ALBERT

Notes: . The proposition that a decentralized structure of local governments can effectively constrain public sector growth is empirically investigated. Data on Swedish municipal sector size for the 1942–87 period are analyzed within the context of a median voter model. The results indicate that decentralization, measured by the number of units of local government serving a given population, constrains the influence of institutional factors (e.g., rent seeking, bureaucracy) on local budgets as long as these units exceed some minimal threshold size. The findings support the view that communities should be given the flexibility to determine their own ideal pattern of local governments.

Notes: A model of private local labor demand and interjurisdictional migration is presented and estimated using data from Swedish counties and municipalities for 1979-84. Our goal is to compare the effects on local labor markets of distinctive public-sector programs with those of traditional market variables. We find that local income taxes and tax-equalization grants have important effects on local labor markets; regional development policy measures and geographical-mobility subsidies do not. Thus, recent efforts scaling back some of these programs may not materially alter the regional economy's performance. Wages and other traditional market variables are also often found to influence significantly local labor markets.

Notes: The econometric evidence that has been brought to bear on the question of how state and local taxes affect the location decision of firms among competing states or regions is surprisingly sparse and often contradictory. In this research the question is addressed from a different empirical perspective than has been considered heretofore. Using a pool of cross-section and time-series data, the trends in employment and capital formation in three energy-rich states are analyzed during a period when these states substituted energy-related revenues for more traditional forms of taxation. McLure's general equilibrium model of regional taxation and industrial location forms the theoretical basis for the empirical analysis. The findings suggest that relative changes in state and local taxes on products and labor are of more significance as a location determinant than relative changes in the state corporate income tax.

Notes: In this paper the excise tax policy of U.S. state governments is analyzed with special attention to how this policy is influenced by the level of excise taxation in neighboring states, “border-tax effects,” and the relative size of the market located across state boundaries. Using a panel data set, state policies towards the taxation of cigarettes, all alcoholic beverages, beer, distilled liquor, motor fuel, and insurance are investigated within the context of a vote-maximizing model of collective decision making. The role of the industry in that state whose goods and services are singled out for special taxation is also examined.

Notes: Summary and conclusions This paper has investigated the ability of an extreme and relatively simple model of political behavior to explain the level of revenues generated by state and local governments. In general, the behavior of these governments appears to be at least consistent with many of the fiscal outcomes predicted by the Leviathan theory. Several, although not all, of the specific Leviathan theory hypotheses considered received empirical support. The evidence was consistent with the hypothesis that states utilizing comprehensive tax bases, especially a personal income tax, can be expected to generate higher levels of aggregate revenues. Strong support was also observed for the contention that intergovernmental competition by general-purpose substate governments may serve as a substitute for constitutional constraints in limiting the revenue generating power of local governments. Despite the consistency of the results with the Leviathan theory, caution must be exercised in reaching the conclusion that states are generating a surplus of funds for the discretionary use of governmental decision makers — a fundamental proposition of this theory. Conclusive evidence would require that the demand for locally financed publicly provided goods and services be estimated and compared with the level of revenues actually generated. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, it is also conceivable that the causality between comprehensive tax bases and the level of revenues generated by the states could be reversed from the direction considered in this paper. That is, it may be rational behavior on the part of states with greater levels of spending for whatever reason, to finance these expenditures with a broader tax base. Perhaps the significance of the Leviathan theory, and the results of this research which support aspects of that theory, are best viewed as part of the ongoing research in the development of a positive theory of public sector tax structure. The Leviathan theory contributes a new and important dimension to our understanding of government behavior. Other recent researchers in the area of tax structure theory, by focusing on the demand side, have formulated their theory solely in terms of voting rules and arrangements. See, for example, Sjoquist (1980) and Hettich and Winer (1984). Integration of the Leviathan theory with the more traditional public-choice theory remains an area for future research.

Notes: Abstract Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.

Notes: Abstract Federal income tax inforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper we apply the Weingast/Moran model to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, we model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. We find that the interstate differences in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS.

Notes: Conclusion Researchers have typically ignored the determinants of the tax structure of the public sector. Political scientists have concentrated their analyses on the expenditure side of the public ledgers while economists have avoided the issue by assuming that taxes are exogenously determined. In this paper we have shown that a behavioral model of political interest groups can be employed to gain insights into the political selection of taxes. The theory provides a general complement to the well-documented analysis of special interest demand for public expenditures. Our analysis raises several important policy questions. First, is the influence of interest groups on the determination of tax systems desirable from a public policy perspective? For example, special interest groups dominated by high and middle income individuals may prefer regressive tax systems which reduce their own tax burden. Certainly the impact of interest groups on the well-known regressivity of state and local tax systems is an area worthy of additional investigation. Second, does the influence of interest groups lead to tax systems that unduly hamper economic efficiency and retard economic growth? For example, governments with economies dominated by a single industry may forsake diversity and economic development by selecting a tax system favorable to the major industry. Interest group demand for taxes may be a factor in explaining long run regional cycles such as the rise and fall of heavy manufacturing states such as the upper midwest. This research has established that a link exists between special interest group demand for taxation and the structure of local tax systems. However, the extent to which these groups influence tax systems and the exact nature of this influence requires further research. Additional research may also provide insights into the control (e.g., constitutional or legislative) of interest group influence on taxes should it be determined that such control is necessary.