ALBERT

Description: The launching by the Soviet Union of the Sputnik satellite in 19457 was an impetuous to the United States. The Intercontinental ballistic Missile (ICBM) that launched the Earth's first satellite, could have been armed with a nuclear warhead, that could destroy an American city. The primary intelligence requirement that the US had was to determine the actual size of the Soviet missile program. To this end, a covert, high-risk photoreconnaissance satellite was developed. The code name of this program was "Corona." This article describes the trials and eventual successes of the Corona program.

Description: In terms of technology, the X-43A/Hyper-X represented a singular milestone. After nearly a half century of high hopes, studies, wind tunnel tests, proposals, and canceled projects, a scramjet-powered vehicle had flown. The performance of the engine qualified the scramjet design tools and scaling laws. In turn, the theoretical calculations and ground testing could be used to design more advanced engine concepts. Just as important, both the scramjet and vehicle systems had successfully operated in the variable temperatures and densities of the atmosphere. The X-43A systems were able to maintain the exact flight conditions necessary for the scramjet to operate properly. Control deflections to correct the engine-induced moments were close to pre-flight predictions. When the unexpected occurred, such as when the vehicle pitched up during the cowl opening on the second flight, the control system was sufficiently designed to correct the situation. The airframe and wing structure, the thermal protection material, and the internal conditions of the X-43A performed largely as predicted. The HXLV thermal anomaly during the ascent on the third flight and "the Mach 8 unpleasantness" during the descent indicated that the HXLV and X-43A were not as resilient to aerodynamic heating as expected. The X-43A 's airframe drag and lift both were slightly higher than predicted, but still within preflight uncertainty predictions. The stability and control were as predicted, as was the boundary layer transition. The biggest aerodynamic worry before the flight was the separation of the HXLV and the X- 43A. After all was said and done, this went exactly as predicted, proving that non-symmetrical/high-dynamic pressure stage separations could be performed. This in turn meant that two-stage-to-orbit vehicles employing this technology were feasible. The Hyper-X program also served as a training ground for a new generation of scramjet and hypersonic researchers. This included both NASA and contractor personnel, providing them with experience in ground testing and component development; vehicle design, construction, integration, system checkout, and, ultimately, flight testing and data analysis. Additionally, researchers learned the practical details of running a project within finite budget and time limits, about the ambiguousness of risk assessment, and about the need to spend a significant amount of time and effort dealing with engineering problems, such as those with the FAS, that have nothing to do with the project's research goals. Finally, all those who worked on the X-43A project now know what it is like to spend years transforming an idea into a functional vehicle, only for it to be lost in a matter of seconds. And then to go through years of work to correct the problems, to face the possibility that still more might exist, and finally to savor the triumph of two successful flights. For those who will work on the hypersonic projects that emerge in coming years, these experiences may prove to be the most valuable of all.

Description: The NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, in partnership with the NASA Langley Research Center and industrial contractors, conducted the first flight tests of a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) in 2004. This was a revolutionary airbreathing engine able to operate at speeds above Mach 5, which carries potential for both high-speed atmospheric flight and as a space launcher. For the Dryden engineers, the X-43 program was the culmination of a nearly 60-year history of flight research, going back to the early days of supersonic flight, and to rocket planes such as the X-1, D-558-II Skyrocket, and the X-15. For the propulsion community, it marked a turning point in a quest that had taken nearly as long. The scramjet engine did not arise from the work of a single individual or from a single technological breakthrough. It evolved instead from work under way on ramjets in the early 1950s, and from research programs at the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) Lewis Research Center, at the U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground, and by the U.S. Navy. Studies developed in the course of these disparate projects raised the possibility of supersonic combustion. Many researchers had considered the notion impractical due to the difficulty of stabilizing a flame front in a supersonic airflow. NACA researchers at Lewis attempted to test the idea's feasibility by burning aluminum borohydride in a supersonic wind tunnel. Sustained burning was believed to have been observed at Mach 1.5, Mach 2, and Mach 3 for as long as two seconds.

Description: During an aerospace engineer's undergraduate studies, he or she will attend classes in aerodynamics, thermodynamics, structures, stability and control, dynamics, design, propulsion, and computer science, along with the related courses in mathematics, physics, statistics, and chemistry required to understand the material. Upon graduation, the new engineer will have acquired a basic knowledge of how to build an aerospace vehicle. What only comes through experience, however, is the understanding of the inevitable imperfect process through which an aerospace vehicle is built. This is the adventure of turning a basic concept into functional hardware. Engineers working on a project must often deal with ambiguous situations. They are routinely asked by management to provide risk assessments of a project, yet even after careful analysis uncertainties remain. The project must be accomplished within finite limits of time and money. The question an engineer answers is whether the solution to potential problem is worth the cost and schedule delay, or if the solution might actually be worse than the problem it is meant to solve. Review protocols are established to ensure that an unknown has not been overlooked. But these cannot protect against an unknown unknown. Examples of these situations can be found in the history of the X-43A Hyper-X (Hypersonic Experiment) program. In this NASA project, a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engine was flight tested on a subscale vehicle. The X-43A Hyper-X Research Vehicle (HXRV) was launched from a B-52B mothership, then boosted to the test speed by a modified Pegasus rocket first stage, called the Hyper-X Launch Vehicle (HXLV). Once at the proper speed and altitude, the X-43A separated from the booster, stabilized itself, and then the engine test began. Although wind-tunnel scramjet engine tests had begun in the late 1950s, before the Hyper-X program there had never been an actual in-flight test of such an engine integrated with an appropriate airframe. Thus, while the scramjet had successfully operated in the artificial airflow of wind tunnels, the concept had yet to be proven in real air. These conditions meant changes in density and temperature, as well as changes in angle of attack and sideslip of a free-flying vehicle. A wind tunnel is limited in its ability to simulate these subtle factures, which have a major impact on almost any vehicle, but especially that of a scramjet's performance. The Hyper-X project was to provide a real-world benchmark of the ground test data. The full scale X-43A engine would be operated in the wind tunnel, and then flown, and the data from its operation would then be compared with projections. If these matched, the wind tunnel data would be considered a reliable design tool for future scramjet. If there were significant differences, the reasons for these would have to be identified. Until such information was available, scramjets would lack the technological maturity to be considered for future space launch or high-speed atmospheric flight vehicles.

Description: This presentation and companion text describe the history of the development of Reaction Control Systems.

Description: This presentation and companion text describe the history of the development of Reaction Control Systems.

Description: In his remarkable memoir Runway to Orbit, Dr. Kenneth W. Iliff - the recently retired Chief Scientist of the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center- tells a highly personal, yet a highly persuasive account of the last forty years of American aeronautical research. His interpretation of events commands respect, because over these years he has played pivotal roles in many of the most important American aeronautics and spaceflight endeavors. Moreover, his narrative covers much of the second half of the first 100 years of flight, a centennial anniversary being celebrated this year. aerospace knowledge. He arrived at the then NASA Flight Research Center in 1962 as a young aeronautical engineer and quickly became involved in two of the seminal projects of modern flight, the X-15 and the lifting bodies. In the process, he pioneered (with Lawrence Taylor) the application of digital computing to the reduction of flight data, arriving at a method known as parameter estimation, now applied the world over. Parameter estimation not only enabled researchers to acquire stability and control derivatives from limited flight data, but in time allowed them to obtain a wide range of aerodynamic effects. Although subsequently involved in dozens of important projects, Dr. Iliff devoted much of his time and energy to hypersonic flight, embodied in the Shuttle orbiter (or as he refers to it, the world s fastest airplane). To him, each Shuttle flight, instrumented to obtain a variety of data, represents a research treasure trove, one that he has mined for years. This book, then, represents the story of Dr. Ken Iliff s passion for flight, his work, and his long and astoundingly productive career. It can be read with profit not just by scientists and engineers, but equally by policy makers, historians, and journalists wishing to better comprehend advancements in flight during the second half of the twentieth century. Dr. Iliff's story is one of immense contributions to the nation s repository of

Description: Following the loss of the first X-43 during launch, the mishap investigation board indicated the Fin Actuator System (FAS) needed to have a larger torque margin. To supply this added torque, a second actuator was added. The consequences of what seemed to be a simple modification would trouble the X-43 program. Because of the second actuator, a new computer board was required. This proved to be subject to electronic noise. This resulted in the actuator latch up in ground tests of the FAS for the second launch. Such a latch up would cause the Pegasus booster to fail, as the FAS was a single string system. The problem was corrected and the second flight was successful. The same modifications were added to the FAS for flight three. When the FAS underwent ground tests, it also latched up. The failure indicated that each computer board had a different tolerance to electronic noise. The problem with the FAS was corrected. Subsequently, another failure occurred, raising questions about the design, and the probability of failure for the X-43 Mach 10 flight. This was not simply a technical issue, but illuminated the difficulties facing both managers and engineers in assessing risk, design requirements, and probabilities in cutting edge aerospace projects.

Description: This NASA SP will discuss the discovery of airflow compressibility and the early X-planes used to explore the phenomena, as well as other discoveries that paved the way for modern aircraft design.

Description: The Hyper-X project (X-43A) provides a number of "lessons learned" which can be applied to other aerospace project. The specific areas examined were the selection of the goals of the Hyper-X. How the technical unknowns and assumptions were handled. The final lesson was the ambiguous nature of risk assessment, and how trying to remove a technical unknown can have unintended consequences.