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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Self-insurance and self-protection: A nonexpected utility analysis (1993)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 18 (1993), S. 131-146 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: Self-Insurance ; Self-Protection ; Rank-Dependent Utility ; Limited Liability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper studies the comparative statics of self-insurance and self-protection for individuals with rank-dependent expected utility preferences. In particular, proportional wealth risks, background risk, and limited liability are considered. Limited liability has a major impact on self-insurance and self-protection. It can reverse seemingly robust comparative static results for the case of self-insurance and can eliminate some puzzling ambiguities for the case of self-protection.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01111466
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contest success functions (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 283-290 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: C70 ; D72 ; D74
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled as contests in which participants exert effort to increase their probability of winning a prize. A Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player's probability of winning as a function of all players' efforts. In this paper the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom. Two frequently used functional forms are also axiomatized: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players' efforts and the other in which winning probabilities depend on the difference in efforts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213906
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contest success functions (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 283-290 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C70 ; D72 ; D74.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  Tournaments, conflict, and rent-seeking have been modelled as contests in which participants exert effort to increase their probability of winning a prize. A Contest Success Function (CSF) provides each player’s probability of winning as a function of all players’ efforts. In this paper the additive CSF employed in most contests is axiomatized, with an independence from irrelevant alternatives property as the key axiom. Two frequently used functional forms are also axiomatized: one in which winning probabilities depend on the ratio of players’ efforts and the other in which winning probabilities depend on the difference in efforts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213906
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the formation of alliances in conflict and contests (1998)
    Springer
    Public choice 96 (1998), S. 25-42 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines the problem of the formation of alliances in conflict and, more generally, in contests with three players. Each player possesses an exogenous strategic endowment (e.g., arms, efforts, rent-seeking activity). The outcome of contests, including those between any alliances of players, is governed by a Contest Success Function (CSF). In the three-person/one-cake problem an alliance between two players against the third one will form if and only if the CSF has an increasing returns characteristic. When an alliance forms, there is a tendency to be formed by the weaker players against the strongest player. Similar tendencies exist in other three-person problems that I examine.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004912124496
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  • 5
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    Guns, Butter, and Openness: On the Relationship Between Security and Trade (2001)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2001-05-01
    Print ISSN: 0002-8282
    Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
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