ALBERT

Description: Sensors, Vol. 18, Pages 2490: Adaptive and Economically-Robust Group Selling of Spectrum Slots for Cognitive Radio-Based Networks Sensors doi: 10.3390/s18082490 Authors: Maqbool Ahmad Muhammad Shafiq Azeem Irshad Muhammad Khalil Afzal Dae Wan Kim Jin-Ghoo Choi Auction theory has found vital application in cognitive radio to relieve spectrum scarcity by redistributing idle channels to those who value them most. However, countries have been slow to introduce spectrum auctions in the secondary market. This could be in part because a number of substantial conflicts could emerge for leasing the spectrum at the micro level. These representative conflicts include the lack of legislation, interference management, setting a reasonable price, etc. In addition, the heterogeneous nature of the spectrum precludes the true evaluation of non-identical channels. The information abstracted from the initial activity in terms of price paid for specific channels may not be a useful indicator for the valuation of another channel. Therefore, auction mechanisms to efficiently redistribute idle channels in the secondary market are of vital interest. In this paper, we first investigate such leading conflicts and then propose a novel Adaptive and Economically-Robust spectrum slot Group-selling scheme (AERG), for cognitive radio-based networks such as IoT, 5G and LTE-Advanced. This scheme enables group-selling behavior among the primary users to collectively sell their uplink slots that are individually not attractive to the buyers due to the auction overhead. AERG is based on two single-round sealed-bid reverse-auction mechanisms accomplished in three phases. In the first phase, participants adapt asks and bids to fairly evaluate uplink slots considering the dynamics of spectrum trading such as space and time. In the second phase, an inner-auction in each primary network is conducted to collect asks on group slots, and then, an outer-auction is held between primary and secondary networks. In the third phase, the winning primary network declares the winners of the inner-auction that can evenly share the revenue of the slots. Simulation results and logical proofs verify that AERG satisfies economic properties such as budget balance, truthfulness and individual rationality and improves the utilities of the participants.