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  • 1
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    Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade (2006)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2006-09-19
    Description: We study a two-country model where two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into a market. The home government may apply an import tariff, an administrative delay, or both to the product of the foreign firm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the product can actually be sold. Our main interest is the differential effect of the tariff and the administrative delay on the timing of new product introductions and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We show that administrative delays are less efficient instruments for maximizing home welfare than tariffs. With a tariff, the home government can affect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic firm moves first at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariff revenues. As a result, if the tariff may be set optimally, administrative delays are not used in a discriminatory manner. If trade liberalization constrains the import tariff to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariff, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
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  • 2
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    Regulatory reform in the Spanish electricity industry: a missed opportunity for competition (1999)
    Elsevier
    Details
    Publication Date: 1999-07-01
    Print ISSN: 0301-4215
    Electronic ISSN: 1873-6777
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Political Science
    Published by Elsevier
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managed Trade, Trade Liberalisation and Local Pollution (2004)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Advances in economic analysis & policy 4.2004, 2, art5 
    Details
    ISSN: 1538-0637
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The current paper addresses the relationship between trade and endogenous pollution levels, with a focus different from the previous literature. The mechanism linking pollution and trade here is that trade policy provides the home government with a credible threat that helps motivate domestic firms to adopt cleaner technologies. This credible threat comes from the fact that the government has a greater incentive to protect a clean industry than to protect a very polluting one. In that sense, the existence of trade helps reduce domestic pollution compared to what would prevail in a situation of autarky. On the other hand, a commitment to free trade would be counterproductive: it removes the government's ability to credibly threaten lower levels of protection. In fact we show that any trade liberalization hurts the welfare of the home country. In terms of world welfare, moderate trade liberalization is helpful, but only as long as it does not affect the technology choices of the firms. Because committing to lower 'bounded' tariffs limits a government's ability to enforce strict environmental standards, a country that has agreed to tighter tariff limits under the World Trade Organization would, other things equal, be a more likely "pollution haven" than a country with weaker WTO commitments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art5
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Administrative Delays as Barriers to Trade (2006)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Contributions to economic analysis & policy 5.2006, 1, art27 
    Details
    ISSN: 1538-0645
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We study a two-country model where two firms, one domestic and the other foreign, must decide when to introduce their new product into a market. The home government may apply an import tariff, an administrative delay, or both to the product of the foreign firm. An administrative delay imposes a waiting period between the time when the quality of the foreign product is determined and the time when the product can actually be sold. Our main interest is the differential effect of the tariff and the administrative delay on the timing of new product introductions and the resulting change in home, foreign and world welfare. We show that administrative delays are less efficient instruments for maximizing home welfare than tariffs. With a tariff, the home government can affect the timing of entry to ensure that the domestic firm moves first at the socially optimal date. Although an optimally chosen delay can achieve the same pattern of introduction, it does not yield any tariff revenues. As a result, if the tariff may be set optimally, administrative delays are not used in a discriminatory manner. If trade liberalization constrains the import tariff to be below its domestically optimal level, discriminatory administrative delays may become part of the optimal policy of the home country. As the optimal delay policy leads to lower levels of world welfare than the optimal tariff, trade liberalization can be welfare decreasing.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss1/art27
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate (1994)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 3 (1994), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by “other working conditions,” e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1994.00325.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Project evaluation and organizational form (2000)
    Springer
    Review of economic design 5 (2000), S. 177-199 
    Details
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification: D23, D83, L22 ; Key words: Organisations, screening, information aggregation, hierarchies, polyarchies
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. In situations of imperfect testing and communication, as suggested by Sah and Stiglitz (AER, 1986), organizational forms can be identified with different rules of aggregating evaluations of individual screening units. In this paper, we discuss the relative merits of polyarchical organizations versus hierarchical organizations in evaluating cost-reducing R&D projects when individual units' decision thresholds are fully endogenous. Contrary to the results of Sah and Stiglitz, we find that the relative merit of an organizational form depends on the curvature of the screening functions of the individual evaluation units. We find that for certain parameters organizations would want to implement asymmetric decision rules across screening units. This allows us to derive sufficient conditions for a polyarchy to dominate a hierarchy. We also find conditions for which the cost curves associated with the two organizational forms cross each other. In this case the optimal organizational form will depend on product market conditions and on the “lumpiness” of cost-reducing R&D.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580000017
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