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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Limitations of Redundancies in the Improvement of System Reliability (2004)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Risk analysis 24 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1539-6924
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
    Notes: Some program managers share a common belief that adding a redundant component to a system reduces the probability of failure by half. This is true only if the failures of the redundant components are independent events, which is rarely the case. For example, the redundant components may be subjected to the same external loads. There is, however, in general a decrease in the failure probability of the system. Nonetheless, the redundant element comes at a cost, even if it is less than that of developing the first one when both are based on the same design. Identical parts save the most in terms of design costs, but are subjected to common failure modes from possible design errors that limit the effectiveness of the redundancy. In the development of critical systems, managers thus need to decide if the costs of a parallel system are justified by the increase in the system's reliability. NASA, for example, has used redundant spacecraft to increase the chances of mission success, which worked well in the cases of the Viking and Voyager missions. These two successes, however, do not guarantee future ones. We present here a risk analysis framework accounting for dependencies to support the decision to launch at the same time a twin mission of identical spacecraft, given incremental costs and risk-reduction benefits of the second one. We illustrate this analytical approach with the case of the Mars Exploration Rovers launched by NASA in 2003, for which we had performed this assessment in 2001.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00539.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Risk Assessment Based on Financial Data: Market Response to Airline Accidents (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Risk analysis 19 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1539-6924
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
    Notes: The risk of catastrophic failures, for example in the aviation and aerospace industries, can be approached from different angles (e.g., statistics when they exist, or a detailed probabilistic analysis of the system). Each new accident carries information that has already been included in the experience base or constitutes new evidence that can be used to update a previous assessment of the risk. In this paper, we take a different approach and consider the risk and the updating from the investor's point of view. Based on the market response to past airplane accidents, we examine which ones have created a “surprise response” and which ones are considered part of the risk of the airline business as previously assessed. To do so, we quantify the magnitude and the timing of the observed market response to catastrophic accidents, and we compare it to an estimate of the response that would be expected based on the true actual cost of the accident including direct and indirect costs (“full-cost information” response). First, we develop a method based on stock market data to measure the actual market response to an accident and we construct an estimate of the “full-cost information” response to such an event. We then compare the two figures for the immediate and the long-term response of the market for the affected firm, as well as for the whole industry group to which the firm belongs. As an illustration, we analyze a sample of ten fatal accidents experienced by major US domestic airlines during the last seven years. In four cases, we observed an abnormal market response. In these instances, it seems that the shareholders may have updated their estimates of the probability of a future accident in the affected airlines or more generally of the firm's future business prospects. This market reaction is not always easy to explain much less to anticipate, a fact which management should bear in mind when planning a firm's response to such an event.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1999.tb00422.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Risk Assessment Based on Financial Data: Market Response to Airline Accidents (1999)
    Springer
    Risk analysis 19 (1999), S. 473-486 
    Details
    ISSN: 1539-6924
    Keywords: Market response ; risk assessment ; airplane accidents ; airline industry
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
    Notes: Abstract The risk of catastrophic failures, for example in the aviation and aerospace industries, can be approached from different angles (e.g., statistics when they exist, or a detailed probabilistic analysis of the system). Each new accident carries information that has already been included in the experience base or constitutes new evidence that can be used to update a previous assessment of the risk. In this paper, we take a different approach and consider the risk and the updating from the investor's point of view. Based on the market response to past airplane accidents, we examine which ones have created a “surprise response” and which ones are considered part of the risk of the airline business as previously assessed. To do so, we quantify the magnitude and the timing of the observed market response to catastrophic accidents, and we compare it to an estimate of the response that would be expected based on the true actual cost of the accident including direct and indirect costs (“full-cost information” response). First, we develop a method based on stock market data to measure the actual market response to an accident and we construct an estimate of the “full-cost information” response to such an event. We then compare the two figures for the immediate and the long-term response of the market for the affected firm, as well as for the whole industry group to which the firm belongs. As an illustration, we analyze a sample of ten fatal accidents experienced by major US domestic airlines during the last seven years. In four cases, we observed an abnormal market response. In these instances, it seems that the shareholders may have updated their estimates of the probability of a future accident in the affected airlines or more generally of the firm's future business prospects. This market reaction is not always easy to explain much less to anticipate, a fact which management should bear in mind when planning a firm's response to such an event.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007056830284
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  • 4
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    Valuing Rigor in the Risk Management Process (2019)
    In:  CASI
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019-07-20
    Description: NASA, as an organization, takes risk management (RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with defining RM processes. For example, many different risk analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and conclude with a few insights from observed best practices.
    Keywords: Administration and Management; Quality Assurance and Reliability
    Type: GSFC-E-DAA-TN64495 , International Conference for Aerospace Experts, Academics, Military Personnel, and Industry Leaders; Mar 02, 2019 - Mar 09, 2019; Big Sky, MT; United States
    Format: application/pdf
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    NASA TECHNICAL REPORTS
  • 5
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    Near-Miss Evaluation Bias as an Obstacle to Organizational Learning: Lessons from NASA (2006)
    In:  CASI
    Details
    Publication Date: 2019-07-13
    Description: After the Shuttle Columbia catastrophe, the investigation board (CAIB) stated that NASA needs to develop a "learning culture", meaning a capability to learn from past failures by understanding the technical and organizational causes of these mistakes (CAIB report, 2003). While many organizations learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for organizations to learn from near-miss events (i.e., situations where a failure does not occur but nearly did), because these near-misses are processed as successes. For the shuttle program, prior debris problems could have caused a similar failure as on the Columbia mission except that the large pieces missed the highly sensitive portions of the orbiter. This acceptance of foam debris was adopted as a normal occurrence by the shuttle program managers similar to the problems at the time of the Challenger Disaster (detailed in Vaughan, 1996). We extend that work to show that an outcome bias influences people's evaluation of project managers, such that managers of failed missions were perceived more poorly than managers who made the same decisions but whose mission ended in either success or a near-miss. The similarity of ratings between the near-miss and success condition imply that even when a problem occurs that is clearly linked to prior managerial decisions, if the project is not harmed because of good luck, that manager is not held accountable for faculty decision making and neither the individual manager nor the organization learn from the experience potentially increasing the likelihood of a failure in the future.
    Keywords: Space Transportation and Safety
    Type: 2006 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management: Knowledge, Action, and the Public Concern; Aug 11, 2006 - Aug 16, 2006; Atlanta, GA; United States
    Format: application/pdf
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