ALBERT

Notes: Some federal structures are and have been stable for relatively long periods; others, though apparently stable, are chronically subject to important strains, while others still are either unstable or have ceased to exist as federal entities. In the paper, I develop a limited model of federalism, built on the number and properties of public goods, which appears to account for some of the observable stability features of federal structure. Essentially, the model assumes that when individuals in one jurisdiction do not only passively receive spillovers from other jurisdictions, but react and adjust to them, possibilities of conflict exist which can only be resolved by the creation of the appropriate machinery. It is shown how a change in the number of public goods can affect the outcome.

Notes: In the SCHUMPETER-DOWNS economic approach to politics, rational citizens vote to select a government that will supply policies to meet their preferences. There is no place in that logic for the variegated coalitions which are called political parties; voting itself is indeed irrational following JOHN STUART MILL'S view of the relationship between citizens and politicians, we suggest that voting and other political activities are the ‘price’ paid in an exchange relationship in which the quid pro quo is the promise of politicians to represent the opinions of citizens in parliamentary debates in what MILL called the Congress of Opinions. In that view, political parties are organizations that serve to guarantee that the implicit or quasi-contracts between citizens and representatives are abided by and fulfilled.〈section xml:id="abs1-2"〉〈title type="main"〉ZUSAMMENFASSUNGIn der demokratischen Wirtschaftstheorie von SCHUMPETER und DOWNS wird ange-nommen, dass der bewusste, rational handelnde Staatsbürger eine Regierung wählt, die seine politischen Interessen unterstützt. In dieser Logik gibt es keinen Platz für die verschiedenen Koalitionen, die als politische Parteien bekannt sind. Der individuelle Akt des Wählens selbst wird als irrational bezeichnet. In diesem Artikel beziehen wir uns auf die Ansicht JOHN STUART MILLS, der das Verhäitnis zwischen Staatsbürgern und politischen Vertretern analysiert, und behaupten, dass der Gebrauch des Stimm-rechts und alle politischen Tätigkeiten der “Preis” für das Versprechen des Politikers, die Interessen des Staatsbürgers im Parlament (JOHN STUART MILL nennt dasselbe “Kongress der politischen Meinungen”) zu vertreten sei. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt gesehen, kann man sagen, dass politische Parteien Organisationen sind, die dazu dienen, die Erfüllung dieses impliziten Vertrages oder quasi-Vertrages zwischen Staatsbürgern und ihren politischen Stellvertretern zu garantieren.〈section xml:id="abs1-3"〉〈title type="main"〉RÉSUMÉLa théorie économique de la démocratic énoncée par SCHUMPETER et DOWNS suppose que les citoyens votent pour désigner un gouvernement qui formulera, à son tour, des choix politiques conformes à leurs préférences. Non seulement une telle façon de concevoir ne laisse aucune place à ces différentes coalitions bigarrées nommées partis politiques, mais le fait même de voter est considéré comme irrationnel. Dans cet article, prenant pretexte de ce que nous suggére JOHN STUART MILL sur les rapports entre citoyens et politiciens, nous interprétons l'expression du suffrage et les autres actes politiques individuels comme le “prix” que les citoyens patent en échange de la promesse que les hommes politiques leur font de les représenter au cours des débats parlementaires qui se déroulent dans ce que MILL définit les “Congrés des Opinions”. Les partis politiques constituent, par conséquent, des organisations qui servent à garantir et à contrôler que ce contrat implicite ou que ce quasi-contrat entre les citoyens et leurs représentants politiques soit rempli et respecté.

Notes: Conclusion I have tried to develop a simple point, namely that without trust, governing is more difficult, because it requires greater use of force. I have suggested that in a heterogeneous federal state the conditions for trust accumulation are more difficult to devise with regard to the national government. On the whole, I have noted that most provincial governments in Canada were satisfied with a status quo that gave them a veto on any change and in which Parliamentary supremacy was the paramount doctrine. The Agreement of November 1981 was the outcome of a titanic struggle between “federalist” and “separatist” views held by Quebecers about the role of Ottawa in the governance of their affairs. The “victory” of the “federalist” forces, well demonstrated by the increased potential role of the national government in the collective affairs of Francophones, will help those same Francophones to have more trust in the national government. Much remains to be done.

Notes: Conclusion In the preceding pages, I have returned time and again to the idea that in the next quarter century the profession will devote more of its resources to an understanding of politics and of political organizations, with a presumption that the behaviors and institutions we observe in the real world represent efficient responses to exogenously given constraints and to competitive forces. That does not mean, of course, that normative preoccupations, critical evaluations and reformist drives will not continue to motivate a good number of scholars. That is to be expected and praised. However, I believe that in relative terms more attention will come to be given to understanding and less to re-designing and reforming. In this context, the economic approach to politics will flourish and, as an important carrier of these research results,Public Choice will continue to play an indispensable role. We can already see the future and it is promising.