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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A REVIEW OF GHEMAWAT'S COMMITMENT: THE DYNAMIC OF STRATEGY (1992)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 1 (1992), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy, by Pankaj Ghemawat.Ghemawat's Commitment makes recent results in game-theoretic industrial organization accessible and useful to practitioners in the field of strategic management. This book contributes to the management strategy literature on two levels. On a conceptual level, Ghemawat strives to isolate “commitment” as the sole explanation of persistent differences in firm performance. On a more pragmatic level, he provides a framework intended to aid managers in making commitment-intensive decisions. It is with respect to how well he achieves these two distinct goals that I evaluate Ghemawat's contribution. In addition, I review briefly the book's content, and I compare Ghemawat's approach to some alternative approaches familiar to scholars and practitioners of strategic management.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00575.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Sunk costs, contestability and airline monopoly power (1995)
    Springer
    Review of industrial organization 10 (1995), S. 289-306 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7160
    Keywords: Airlines ; monopoly ; sunk-costs ; contestability ; limit pricing
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines the effects of sunk costs and potential competition on pricing behavior in monopoly airline markets. We find little evidence to support the proposition from contestable markets theory that the level of sunk costs influences pricing by monopolists. Rather, the results support the view, consistent with numerous game theoretic oligopoly models, that the costs and the price-cutting reputation of potential entrants influence incumbent behavior. These results suggest that contestability theory may not be robust. Even in the markets characterized by increasing returns to scale, the perfectly contestable market may not be a useful welfare standard.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01027076
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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