ALBERT

Description: This paper describes an approach for creating space transportation architectures that are affordable, productive, and sustainable. The architectural scope includes both flight and ground system elements, and focuses on their compatibility to achieve a technical solution that is operationally productive, and also affordable throughout its life cycle. Previous papers by the authors and other members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) focused on space flight system engineering methods, along with operationally efficient propulsion system concepts and technologies. This paper follows up previous work by using a structured process to derive examples of conceptual architectures that integrate a number of advanced concepts and technologies. The examples are not intended to provide a near-term alternative architecture to displace current near-term design and development activity. Rather, the examples demonstrate an approach that promotes early investments in advanced system concept studies and trades (flight and ground), as well as in advanced technologies with the goal of enabling highly affordable, productive flight and ground space transportation systems.

Description: This paper describes Advanced Space Transportation Concepts and Propulsion Technologies for a New Delivery Paradigm. It builds on the work of the previous paper "Approach to an Affordable and Productive Space Transportation System". The scope includes both flight and ground system elements, and focuses on their compatibility and capability to achieve a technical solution that is operationally productive and also affordable. A clear and revolutionary approach, including advanced propulsion systems (advanced LOX rich booster engine concept having independent LOX and fuel cooling systems, thrust augmentation with LOX rich boost and fuel rich operation at altitude), improved vehicle concepts (autogeneous pressurization, turbo alternator for electric power during ascent, hot gases to purge system and keep moisture out), and ground delivery systems, was examined. Previous papers by the authors and other members of the Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) focused on space flight system engineering methods, along with operationally efficient propulsion system concepts and technologies. This paper continues the previous work by exploring the propulsion technology aspects in more depth and how they may enable the vehicle designs from the previous paper. Subsequent papers will explore the vehicle design, the ground support system, and the operations aspects of the new delivery paradigm in greater detail.

Description: Future space transportation architectures and designs must be affordable. Consequently, their Life Cycle Cost (LCC) must be controlled. For the LCC to be controlled, it is necessary to identify all the requirements and elements of the architecture at the beginning of the concept phase. Controlling LCC requires the establishment of the major operational cost drivers. Two of these major cost drivers are reliability and maintainability, in other words, the system's availability (responsiveness). Potential reasons that may drive the inherent availability requirement are the need to control the number of unique parts and the spare parts required to support the transportation system's operation. For more typical space transportation systems used to place satellites in space, the productivity of the system will drive the launch cost. This system productivity is the resultant output of the system availability. Availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean downtime. Since many operational factors cannot be projected early in the definition phase, the focus will be on inherent availability which is equal to the mean time between a failure (MTBF) divided by the MTBF plus the mean time to repair (MTTR) the system. The MTBF is a function of reliability or the expected frequency of failures. When the system experiences failures the result is added operational flow time, parts consumption, and increased labor with an impact to responsiveness resulting in increased LCC. The other function of availability is the MTTR, or maintainability. In other words, how accessible is the failed hardware that requires replacement and what operational functions are required before and after change-out to make the system operable. This paper will describe how the MTTR can be equated to additional labor, additional operational flow time, and additional structural access capability, all of which drive up the LCC. A methodology will be presented that provides the decision makers with the understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition. This methodology for the major drivers will determine the inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system. This methodology will focus on the achievement of an affordable, responsive space transportation system. It is the intent of this paper to not only provide the visibility of the relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability, but also to provide the capability to bound the variables, thus providing the insight required to control the system's engineering solution. An example of this visibility is the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions to allow control of the total parts count of the space transportation system. Also, selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given inherent availability requirement, or require accepting a larger parts count with the resulting higher individual part reliability requirements. This paper will provide an understanding of the relationship of mean repair time (mean downtime) to maintainability (accessibility for repair), and both mean time between failure (reliability of hardware) and the system inherent availability.

Description: Cost control must be implemented through the establishment of requirements and controlled continually by managing to these requirements. Cost control of the non-recurring side of life cycle cost has traditionally been implemented in both commercial and government programs. The government uses the budget process to implement this control. The commercial approach is to use a similar process of allocating the non-recurring cost to major elements of the program. This type of control generally manages through a work breakdown structure (WBS) by defining the major elements of the program. If the cost control is to be applied across the entire program life cycle cost (LCC), the approach must be addressed very differently. A functional breakdown structure (FBS) is defined and recommended. Use of a FBS provides the visibifity to allow the choice of an integrated solution reducing the cost of providing many different elements of like function. The different functional solutions that drive the hardware logistics, quantity of documentation, operational labor, reliability and maintainability balance, and total integration of the entire system from DDT&E through the life of the program must be fully defined, compared, and final decisions made among these competing solutions. The major drivers of recurring cost have been identified and are presented and discussed. The LCC requirements must be established and flowed down to provide control of LCC. This LCC control will require a structured rigid process similar to the one traditionally used to control weight/performance for space transportation systems throughout the entire program. It has been demonstrated over the last 30 years that without a firm requirement and methodically structured cost control, it is unlikely that affordable and sustainable space transportation system LCC will be achieved.

Description: Programs such as space transportation systems are developed and deployed only rarely, and they have long development schedules and large development and life cycle costs (LCC). They have not historically had their LCC predicted well and have only had an effort to control the DDT&E phase of the programs. One of the factors driving the predictability, and thus control, of the LCC of a program is the maturity of the technologies incorporated in the program. If the technologies incorporated are less mature (as measured by their Technology Readiness Level - TRL), then the LCC not only increases but the degree of increase is difficult to predict. Consequently, new programs avoid incorporating technologies unless they are quite mature, generally TRL greater than or equal to 7 (system prototype demonstrated in a space environment) to allow better predictability of the DDT&E phase costs unless there is no alternative. On the other hand, technology development programs rarely develop technologies beyond TRL 6 (system/subsystem model or prototype demonstrated in a relevant environment). Currently the lack of development funds beyond TRL 6 and the major funding required for full scale development leave little or no funding available to prototype TRL 6 concepts so that hardware would be in the ready mode for safe, reliable and cost effective incorporation. The net effect is that each new program either incorporates little new technology or has longer development schedules and costs, and higher LCC, than planned. This paper presents methods to ensure that advanced technologies are incorporated into future programs while providing a greater accuracy of predicting their LCC. One method is having a dedicated organization to develop X-series vehicles or separate prototypes carried on other vehicles. The question of whether such an organization should be independent of NASA and/or have an independent funding source is discussed. Other methods are also discussed. How to make the choice of which technologies to pursue to the prototype level is also discussed since, to achieve better LCC, first the selection of the appropriate technologies.

Description: Influence diagrams are relatively simple, but powerful, tools for assessing the impact of choices or resource allocations on goals or requirements. They are very general and can be used on a wide range of problems. They can be used for any problem that has defined goals, a set of factors that influence the goals or the other factors, and a set of inputs. Influence diagrams show the relationship among a set of results and the attributes that influence them and the inputs that influence the attributes. If the results are goals or requirements of a program, then the influence diagram can be used to examine how the requirements are affected by changes to technology investment. This paper uses an example to show how to construct and interpret influence diagrams, how to assign weights to the inputs and attributes, how to assign weights to the transfer functions (influences), and how to calculate the resulting influences of the inputs on the results. A study is also presented as an example of how using influence diagrams can help in technology planning and investment. The Space Propulsion Synergy Team (SPST) used this technique to examine the impact of R&D spending on the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a space transportation system. The question addressed was the effect on the recurring and the non-recurring portions of LCC of the proportion of R&D resources spent to impact technology objectives versus the proportion spent to impact operational dependability objectives. The goals, attributes, and the inputs were established. All of the linkages (influences) were determined. The weighting of each of the attributes and each of the linkages was determined. Finally the inputs were varied and the impacts on the LCC determined and are presented. The paper discusses how each of these was accomplished both for credibility and as an example for future studies using influence diagrams for technology planning and investment planning.

Description: All programs have requirements. For these requirements to be met, there must be a means of measurement. A Technical Performance Measure (TPM) is defined to produce a measured quantity that can be compared to the requirement. In practice, the TPM is often expressed as a maximum or minimum and a goal. Example TPMs for a rocket program are: vacuum or sea level specific impulse (lsp), weight, reliability (often expressed as a failure rate), schedule, operability (turn-around time), design and development cost, production cost, and operating cost. Program status is evaluated by comparing the TPMs against specified values of the requirements. During the program many design decisions are made and most of them affect some or all of the TPMs. Often, the same design decision changes some TPMs favorably while affecting other TPMs unfavorably. The problem then becomes how to compare the effects of a design decision on different TPMs. How much failure rate is one second of specific impulse worth? How many days of schedule is one pound of weight worth? In other words, how to compare dissimilar quantities in order to trade and manage the TPMs to meet all requirements. One method that has been used successfully and has a mathematical basis is Utility Analysis. Utility Analysis enables quantitative comparison among dissimilar attributes. It uses a mathematical model that maps decision maker preferences over the tradeable range of each attribute. It is capable of modeling both independent and dependent attributes. Utility Analysis is well supported in the literature on Decision Theory. It has been used at Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne for internal programs and for contracted work such as the J-2X rocket engine program. This paper describes the construction of TPMs and describes Utility Analysis. It then discusses the use of TPMs in design trades and to manage margin during a program using Utility Analysis.

Description: It is essential that management and engineering understand the need for an availability requirement for the customer's space transportation system as it enables the meeting of his needs, goal, and objectives. There are three types of availability, e.g., operational availability, achieved availability, or inherent availability. The basic definition of availability is equal to the mean uptime divided by the sum of the mean uptime plus the mean downtime. The major difference is the inclusiveness of the functions within the mean downtime and the mean uptime. This paper will address tIe inherent availability which only addresses the mean downtime as that mean time to repair or the time to determine the failed article, remove it, install a replacement article and verify the functionality of the repaired system. The definitions of operational availability include the replacement hardware supply or maintenance delays and other non-design factors in the mean downtime. Also with inherent availability the mean uptime will only consider the mean time between failures (other availability definitions consider this as mean time between maintenance - preventive and corrective maintenance) that requires the repair of the system to be functional. It is also essential that management and engineering understand all influencing attributes relationships to each other and to the resultant inherent availability requirement. This visibility will provide the decision makers with the understanding necessary to place constraints on the design definition for the major drivers that will determine the inherent availability, safety, reliability, maintainability, and the life cycle cost of the fielded system provided the customer. This inherent availability requirement may be driven by the need to use a multiple launch approach to placing humans on the moon or the desire to control the number of spare parts required to support long stays in either orbit or on the surface of the moon or mars. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability, but also provide the capability to bound the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution. An example of this visibility will be the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions to allow control of the total parts count of the space transportation system. Also the relationship visibility of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given inherent availability requirement or accepting a larger parts count with the resulting higher reliability requirement. This paper will provide an understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (mean downtime) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and the system inherent availability. Having an understanding of these relationships and resulting requirements before starting the architectural design concept definition will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.

Description: This paper presents a structured approach for achieving a compatible Ground System (GS) and Flight System (FS) architecture that is affordable, productive and sustainable. This paper is an extension of the paper titled "Approach to an Affordable and Productive Space Transportation System" by McCleskey et al. This paper integrates systems engineering concepts and operationally efficient propulsion system concepts into a structured framework for achieving GS and FS compatibility in the mid-term and long-term time frames. It also presents a functional and quantitative relationship for assessing system compatibility called the Architecture Complexity Index (ACI). This paper: (1) focuses on systems engineering fundamentals as it applies to improving GS and FS compatibility; (2) establishes mid-term and long-term spaceport goals; (3) presents an overview of transitioning a spaceport to an airport model; (4) establishes a framework for defining a ground system architecture; (5) presents the ACI concept; (6) demonstrates the approach by presenting a comparison of different GS architectures; and (7) presents a discussion on the benefits of using this approach with a focus on commonality.

Description: It is important that engineering and management accept the need for an availability requirement that is derived with its influencing attributes. It is the intent of this paper to provide the visibility of relationships of these major attribute drivers (variables) to each other and the resultant system inherent availability. Also important to provide bounds of the variables providing engineering the insight required to control the system's engineering solution, e.g., these influencing attributes become design requirements also. These variables will drive the need to provide integration of similar discipline functions or technology selection to allow control of the total parts count. The relationship of selecting a reliability requirement will place a constraint on parts count to achieve a given availability requirement or if allowed to increase the parts count will drive the system reliability requirement higher. They also provide the understanding for the relationship of mean repair time (or mean down time) to maintainability, e.g., accessibility for repair, and both the mean time between failure, e.g., reliability of hardware and availability. The concerns and importance of achieving a strong availability requirement is driven by the need for affordability, the choice of using the two launch solution for the single space application, or the need to control the spare parts count needed to support the long stay in either orbit or on the surface of the moon. Understanding the requirements before starting the architectural design concept will avoid considerable time and money required to iterate the design to meet the redesign and assessment process required to achieve the results required of the customer's space transportation system. In fact the impact to the schedule to being able to deliver the system that meets the customer's needs, goals, and objectives may cause the customer to compromise his desired operational goal and objectives resulting in considerable increased life cycle cost of the fielded space transportation system.