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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rent Division, Restructuring, and Managerial Risk Taking: A Strategic Bargaining Model (1993)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 2 (1993), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper demonstrates that, when the manager of a poorly performing firm generates firm-specific rents, strategic considerations associated with anticipated future restructuring may lead to the adoption of risky operating policies. Furthermore, this bias toward risky policies may be exacerbated by increases in managerial entrenchment. This is the case even when the manager does not have an ownership stake in the firm. On the other hand, a manager of a firm that is performing well will prefer safer policies. These results are driven by endogenously determined management-borne costs of financial distress, and obtain under both restructuring regimes that enforce the priority of creditor claims as well as restructuring regimes that induce deviations from absolute priority.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00245.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    TAKEOVERS OF DIFFUSELY HELD FIRMS: A NONSTANDARD APPROACH (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Mathematical finance 5 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-9965
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: A common theme in the literature on corporate control is that, when share ownership is diffuse, the free-rider problem prevents raiders from making acquisitions at tender prices below the postacquisition share price. In this paper, we address this question by formulating a nonstandard model of takeovers of diffusely held firms. It is demonstrated that, even when individual shareholdings are infinitesimal relative to firm size, takeovers succeed with positive probability and equilibria exist in which the raider earns substantial per share profits. Further, the Nash equilibria of the game are characterized with regard to raider profit, the aggregate fraction of shares tendered, and the relation between raider profit and the degree of randomization exhibited by shareholder tendering strategies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9965.1995.tb00067.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Impact of Dual-Class Creation on Shareholder Wealth (1993)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Corporate governance 1 (1993), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1467-8683
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Political Science , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1993.tb00027.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dilution costs, underinvestment, and utility regulation under asymmetric information (1995)
    Springer
    Journal of regulatory economics 7 (1995), S. 177-197 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0468
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article addresses the problem faced by a regulated natural monopolist who must raise outside funds to finance socially desirable projects. We demonstrate that “fair rate of return” utility price regulation will lead to underinvestment incentives in the presence of asymmetric information between the firm and the capital markets regarding the firm's assets and future costs. This problem is especially severe when financing choice is restricted to equity. Underinvestment can be either completely eliminated by adjusting the allowed rate of return above the fair rate or reduced by switching to debt finance.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01062690
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  • 5
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    Dilution Costs, Underinvestment and Utility Regulation under Asymmetric Information (1995)
    Norwell, Mass. : Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)
    Journal of regulatory economics. 7:2 (1995:Mar.) 177-197 
    Details
    ISSN: 0922-680X
    Topics: Economics
    URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:h431-1995-007-02-000005
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management (1995)
    Springer
    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 315-335 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01215206
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rationalizable and Coalition Proof Shareholder Tendering Strategies in Corporate Takeovers (1998)
    Springer
    Review of quantitative finance and accounting 11 (1998), S. 269-291 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7179
    Keywords: coalition proof ; takeovers ; free-rider problem
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper determines the set of rational responses by shareholders to unconditional takeover offers at prices between the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition price of the firm. Two cases are considered. In the first case, coordination across shareholders is not presumed. In this case, the game is analyzed using the Rationalizability criteria (Bernheim, 1984). It is demonstrated that the Rationalizable strategy vectors include all pure strategy vectors. In the second case, the set of strategies consistent with coordination through preplay communication, the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) are analyzed. It is shown that, given even a minimal degree of divisibility of shareholdings, the raider's per share profit is bounded from below by a positive constant independent of the number of shareholders. These results imply that preplay coordination between shareholders eliminates the “free-rider” problem.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008333916568
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