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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Jassay, Anthony De: Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem : Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989 (1990)
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Economics and philosophy 6 (1990), S. 327-332 
    Details
    ISSN: 0266-2671
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267100001310
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An impartial reasoning solution to the prisoner's dilemma (1992)
    Springer
    Public choice 74 (1992), S. 447-460 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The notion that fairness can be determined by using impartial reasoning is examined and an argument is advanced that experimental methods can be used to determine what is fair in certain well-defined contexts. Implications for the prisoner's dilemma are examined. The standard game theoretic prescription of defection in the two-person prisoner's dilemma is contrasted with the prescription generated by rational self-interested players playing the game from an “impartial reasoning” point of view. The incentive structure in such a situation is shown to be similar to that in the familiar “You cut the cake and I choose” rule. The incentive is to be as fair as possible and it reveals the ethical content of rational self-interested behavior. When players choose in ignorance of whether the strategic choice is for themselves or their counterpart their choices are ipso facto fair. The indicated choice of mutual cooperation furnishes a partial explanation for the observed cooperation in experimental contexts. The moral prescriptions that individuals experience are shown to be a function of their risk propensities and to vary as a function of the cardinal properties of games. Implications for behavior in other games are briefly discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00137689
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Experiencing impartiality to invoke fairness in the n-PD: Some experimental results (1996)
    Springer
    Public choice 86 (1996), S. 117-135 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Subjects play a 5-person Prisoner's Dilemma both from an impartial point of view and in a regular fashion to determine whether 1) Concerns for fairness increase cooperative behavior; 2) Play of a Prisoner's Dilemma from an impartial point of view results in significantly higher levels of cooperation than does normal play; 3) Concern for fairness has greater explanatory force in explaining cooperation in impartial plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma than in normal plays; and 4) Experience with impartial play of a Prisoner's Dilemma sensitizes subjects to normative imperatives and results in higher levels of cooperation in subsequent normal plays of Prisoner's Dilemmas. The first and second hypotheses are supported, the third is inverted, and the fourth is not supported. Concern for fairness is demonstrated to play a complex role in explaining cooperative behavior in regular plays of the game. An earlier version was presented at the Annual meetings of the Public Choice Society, 1993 Monteleone Hotel, New Orleans; 20 March 1993.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00114878
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The carrot and the stick (1974)
    Springer
    Public choice 19 (1974), S. 43-61 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01718545
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Post election redistributive strategies of representatives: A partial theory of the politics of redistribution (1984)
    Springer
    Public choice 42 (1984), S. 113-131 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Vote maximizing candidates for reelection often have an incentive to redistribute income. They target certain constituent groups as recipients for income transfers and others as income losers. Resulting situations bifurcate sharply. Some have characteristics of ‘fairness’ and moderation and others of exploitation. The conditions which lead to these sorts of situations are identified. It is shown that recipients of income transfers need not be central members of the incumbents' coalitions but rather may at times be ‘fence straddlers.’
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00124155
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Redistributive politics: A theory of taxation for an incumbent in a democracy (1990)
    Springer
    Public choice 64 (1990), S. 135-153 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In order to maximize votes, incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs. These programs benefit some voters at the expense of others. In the simple two group (or tax payers and beneficiaries) case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies. This model's basic approach is shown to hold for multiple group models as well. Strategic implications for the organizers of sub groups of the population (or group leaders) are developed. Other extensions of the model are discussed. qu]Where the budget is clever is in its detail. Each little measure is designed to hurt (but not too much) people who are not politically important, while tossing a bone to people who are. You can see this in a host of different ways.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00153160
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