ISSN:
1573-2878
Keywords:
Differential games
;
multistage games
;
Stackelberg strategy
;
strategy with memory
;
decentralized control
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
Notes:
Abstract A new solution of a two-person, nonzero-sum Stackelberg game, with linear dynamics, quadratic performance criteion, and closed-loop information available to both players, is presented. This solution is applicable to all problems where the leader is able to influence the objective function of the follower, and this function is strictly convex with respect to the control variable handled by the follower. The resulting equilibrium strategies adapt to the possible nonoptimal behavior of players at some stages of the game. The strategy of the leader has a simple interpretation of a threat formulated by the leader toward the follower and, if necessary, carried out one stage after the follower has played inconsistently with the leader's wishes.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00935889
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