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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    RELATIVE INEQUALITY, ABSOLUTE INEQUALITY, AND WELFARE: LARGE SAMPLE TESTS FOR PARTIAL ORDERS (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Bulletin of economic research 46 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-8586
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Two general welfare criteria, mean-relative Lorenz and mean-absolute Lorenz dominance, induce partial orders on income distributions. We propose asymptotically distribution-free inference procedures, based on the union-intersection principle, for these two welfare criteria. Unlike classical tests, our procedures allow one to distinguish among dominance, equality, and noncomparability. We show that union-intersection tests must be used to test for partial orders, and that the statistical ordering is acyclic. The tests are applied to compare the UK distribution of real family income to five other countries.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.1994.tb00577.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Consumer risk perceptions and information in insurance markets with adverse selection (1996)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 21 (1996), S. 191-210 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: adverse selection ; hidden information ; informational equilibrium ; learning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is “as if” policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00941938
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Changing American earnings distributions: One-half century of experience (1997)
    Springer
    Empirical economics 22 (1997), S. 501-514 
    Details
    ISSN: 1435-8921
    Keywords: earnings inequality ; Lorenz curves ; dominance tests ; D31 ; J30
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Recent increases in earnings inequality have been described as “enormous.” Is it that we are experiencing a unique shift toward greater inequality or are we returning to a more normal state of affairs for the American economy? The recent availability of six decades of data together with important new developments in the theory and measurement of inequality invite a renewed look at the changes in earnings inequality over the past half century. Our findings for male earnings suggest a dramatic contraction in inequality after 1939 followed by a steady rise in earnings inequality through 1989. Focusing on per capita incomes as opposed to earnings eliminates much of the trend toward rising inequality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01205776
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Economic efficiency, antitrust and rate-of-return (1990)
    Springer
    Review of industrial organization 5 (1990), S. 59-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7160
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines the economic consequences of using excessive rates-of-return to detect and prosecute cartels. We find that this policy leads to inefficient factor utilization, but always increases output and welfare. The rate-of-return policy may yield greater social gains than a welfare-based antitrust policy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02229751
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs (1988)
    Springer
    Public choice 57 (1988), S. 115-126 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper investigates shifts in cost functions of monopoly and regulated firms operating under conditions of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking behavior. We show that X-inefficiency and rent seeking have significantly different implications for economic welfare. Distinctions are drawn between pecuniary and real X-inefficiency and between sunk and continuing rent-seeking costs. In general, for a given cost shift rent-seeking behavior implies larger social costs than does X-inefficiency theory. However, cost shifts caused by either X-inefficiency or rent seeking are observationally equivalent. This implies empirically measured cost shifts cannot unambiguously be attributed to either cause.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00052400
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Social Structure, Economic Performance and Pareto Optimality (1998)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 45 (1998), S. 161-173 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Equal opportunity ; Income distribution ; Pareto optimality ; Rank dominance ; Welfare
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper shows that, if the performance of the economy is independent of the identities of individuals, then many welfare criteria yield sets of optimal social states that are equal to the Pareto optimal set. This result is proved for income distributions and extended to more general social choice problems. If the independence condition holds, then the set of optimal states is invariant to the adoption of an anonymity axiom, and to the utility information available.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004906307146
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Public utility regulation and bond ratings (1995)
    Springer
    Public choice 84 (1995), S. 119-136 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper investigates the extent to which political factors, which vary across state Public Utility Commissions, affect electric utility bond ratings. The paper focuses on the effects of the commissioner selection method (election or appointment) and other politically determined variables on bond ratings of privately owned and regulated electric utilities. The paper develops a generalization of ordered logit that allows the latent risk measure to have a skewed and thicktailed distribution. The distributional assumption underlying the standard logit model is strongly rejected. Empirically, both political variables and financial variables are determinants of electric utility bond ratings, and election of the PUC has a strong negative effect on bond ratings.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01047804
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    X-efficiency, rent-seeking and social costs: Reply (1991)
    Springer
    Public choice 68 (1991), S. 267-271 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Conclusion Contrary to their claim, Naughton and Frantz fail to disprove the fundamental difference in the social costs of rent-seeking and X-inefficiency identified in our paper. Nor have they shown that our measure of the social costs is incorrect. What they have done is introduce, in an ex post fashion, fixed costs for X-inefficiency. But they fail to provide any explanation of why the inefficiency should take the fixed cost form or why there should be unrecoverable sunk costs. Quite aside from the issue of dissipation, Naughton and Frantz also argue that the level of rent-seeking cost is inherently vague, a contention with which we disagree. Naughton and Frantz's Comment does not argue convincingly against our conclusions and certainly does not demonstrate their claims. In fact, Naughton and Frantz conclude by accepting one of the major results in our article. At the end of their Section 4, they conclude that “part of what passes for X-inefficiency is a transfer.” So long as this is true, then, for a given cost shift, the social costs of X-inefficiency can never exceed the social costs of rent-seeking.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00173833
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Market Power, Efficiency and the Dispersion of Systematic Risk (1999)
    Springer
    Review of industrial organization 14 (1999), S. 377-390 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7160
    Keywords: Market power ; CAPM ; concentration ; efficiency ; entry barriers ; systematic risk
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract A number of studies have used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to integrate product market and financial theories of the firm. We reexamine the relationship between product market structure and systematic risk at the firm and industry level. We show that theory yields no testable implications at the firm level. We show, however, that there is a relationship between the intraindustry dispersion of systematic risk and industry concentration which depends on the causes and consequences of concentration. Estimates of the relationship between the intraindustry variance of β and concentration for a 1987 cross-section of U.S. industries suggest that concentration allows larger firms to exercise market power.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007721630527
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