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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and program profile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of program profile and time schedule, as perceived by the viewers, determines the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, we find that there is a first-mover disadvantage in a sequential game where one channel sets its two choice variables before its rival does, and a first-mover advantage in a semise-quential game where the channels set time schedules sequentially and thereafter set program profiles simultaneously. The results are applied to the Norwegian and Danish markets for TV news, where number-two channels have challenged the incumbents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00209.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Erratum: “Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark” (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00161.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Media Competition on the Internet (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Topics in economic analysis & policy 4.2005, 1, art32 
    Details
    ISSN: 1538-0653
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We present a model of competition between two advertising-financed media firms when consumers dislike advertising. We apply the model to analyze competition between Internet portals and find that equilibrium prices of advertising are higher the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Moreover, we find that the portals' aggregate profit increases if they integrate vertically with advertisers. This is true even if there is perfect competition between advertisers for advertising space. But if the portals are close substitutes, then it is profitable for one of the portals not to combine with an advertiser, and we end up with an asymmetric equilibrium with only one vertical merger - despite aggregate profits being higher with two.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/art32
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Insurance monopoly and renegotiation (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 341-354 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Number: D42.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. The mechanism design problem of a monopoly insurer — faced with privately informed insurees — is considered. It is assumed that the insurer cannot commit not to renegotiate (by using the information that customer separa-tion reveals) before contracts are put into force. A solution is offered by modeling renegotiation-proofness in a framework inspired by Greenberg’s theory of social situations. Maximizing profit within the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes always leads to a semi-separating outcome (i.e. neither full pooling nor full separation can occur) and may leave all low-risks as well as some of the high-risks self-insured.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213805
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Insurance monopoly and renegotiation (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 9 (1997), S. 341-354 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: D42
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary The mechanism design problem of a monopoly insurer — faced with privately informed insurees — is considered. It is assumed that the insurer cannot commit not to renegotiate (by using the information that customer separation reveals) before contracts are put into force. A solution is offered by modeling renegotiation-proofness in a framework inspired by Greenberg's theory of social situations. Maximizing profit within the set of renegotiation-proof outcomes always leads to a semi-separating outcome (i.e. neither full pooling nor full separation can occur) and may leave all low-risks as well as some of the high-risks self-insured.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213805
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 6
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    Media Competition on the Internet (2005)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2005-01-05
    Description: We present a model of competition between two advertising-financed media firms when consumers dislike advertising. We apply the model to analyze competition between Internet portals and find that equilibrium prices of advertising are higher the less differentiated the portals are perceived to be. Moreover, we find that the portals' aggregate profit increases if they integrate vertically with advertisers. This is true even if there is perfect competition between advertisers for advertising space. But if the portals are close substitutes, then it is profitable for one of the portals not to combine with an advertiser, and we end up with an asymmetric equilibrium with only one vertical merger - despite aggregate profits being higher with two.
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
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