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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incomplete markets and incentives to set up an options exchange (1990)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 15 (1990), S. 17-46 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Traditional analyses with incomplete markets take the securities that are traded as exogenous. In this paper we endogenize the market structure by considering incentives to introduce (costly) options exchanges which issue derivative securities. The method of financing the exchange is critical in determining whether the market structure is socially efficient. If the exchange can charge fees to all agents and make every agent's participation a necessary condition for establishing the exchange then the market structure chosen in equilibrium is efficient. However, if either of these conditions is not satisfied then an inefficient market structure may be chosen.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01498458
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 207-235 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents’ beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213903
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection (1996)
    Springer
    Economic theory 7 (1996), S. 207-235 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary This paper examines the efficiency properties of competitive equilibrium in an economy with adverse selection. The agents (firms and households) in this economy exchange contracts, which specify all the relevant aspects of their interaction. Markets are assumed to be complete, in the sense that all possible contracts can, in principle, be traded. Since prices are specified as part of the contract, they cannot be used as free parameters to equate supply and demand in the market for the contract. Instead, equilibrium is achieved by adjusting the probability of trade. If the contract space is sufficiently rich, it can be shown that rationing will not be observed in equilibrium. A further refinement of equilibrium is proposed, restricting agents' beliefs about contracts that are not traded in equilibrium. Incentive-efficient and constrained incentive-efficient allocations are defined to be solutions to appropriately specified mechanism design problems. Constrained incentive efficiency is an artificial construction, obtained by adding the constraint that all contracts yield the same rate of return to firms. Using this notion, analogues of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics can be proved: all refined equilibria are constrained incentive-efficient and all constrained incentive-efficient allocations satisfying some additional conditions can be decentralized as refined equilibria. A constrained incentive-efficient equilibrium is typically not incentive-efficient, however. The source of the inefficiency is the equilibrium condition that forces all firms to earn the same rate of return on each contract.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213903
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts (1992)
    Springer
    Economic theory 2 (1992), S. 1-26 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213250
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dynamic coordination games (1995)
    Springer
    Economic theory 5 (1995), S. 1-18 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Coordination ; delay ; strategic complementarities ; dynamic games
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary Gains from coordination provide incentives for delay. In this paper, the extent of delay is studied in a dynamic,N-person, coordination game. There is no social gain from delay, so an equilibrium with delay is always inefficient. For fixedN, there is no coordination failure when the period length is short: all equilibrium outcomes converge to the Pareto efficient outcome as the period length converges to zero. On the other hand, holding period length fixed, there exist equilibria in which delay is proportional toN, for arbitrarily large values ofN. In addition, it can be shown that the possibility of delay depends on the “timing” of strategic complementarities. However, under certain conditions, delay is shown to be a robust phenomenon, in the sense that “well-behaved” equilibria exhibit infinite delay forN sufficiently large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213641
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Variable-temperature NMR studies of thyroid hormone conformations (1988)
    Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell
    Organic Magnetic Resonance 26 (1988), S. 275-280 
    Details
    ISSN: 0749-1581
    Keywords: Thyroxine ; Triiodothyronine ; Variable-temperature ; 1H NMR ; Activation barriers ; Chemistry ; Analytical Chemistry and Spectroscopy
    Source: Wiley InterScience Backfile Collection 1832-2000
    Topics: Chemistry and Pharmacology
    Notes: 1H NMR spectra at 300 and 400 MHz have been recorded for the thyroid hormones thyroxine (T4) and triiodothyronine (T3) over a range of temperatures from 175 to 298 K in MeOH-d4. Above 200 K the aromatic region of the NMR spectrum of T4 consists of two peaks, one for the H-2′, H-6′ protons and one for H-2,H-6. As the temperature is lowered each of these resonances first broadens and then splits into two peaks of equal intensity at low temperature. This is consistent with slowed exchange between two equally populated conformers. Similar behaviour is noted for T3, although in this case the spectrum is complicated by the presence of spin-spin splitting. Consideration of coalescence temperatures and a line-shape analysis yielded activation barriers in the range 35-38 kJ mol-1. It is concluded that the observed spectral changes are due to dynamic interconversion between proximal and distal forms of the hormones, and that the interconversion takes place by cooperative rotations around the bonds between each phenyl ring and the linking oxygen atom.
    Additional Material: 7 Ill.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mrc.1260260402
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  • 7
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    Production of Protons, Deuterons, and Tritons fromLi6onLi7at 3.5 MeV (1967)
    American Physical Society
    Details
    Publication Date: 1967-09-20
    Print ISSN: 0031-899X
    Electronic ISSN: 1536-6065
    Topics: Physics
    Published by American Physical Society
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  • 8
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    Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal Smoothing (1997)
    University of Chicago Press
    Details
    Publication Date: 1997-06-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3808
    Electronic ISSN: 1537-534X
    Topics: Economics
    Published by University of Chicago Press
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  • 9
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    Financial Contagion (2000)
    University of Chicago Press
    Details
    Publication Date: 2000-02-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3808
    Electronic ISSN: 1537-534X
    Topics: Economics
    Published by University of Chicago Press
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  • 10
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    Money and Value: A Reconsideration of Classical and Neoclassical Monetary Economics. Jean-Michel Grandmont (1985)
    University of Chicago Press
    Details
    Publication Date: 1985-04-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3808
    Electronic ISSN: 1537-534X
    Topics: Economics
    Published by University of Chicago Press
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