ALBERT

Description: Competition for water between key economic sectors and the environment means agreeing allocations is challenging. Managing releases from the three major dams in Kenya's Tana River basin with its 4.4 million inhabitants, 567 MW of installed hydropower capacity, 33 000 ha of irrigation and ecologically important wetlands and forests is a pertinent example. This research seeks firstly to identify and help decision-makers visualise reservoir management strategies which result in the best possible (Pareto-optimal) allocation of benefits between sectors. Secondly, it seeks to show how trade-offs between achievable benefits shift with the implementation of proposed new rice, cotton and biofuel irrigation projects. To approximate the Pareto-optimal trade-offs we link a water resources management simulation model to a multi-criteria search algorithm. The decisions or "levers" of the management problem are volume-dependent release rules for the three major dams and extent of investment in new irrigation schemes. These decisions are optimised for eight objectives covering the provision of water supply and irrigation, energy generation and maintenance of ecosystem services. Trade-off plots allow decision-makers to assess multi-reservoir rule-sets and irrigation investment options by visualising their impacts on different beneficiaries. Results quantify how economic gains from proposed irrigation schemes trade-off against the disturbance of ecosystems and local livelihoods that depend on them. Full implementation of the proposed schemes is shown to come at a high environmental and social cost. The clarity and comprehensiveness of "best-case" trade-off analysis is a useful vantage point from which to tackle the interdependence and complexity of "water-energy-food nexus" resource security issues.

Description: Competition for water between key economic sectors and the environment means agreeing on allocation is challenging. Managing releases from the three major dams in Kenya's Tana River basin with its 4.4 million inhabitants, 567 MW of installed hydropower capacity, 33 000 ha of irrigation and ecologically important wetlands and forests is a pertinent example. This research seeks to identify and help decision-makers visualise reservoir management strategies which result in the best possible (Pareto-optimal) allocation of benefits between sectors. Secondly we seek to show how trade-offs between achievable benefits shift with the implementation of new proposed rice, cotton and biofuel irrigation projects. To identify the Pareto-optimal trade-offs we link a water resources management model to a multi-criteria search algorithm. The decisions or "levers" of the management problem are volume dependent release rules for the three major dams and extent of investment in new irrigation schemes. These decisions are optimised for objectives covering provision of water supply and irrigation, energy generation and maintenance of ecosystem services which underpin tourism and local livelihoods. Visual analytic plots allow decision makers to assess multi-reservoir rule-sets by understanding their impacts on different beneficiaries. Results quantify how economic gains from proposed irrigation schemes trade-off against disturbance of the flow regime which supports ecosystem services. Full implementation of the proposed schemes is shown to be Pareto-optimal, but at high environmental and social cost. The clarity and comprehensiveness of "best-case" trade-off analysis is a useful vantage point from which to tackle the interdependence and complexity of water-energy-food "nexus" challenges.

Description: To enable economically efficient future adaptation to water scarcity some countries are revising water management institutions such as water rights or licensing systems to more effectively protect ecosystems and their services. However, allocating more flow to the environment can mean less abstraction for economic production, or the inability to accommodate new entrants (diverters). Modern licensing arrangements should simultaneously enhance environmental flows and protect water abstractors who depend on water. Making new licensing regimes compatible with tradable water rights is an important component of water allocation reform. Regulated water markets can help decrease the societal cost of water scarcity whilst enforcing environmental and/or social protections. In this article we simulate water markets under a regime of fixed volumetric water abstraction licenses with fixed minimum flows or under a scalable water license regime (using water "shares") with dynamic environmental minimum flows. Shares allow adapting allocations to available water and dynamic environmental minimum flows vary as a function of ecological requirements. We investigate how a short-term spot market manifests within each licensing regime. We use a river-basin-scale hydroeconomic agent model that represents individual abstractors and can simulate a spot market under both licensing regimes. We apply this model to the Great Ouse River basin in eastern England with public water supply, agricultural, energy and industrial water-using agents. Results show the proposed shares with dynamic environmental flow licensing system protects river flows more effectively than the current static minimum flow requirements during a dry historical year, but that the total opportunity cost to water abstractors of the environmental gains is a 10–15% loss in economic benefits.

Description: To enable economically efficient future adaptation to water scarcity some countries are revising water management institutions such as water rights or licensing systems to more effectively protect ecosystems and their services. Allocating more flow to the environment though can mean less abstraction for economic production, or the inability to accommodate new entrants (diverters). Modern licensing arrangements should simultaneously enhance environmental flows and protect water abstractors who depend on water. Making new licensing regimes compatible with tradable water rights is an important component of water allocation reform. Regulated water markets can help decrease the societal cost of water scarcity whilst enforcing environmental and/or social protections. In this article we simulate water markets under a regime of fixed volumetric water abstraction licenses with fixed minimum flows or under a scalable water license regime (using water "shares") with dynamic environmental minimum flows. Shares allow adapting allocations to available water and dynamic environmental minimum flows can vary as a function of ecological requirements. We investigate how a short-term spot market manifests within each licensing regime. We use a river-basin-scale hydro-economic agent model that represents individual abstractors and can simulate a spot market under both licensing regimes. We apply this model to the Great Ouse river basin in Eastern England with public water supply, agricultural, energy and industrial water using agents. Results show the proposed shares with dynamic environmental flow licensing system protects river flows more effectively than the current static minimum flow requirements during a dry historical year, but that the total opportunity cost to water abstractors of the environmental gains is a 10 to 15% loss in economic benefits.