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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Endogenously Asynchronous Entries into an Uncertain Industry (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model and analyze a priori symmetric duopoly where supply quantity adjustment is slow and time-consuming. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a certain time period after at least one firm's entry. We characterize those conditions under which sequential entries can be endogenously chosen either as an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium or as a consequence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Also, in the limit where information revelation is infinitely fast (i.e., the time period it requires becomes infinitesimally short), the expected waiting time until the first entry does not necessarily become proportionately short, whilst the time interval between the leader's entry and the follower's entry does become infinitesimally short. This suggests that chronologically nearly simultaneous entry should not necessarily be interpreted as counterevidence against leader-follower relations. In addition to equilibrium comparative statics, we also analyze some of the welfare issues associated with strategic timing of entry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00435.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategic Choice of Quantity Stickiness and Stackelberg Leadership (2001)
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishers Ltd
    Bulletin of economic research 53 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-8586
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper re-examines endogenous Stackelberg leader–follower relations by modelling an explicitly dynamic market. We analyze a twice-repeated duopoly where, in the beginning, each firm chooses either a quantity-sticky production mode or a quantity-flexible production mode. The size of the market becomes observable after the first period. In the second period, a firm can adjust its quantity if and only if it has adopted the flexible mode. Hence, if one firm chooses the sticky mode whilst the other chooses the flexible mode, then they respectively play the roles of a Stackelberg leader and a Stackelberg follower in the second marketing period. Somewhat intriguing is the finding that such a Stackelberg-like equilibrium can arise only when the relative weight of the pre-Stackelberg first marketing period is sufficiently high, with time preferences being sufficiently strong.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00115
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 173-188 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: penal codes ; security level ; product differentiation ; positivity constraints ; C72 ; D43 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232420
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incentives in private and public good models: An equivalence result (1997)
    Springer
    International advances in economic research 3 (1997), S. 122-122 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-966X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02295006
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The value of information in games (1997)
    Springer
    International advances in economic research 3 (1997), S. 326-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-966X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02294921
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Newtonian auctioneering (1997)
    Springer
    International advances in economic research 3 (1997), S. 424-424 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-966X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02295223
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