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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Sustainability and the moral community (1992)
    Springer
    Agriculture and human values 9 (1992), S. 48-57 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8366
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition
    Notes: Abstract Three views of sustainability are juxtaposed with four views about who the members of the moral community are. These provide points of contact for understanding the moral issues in sustainability. Attention is drawn to the preferred epistemic methods of the differing factions arguing for sustainability. Criteria for defining membership in the moral community are explored; rationality and capacity for pain are rejected as consistent criteria. The criterion of having interests is shown to be most coherent for explaining why all living humans belong to the moral community. This criterion allows inclusion of future generations as well, and extends to animals and plants membership in the moral community. Inferences are drawn that food sufficiency advocates hold only presently living persons to be full-fledged members of the moral community, but that this view is internally inconsistent. Stewards should agree that all living things are members of the moral community. A distinction between welfare interests and ulterior interests allows the steward to include the aims of those who argue for sustainability as community without committing some of their errors. Community advocates argue that essential values and virtues will be lost is the culture of agriculture is transformed. I argue that community advocates may fail to pass on our most important virtue — justice — without such a transformation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02217964
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Individual ethics and the social goals of agriculture (1987)
    Springer
    Agriculture and human values 4 (1987), S. 100-104 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8366
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition
    Notes: Abstract This article is a response to Paul Thompson's recent claim that individual farmers cannot have obligations to practice sustainable methods unless a large number of other producers also use them. Using a moral rights framework, I explain the relation of human interests and needs to the duties of individuals to accomplish moral social goals; i.e., those moral goals whose accomplishment requires the cooperation of other persons. The purpose is to show that individual action to promote sustainability does have moral value. Duties to practice sustainable methods are derived from the rights of all persons to adequate food and nutrition. These rights themselves are grounded, not in individual subjective desires or preferences, but in the genuine interests all persons (present and future) have in the satisfaction of basic biological needs to sustain life and health. The duty of each person is correlative to the rights of the others, and fulfillment of the duty requires social action, in this case practicing sustainable methods in farming. If others are unwilling or constrained from fulfilling their obligations, then duties to take other kinds of actions may be derived from the primary duty to attain the goal of sustainability. Actions to secure social cooperation may include, for example, exhorting others to participate and taking political action to force restructuring of agricultural policy, as well as practicing sustainable methods on one's own farm. While frameworks of individual responsibility have been attacked as failing to capture the moral importance of holistic outcomes, it is argued that such problems are related to human motivation rather than to the structure of our moral systems. I conclude that a properly elaborated system of moral rights and duties connected with an adequate moral psychology can account for our duties to other humans to accomplish the goal of a sustainable agriculture.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01530646
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    So animal a human ..., or the moral relevance of being an omnivore (1990)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 3 (1990), S. 172-186 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: ethics ; rights ; animals ; vegetarianism ; omnivore ; genetic diversity ; eugenics ; naturalism ; human nature ; cannibalism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It is argued that the question of whether or not one is required to be or become a strict vegetarian depends, not upon a rule or ideal that endorses vegetarianism on moral grounds, but rather upon whether one's own physical, biological nature is adapted to maintaining health and well-being on a vegetarian diet. Even if we accept the view that animals have rights, we still have no duty to make ourselves substantially worse off for the sake of other rights-holders. Moreover, duties to others, such as fetuses and infants, may require one to consume meat or animal products. Seven classes of individuals who are not required to be or become vegetarians are identified and their examption is related to nutritional facts; these classes comprise most of the earth's population. The rule of vegetarianism defines a special or provisional duty rather than any general or universal rule, since its observance it based upon the biological capacities of individual humans whose genetic constitution and environment makes them suitably herbivorous. It is also argued that generalizing the vegetarian ideal as a social goal for all would be wrongful because it fails to consider the individual nutritional needs of humans at various stages of life, according to biological differences between the sexes, and because it would have the eugenic effect of limiting the adaptability of the human species. The appeal to the natural interests of omnivores will not justify any claim that humans may eat amounts of meat or animal products in excess of a reasonable safety margin since animals have rights-claims against us.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02014612
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Use and abuse revisited: Response to Pluhar and Varner (1994)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 7 (1994), S. 41-76 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: animal rights ; animal welfare ; children ; diet ; morality ; ethics ; scientific reasoning ; vegan ; vegetarian ; women's health
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In her recent “Counter-Reply” to my views, Evelyn Pluhar defends her use of literature on nutrition and restates her argument for moral vegetarianism. In his “Vegan Ideal” article, Gary Varner claims that the nutrition literature does not show sufficient differences among women, men, and children to warrant concern about discrimination. In this response I show how Professor Pluhar continues to draw fallacious inferences: she begs the question on equality, avoids the main issue in my ethical arguments, argues from irrelevancies, misquotes her sources, equivocates on context, confuses safety with morality, appeals to fear, confuses correlation with cause, fails to evaluate scientific studies, draws hasty conclusions from insufficient data, ignores a large amount of data which would call her views into question, does not follow good scientific or moral argumentation, objectionably exceeds the limits of her expertise, and resorts to scapegoating. I also argue that Professor Varner fails to make his case because he offers virtually no evidence from scientific studies on nutrition, relies on outdated and fallacious sources, makes unsupported claims, ignores evidence that would contravene his claims, draws hasty conclusions based on weakly supported hypotheses rather than facts, employs a double standard, appeals to ignorance, does not evaluate arguments from his sources, and makes anad hominem attack on a respected nutritionist when his focus should be on evaluating the evidence and arguments from the scientific studies themselves. Neither Varner nor Pluhar have responded sufficiently to the real issue in my arguments, that of discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01997223
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Biodiversity and biotechnology (1988)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 1 (1988), S. 175-192 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: Biodiversity ; biotechnology ; ecology ; ecosystem ; environment ; ethics ; evolution ; genetics ; health ; medicine
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The maintenance of biodiversity is urged from many quarters and on grounds ranging from aesthetic considerations to its usefulness, particularly for biotechnology. But regardless of the grounds for preserving biodiversity, writers are generally in agreement that it should be preserved. But, in examining the various references “biodiversity,” such as species diversity, genetic diversity, and habitat diversity, it is apparent that we cannot aim to preserve biodiversityas such, since there are a number of conflicts in any such undertaking. In preserving one aspect of biodiversity, we damage another aspect. Five arguments which attempt to ground our moral concern for biodiversity are reviewed and critiqued, not only for their consistency but also for their power to move us to action. The final section of the paper shows how conflicts in the values of personal and environmental health can impair ethical action and especially policy formation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01833408
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The use and abuse of scientific studies (1992)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 5 (1992), S. 217-233 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: animal rights ; animal welfare ; children ; diet ; moral vegetarianism ; scientific reasoning ; vegan ; vegetarian ; women's health
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Evelyn Pluhar'sWho Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? in this journal issue, the author has read all of Pluhar's citations for the accuracy of her claims and had these read by an independent nutritionist. Detailed analysis of Pluhar's argument shows that she attempts to make her case by consistent misappropriation of the findings and conclusions of the studies she cites. Pluhar makes sweeping generalizations from scanty data, ignores causal explanations given by scientists, equates hypothesis with fact, draws false cause conclusions from studies, and in one case claims a conclusion opposite of what the scientist published. Such poor reasoning cannot be the basis of an argument for moral vegetarianism. A broader search of the literature and attention to reviews and textbooks in nutrition shows that each of Pluhar's claims is suspect or incorrect. Pluhar has not undermined my central claims: even if animals have certain rights and well-planned vegetarian diets are safe in complex industrialized societies, these diets cannot be so regarded if the presuppositions of high levels of wealth, education, and medical care do not exist; and, women, children, the aged and some ill persons are at greater risk on restrictive vegan diets. Thus, any duty of moral vegetarianism is not categorical but provisional in nature.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01966361
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Moral and nonmoral innate constraints (1992)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 189-202 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Epigenetic rule ; ethics ; human behavioral ecology ; innate constraint ; morality ; sociobiology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Charles J. Lumsden and E.O. Wilson, in their writings together and individually, have proposed that human behaviors, whether moral or nonmoral, are governed by innate constraints (which they have termed “epigenetic rules”). I propose that if a genetic component of moral behavior is to be discovered, some sorting out of specifically moral from nonmoral innate constraints will be necessary. That some specifically moral innate constraits exist is evidenced by virtuous behaviors exhibited in nonhuman mammals, whose behavior is usually granted to be importantly governed by genetic factors. Propensities for such virtuous behaviors may have been passed to humans as highly conserved mammalian genes and continue to influence us. I propose that these constitute at least a “rudimentary morality” and may account in part for the moral intuitions. But other innate constraints which are nonmoral in nature interact with the specifically moral innate constraints and with culture to yield human moral decisions and actions. Any model which aims to identify the genetic component of moral behaviors or behaviors with moral import must provide not only a delineation of cultural causes but must also distinguish between those genetic causes which may have their origin in innate moral constraints from others which are fundamentally nonmoral because the critical faculty necessary to higher level human morality itself arises in part from innate constraints of a nonmoral type; i.e., the processes of inductive reasoning common to both ethics and science. Finally, humans who could bring the nonmoral evaluative capacities to bear upon whatever moral intuitions might be genetically conserved in mammalian heritage would have an advantage over similar beings who could not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00129883
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Discrimination and bias in the vegan ideal (1994)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 7 (1994), S. 19-28 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: animal rights ; animal welfare ; children ; diet ; ethics ; scientific reasoning ; values ; vegan ; vegetarian ; women's health
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The vegan ideal is entailed by arguments for ethical veganism based on traditional moral theory (rights and/or utilitarianism) extended to animals. The most ideal lifestyle would abjure the use of animals or their products for food since animals suffer and have rights not to be killed. The ideal is discriminatory because the arguments presuppose a “male physiological norm” that gives a privileged position to adult, middle-class males living in industrialized countries. Women, children, the aged, and others have substantially different nutritional requirements and would bear a greater burden on vegetarian and vegan diets with respect to health and economic risks, than do these males. The poor and many persons in Third World nations live in circumstances that make the obligatory adoption of such diets, where they are not already a matter of sheer necessity, even more risky. Traditional moral theorists (such as Evelyn Pluhar and Gary Varner whose essays appear in this issue) argue that those who are at risk would beexcused from a duty to attain the virtue associated with ethical vegan lifestyles. The routine excuse of nearly everyone in the world besides adult, middle-class males in industrialized countries suggests bias in the perspective from which traditional arguments for animal rights and (utilitarian) animal welfare are formulated.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01997221
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  • 9
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    Moral and nonmoral innate constraints (1992)
    Springer
    Details
    Publication Date: 1992-04-01
    Print ISSN: 0169-3867
    Electronic ISSN: 1572-8404
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Published by Springer
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