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  • 1
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    Field Centipedes (2009)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2009-08-01
    Description: In the centipede game, all standard equilibrium concepts dictate that the player who decides first must stop the game immediately. There is vast experimental evidence, however, that this rarely occurs. We first conduct a field experiment in which highly ranked chess players play this game. Contrary to previous evidence, our results show that 69 percent of chess players stop immediately. When we restrict attention to Grandmasters, this percentage escalates to 100 percent. We then conduct a laboratory experiment in which chess players and students are matched in different treatments. When students play against chess players, the outcome approaches the subgame-perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C93)
    Print ISSN: 0002-8282
    Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 291-306 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213907
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 291-306 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213907
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bargaining, coalitions and competition (2000)
    Springer
    Economic theory 15 (2000), S. 279-296 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Finite coalitions and Edgeworthian theory of exchange, Marginal rates of substitution and Jevonsian theory of exchange, Matching and bargaining, Core, Walrasian equilibrium. ; JEL Classification Numbers: D51, D41, C78.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050013
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 11-25 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract: We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistent n-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 29 (2000), S. 63-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: Asymmetric information, core, common knowledge
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050005
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bilateral comparisons and consistent fair division rules in the context of bankruptcy problems (1997)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 26 (1997), S. 11-25 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We analyze the problem of extending a given bilateral principle of justice to a consistentn-creditor bankruptcy rule. Based on the bilateral principle, we build a family of binary relations on the set of creditors in order to make bilateral comparisons between them. We find that the possibility of extending a specific bilateral principle of justice in a consistent way is closely related to the quasi-transitivity of the binary relations mentioned above.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01262509
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Feasible implementation of taxation methods (1999)
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 57-72 
    Details
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Feasible implementation, taxation methods, consistency, decentralization, flat tax ; JEL classification: D31, D71
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two mechanisms. The first one, which requires complete information, implements every taxation method in Nash, strong and coalition-proof equilibrium. The second, where informational requirements are relaxed, implements a large class of consistent and monotone methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by the general theory. Under fully private information no method is implementable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050026
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