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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Environmental management 6 (1982), S. 527-533 
    ISSN: 1432-1009
    Keywords: Regional institutions ; Resource management ; Participation ; Political ; Rational ; Decison rule ; Consensus
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
    Notes: Abstract Evaluators frequently cite the absence of effective participation by constituent governments and the need for consensus or even unanimity prior to action as the causes of poor performance by regional resource management institutions. Major governments either will not join the regional institution, will not participate even if legally members, or will exercise a veto over many important management projects. This paper examines the variables that may cause these problems and provides an improved understanding of why rational political actors would act in ways that inhibit the efficient management of resources. Among the principal variables determining participation are expected benefits of collective decisions, perceived losses of autonomy and representation, the number and homogeneity of other participants, decision costs, and the decision rule used to determine actions. Analysis of these factors suggests why consensus and unanimity decision rules are frequently chosen and why participation is usually limited.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 57 (1988), S. 275-279 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Cooperation in public dilemmas (and in externality dilemmas generally) is sometimes explained as a function of players' experience with the game: The more experience, the less cooperation. Experience, however, can produce both knowledge about how others will play the game (in particular, that they will defect) and improved understanding of the incentive structure of the game. We report data from two different experiments showing at best only a slight relationship between understanding the incentive structure of the game and cooperation. Inferences from the ‘experience’ finding that cooperation is based on misunderstanding of game incentives, therefore, seem misplaced.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 39 (1982), S. 361-370 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 62 (1989), S. 25-39 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We note the failure of a rational egoist model of human behavior to generate successful predictions of important economic and political behaviors including collective action. Alternative models are presented that combine rational, utility-maximizing features with concerns about collective welfare. The performance of these models in explaining contributing behavior in an experimentally-induced public goods game is compared to the performance of a rational egoist and collective welfare model. The results indicate that a model in which subjects are presumed to “trade off” benefits to self with benefits to others provides a better explanation of actual contributing behavior than either the rational egoist or collective welfare models, but still explains only a small amount of the individual variance in contributing behavior.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Publication Date: 1982-11-01
    Print ISSN: 0364-152X
    Electronic ISSN: 1432-1009
    Topics: Biology , Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
    Published by Springer
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