Electronic Resource
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA
:
Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Pacific economic review
5 (2000), S. 0
ISSN:
1468-0106
Source:
Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Home and foreign duopolists collude in the absence of an antidumping (AD) law because competition law makes renegotiation of collusion more costly than imposition of punishment for defection. Introduction of an AD law with a weak injury standard can undermine collusion by providing a low-cost mechanism for renegotiation. This induces dumping by the foreign firm and defection by the home firm. An AD law can be procompetitive, in contrast to recent literature suggesting that an AD law can facilitate collusion. The law is asymmetric, providing a greater incentive for home-firm than foreign-firm deviation.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.00086
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