained Optimization ; Nondifferentiable Optimization ; Min—Max Problems
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper, we suggest approximations for smoothing out the kinks caused by the presence of “max” or “min” operators in many non-smooth optimization problems. We concentrate on the continuous-discrete min—max optimization problem. The new approximations replace the original problem in some neighborhoods of the kink points. These neighborhoods can be made arbitrarily small, thus leaving the original objective function unchanged at almost every point ofR n . Furthermore, the maximal possible difference between the optimal values of the approximate problem and the original one, is determined a priori by fixing the value of a single parameter. The approximations introduced preserve properties such as convexity and continuous differentiability provided that each function composing the original problem has the same properties. This enables the use of efficient gradient techniques in the solution process. Some numerical examples are presented.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical programming 15 (1978), S. 36-52 
    ISSN: 1436-4646
    Keywords: Optimization ; Non-linear Programming ; Unconstrained Optimization ; Gradientpath Algorithms ; Quasi-Newton Methods ; Arc Algorithms
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract The gradient path of a real valued differentiable function is given by the solution of a system of differential equations. For a quadratic function the above equations are linear, resulting in a closed form solution. A quasi-Newton type algorithm for minimizing ann-dimensional differentiable function is presented. Each stage of the algorithm consists of a search along an arc corresponding to some local quadratic approximation of the function being minimized. The algorithm uses a matrix approximating the Hessian in order to represent the arc. This matrix is updated each stage and is stored in its Cholesky product form. This simplifies the representation of the arc and the updating process. Quadratic termination properties of the algorithm are discussed as well as its global convergence for a general continuously differentiable function. Numerical experiments indicating the efficiency of the algorithm are presented.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical programming 19 (1980), S. 289-299 
    ISSN: 1436-4646
    Keywords: Generalized Convexity ; Pseudoconvexity ; Strict Pseudoconvexity ; Convexifiability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract We present new criteria that characterize functions which are convex transformable by a suitable strictly increasing function. We concentrate on twice continuously differentiable pseudoconvex and strictly pseudoconvex functions, and derive conditions which are both necessary and sufficient for these functions to be convex transformable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 28 (1999), S. 35-52 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Antitrust regulation ; monopolies ; Nash equilibria
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. A major issue within the realm of Antitrust policy is the regulation of existing monopolies. We describe a new potential indirect scheme for regulating a natural monopoly that arises from high entry cost. The approach involves minimal government intervention, and it is based on encouraging entry by offering to subsidize entry cost for potential competitors. We pose this issue as a four-stage non-cooperative game. Analysis of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria of the game reveals that the first best outcome is achieved as the unique equilibrium in which the monopolist prices at marginal cost and there is no entry. The regulation is “costless,” since no entry will occur and hence no subsidy will be paid.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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