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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 291-306 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213907
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 291-306 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213907
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on the characterizations of the compromise value (1996)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 25 (1996), S. 427-435 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) the compromise value is introduced as a solution concept on the class of compromise admissible NTU-games. Two characterizations of the compromise value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games. This note shows that in one of these characterizations the axioms are dependent. As a result of this observation a new characterization of the compromise value is provided. Moreover, it turns out that with a small weakening of the symmetry property the axioms in the original characterization become independent. Further, it is shown that these characterizations can be extended to a larger class of NTU-games. Finally, all monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covariant values on this class of NTU-games are described.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01803949
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 37-47 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Key words: NTU-games ; marginal vectors ; MC-value
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract. The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01243193
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 37-47 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: NTU-games ; marginal vectors ; MC-value
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermore, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games which need not be convex valued. This allows for a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01243193
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method (1993)
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 38 (1993), S. 175-185 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In the 1930's the Tennessee Valley Authority developed several methods to allocate the costs of multipurpose water projects. One of these methods is the alternate cost avoided method. This paper provides two characterizations of the alternate cost avoided method, one on a class of cost games with a fixed player set, the other on a class of cost games with a variable player set using a reduced game property.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01414213
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  • 7
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    Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method (1993)
    Springer
    Details
    Publication Date: 1993-06-01
    Print ISSN: 1432-2994
    Electronic ISSN: 1432-5217
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Published by Springer
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