Electronic Resource
Springer
Public choice
40 (1983), S. 293-305
ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Conclusion Our results here demonstrate rather convincingly what our intuition tells us is correct. A chairman with a regular and tie-breaking vote is more likely to get his first choice than is a person with only a regular vote, and a person with a regular vote is more likely to get his way than is a chairman with only a tiebreaking vote. In addition, if ties occur, a non-member who is chairman is more likely to get his first choice than is a regular member. These results hold for sincere and sophisticated voting and for the successive and amendment procedures. They hold — only more so — if the chairman controls the agenda. At least for these binary procedures, Farquharson's conclusion should have been: Seek a tie-breaking vote if you do not have to give up a regular vote to obtain it; shun the power to break ties if it means giving up a regular vote.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00114525
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