ALBERT

Description: This report is part of a series of reports that address flight deck design and evaluation, written as a response to loss of control accidents. In particular, this activity is directed at failures in airplane state awareness in which the pilot loses awareness of the airplane's energy state or attitude and enters an upset condition. In a report by the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, an analysis of accidents and incidents related to loss of airplane state awareness determined that hazard alerting was not effective in producing the appropriate pilot response to a hazard (CAST, 2014). In the current report, we take a detailed look at 28 airplane state awareness accidents and incidents to determine how well the hazard alerting worked. We describe a five-step integrated alerting-to-recovery sequence that prescribes how hazard alerting should lead to effective flight crew actions for managing the hazard. Then, for each hazard in each of the 28 events, we determine if that sequence failed and, if so, how it failed. The results show that there was an alerting failure in every one of the 28 safety events, and that the most frequent failure (20/28) was tied to the flight crew not orienting to (not being aware of) the hazard. The discussion section summarizes findings and identifies alerting issues that are being addressed and issues that are not currently being addressed. We identify a few recent upgrades that have addressed certain alerting failures. Two of these upgrades address alerting design, but one response to the safety events is to upgrade training for approach to stall and stall recovery. We also describe issues that are not being addressed adequately: better alert integration for flight path management types of hazards, airplanes in the fleet that do not meet the current alerting regulations, a lack of innovation for addressing cases of channelized attention, and existing vulnerabilities in managing data validity.

Description: The addition of automation has greatly extended humans' capability to accomplish tasks, including those that are difficult, complex and safety critical. The majority of Human - Automation Interact~on (HAl) results in more efficient and safe operations, ho,,:,ever ~ertain un~~pected a~tomatlon behaviors or "automation surprises" can be frustrating and, In certain safety critical operations (e.g. transport~tion, manufacturing control, medicine), may result in injuries or. the loss of life.. (Mellor, 1994; Leveson, 1995; FAA, 1995; BASI, 1998; Sheridan, 2002). This pap~r describes ~he development of a design tool that enables on the rapid development and evaluation. of automat~on prototypes. The ultimate goal of the work is to provide a design platform upon which automation surprise vulnerability analyses can be integrated.

Description: A two-part study was conducted to evaluate modern flight deck automation and interfaces. In the first part, a survey was performed to validate the existence of automation surprises with current pilots. Results indicated that pilots were often surprised by the behavior of the automation. There were several surprises that were reported more frequently than others. An experimental study was then performed to evaluate (1) the reduction of automation surprises through training specifically for the vertical guidance logic, and (2) a new display that describes the flight guidance in terms of aircraft behaviors instead of control modes. The study was performed in a simulator that was used to run a complete flight with actual airline pilots. Three groups were used to evaluate the guidance display and training. In the training, condition, participants went through a training program for vertical guidance before flying the simulation. In the display condition, participants ran through the same training program and then flew the experimental scenario with the new Guidance-Flight Mode Annunciator (G-FMA). Results showed improved pilot performance when given training specifically for the vertical guidance logic and greater improvements when given the training and the new G-FMA. Using actual behavior of the avionics to design pilot training and FMA is feasible, and when the automated vertical guidance mode of the Flight Management System is engaged, the display of the guidance mode and targets yields improved pilot performance.

Description: This paper will summarize the results of a study which introduces a structured, model based approach to learning how the automated vertical guidance system works on a modern commercial air transport. The study proposes a framework to provide accurate and complete information in an attempt to eliminate confusion about 'what the system is doing'. This study will examine a structured methodology for organizing the ideas on which the system was designed, communicating this information through the training material, and displaying it in the airplane. Previous research on model-based, computer aided instructional technology has shown reductions in the amount of time to a specified level of competence. The lessons learned from the development of these technologies are well suited for use with the design methodology which was used to develop the vertical guidance logic for a large commercial air transport. The design methodology presents the model from which to derive the training material, and the content of information to be displayed to the operator. The study consists of a 2 X 2 factorial experiment which will compare a new method of training vertical guidance logic and a new type of display. The format of the material used to derive both the training and the display will be provided by the Operational Procedure Methodology. The training condition will compare current training material to the new structured format. The display condition will involve a change of the content of the information displayed into pieces that agree with the concepts with which the system was designed.

Description: This paper proposes a model-based training program for the skills necessary to operate advance avionics systems that incorporate advanced autopilots and fight management systems. The training model is based on a formalism, the operational procedure model, that represents the mission model, the rules, and the functions of a modem avionics system. This formalism has been defined such that it can be understood and shared by pilots, the avionics software, and design engineers. Each element of the software is defined in terms of its intent (What?), the rationale (Why?), and the resulting behavior (How?). The Advanced Computer Tutoring project at Carnegie Mellon University has developed a type of model-based, computer aided instructional technology called cognitive tutors. They summarize numerous studies showing that training times to a specified level of competence can be achieved in one third the time of conventional class room instruction. We are developing a similar model-based training program for the skills necessary to operation the avionics. The model underlying the instructional program and that simulates the effects of pilots entries and the behavior of the avionics is based on the operational procedure model. Pilots are given a series of vertical flightpath management problems. Entries that result in violations, such as failure to make a crossing restriction or violating the speed limits, result in error messages with instruction. At any time, the flightcrew can request suggestions on the appropriate set of actions. A similar and successful training program for basic skills for the FMS on the Boeing 737-300 was developed and evaluated. The results strongly support the claim that the training methodology can be adapted to the cockpit.

Description: The Center TRACON Automation System (CTAS) is a new support system that is designed to assist air traffic controllers in the management of arrival traffic. CTAS will provide controllers with more information about current air traffic, enabling them to provide clearances for efficient, conflict-free descents that help achieve an orderly stream of aircraft at the final approach fix. CTAS is a computer-based system that functions as a "ground-based FMS" that can predict flight trajectories and arrival times for all incoming aircraft. CTAS uses an aircraft's cruise airspeed; current air traffic, winds and temperature; performance characteristics of the aircraft type; and individual airline preferences to create a flight profile from cruise altitude to the final approach fix. Controllers can use this flight profile to provide a descent clearance that will allow an aircraft to fly an efficient descent and merge more smoothly with other arriving aircraft. A field test of the CTAS Descent Advisor software was conducted at the Denver Center for aircraft arriving at the Stapleton International Airport from September 12-29. CTAS Descent clearances were given to a NASA flight test aircraft and to 77 airline flights that arrived during low traffic periods. For the airline portion of the field test, cockpit procedures and pilot briefing packages for both FMS equipped and unequipped aircraft were developed in cooperation with an airline. The procedures developed for the FMS equipped aircraft were to fly a VNAV descent at a controller specified speed to cross a metering fix at a specified altitude and speed. For nonFMS aircraft, the clearance also specified a CTAS calculated top-of-descent point. Some CTAS related flight deck issues included how much time was available to the pilots' for compliance, the amount of information that needed to be interpreted in the clearance and possible repercussions of misunderstandings. Data collected during the study ranged from subjective data (including the airline pilots' opinions and comments about the new descent clearances and procedures) to objective data (including observations of aircraft performance from the flight deck). This paper will present data and the resulting changes in the design of the procedures and clearance phraseology.

Description: Electric Vertical Takeoff and Landing (eVTOL) vehicle and airspace technologies promise large increases in the number of aircraft in operation. One critical technology for these emerging markets is the increased use of automated systems to reduce pilot skill, training, and proficiency requirements. While the use of these systems promises to reduce or eliminate pilot functions in the long-term, the technology development for the required functions will necessitate a phased transition. The transition to, and adoption of automated systems will generate new safety challenges. This presentation discusses current safety challenges, new challenges for eVTOLs, and some research focused on addressing these challenges.

Description: In the glass cockpit, it's not uncommon to hear exclamations such as "why is it doing that?". Sometimes pilots ask "what were they thinking when they set it this way?" or "why doesn't it tell me what it's going to do next?". Pilots may hold a conceptual model of the automation that is the result of fleet lore, which may or may not be consistent with what the engineers had in mind. But what did the engineers have in mind? In this study, we present some of the underlying assumptions surrounding the glass cockpit. Engineers and designers make assumptions about the nature of the flight task; at the other end, instructor and line pilots make assumptions about how the automation works and how it was intended to be used. These underlying assumptions are seldom recognized or acknowledged, This study is an attempt to explicitly arti culate such assumptions to better inform design and training developments. This work is part of a larger project to support training strategies for automation.

Description: Prior studies have confirmed that commercial airline pilots experience circadian phase shifts and short sleep duration following travel with layovers in different time zones. Few studies have examined the impact of early and late starts on the sleep and circadian phase of airline pilots who return to their domicile after each duty period. We recruited 44 pilots (4 female) from a short-haul commercial airline to participate in a study examining sleep and circadian phase over four duty schedules (baseline, early starts, mid-day starts, late starts). Each duty schedule was five days long, separated by three rest days. Participants completed the rosters in the same order. Sleep outcomes were estimated using wrist-borne actigraphy (Actiware Software, Respironics, Bend, OR) and daily sleep diaries. Thirteen participants volunteered to collect urine samples for the assessment of 6-sulfatoxymelatonin (aMT6s). Urine samples were collected in four hourly bins during the day and eight-hourly bins during sleep episodes, for 24 hours immediately following each experimental duty schedule. The aMT6s results were fit to a cosine in order to obtain the acrophase to estimate circadian phase. Univariate statistics were calculated for acrophase changes, schedule start times and sleep times. All statistical analyses were computed using SAS software (Cary, IN).The mean duty start times varied as expected (baseline 10:17 [ 3:50], early starts 5:24 [ 0:30], mid-day starts 13:52 [ 1:20], late starts 16:33 [ 1:33]). Actigraphy-derived sleep duration varied between schedule types, with the shortest average sleep durations occurring during the early starts and night duty. Mean circadian phase was similar during each schedule type (baseline 26:14 [ 3:22], early starts 25:29 [2:13], mid-day starts 26:20 [ 3:16], late starts 25:49 [ 4:28]), but there were wide inter-individual differences in phase shifting from the beginning to the end of the study, with phase shifts ranging from a 5.98 hour phase advance to an 11.34 hour phase delay. Our preliminary findings suggest that early and late starts are associated with reduced sleep duration. The dispersion in inter-individual differences in circadian phase across shifting duty schedules should be further evaluated to determine how schedule-induced phase shifts may affect operational performance.