Publication Date:
2004-10-30
Description:
Coexistence of cooperators and defectors is common in nature, yet the evolutionary origin of such social diversification is unclear. Many models have been studied on the basis of the assumption that benefits of cooperative acts only accrue to others. Here, we analyze the continuous snowdrift game, in which cooperative investments are costly but yield benefits to others as well as to the cooperator. Adaptive dynamics of investment levels often result in evolutionary diversification from initially uniform populations to a stable state in which cooperators making large investments coexist with defectors who invest very little. Thus, when individuals benefit from their own actions, large asymmetries in cooperative investments can evolve.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Notes: 〈/span〉Doebeli, Michael -- Hauert, Christoph -- Killingback, Timothy -- New York, N.Y. -- Science. 2004 Oct 29;306(5697):859-62.〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Author address: 〈/span〉Department of Zoology and Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada. doebeli@zoology.ubc.ca〈br /〉〈span class="detail_caption"〉Record origin:〈/span〉 〈a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15514155" target="_blank"〉PubMed〈/a〉
Keywords:
Altruism
;
*Biological Evolution
;
*Cooperative Behavior
;
Cultural Evolution
;
*Game Theory
;
Humans
;
Mathematics
Print ISSN:
0036-8075
Electronic ISSN:
1095-9203
Topics:
Biology
,
Chemistry and Pharmacology
,
Computer Science
,
Medicine
,
Natural Sciences in General
,
Physics
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