ALBERT

Beschreibung: The Space Shuttle Integrated Main Propulsion System (IMPS) consists of the External Tank (ET), Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS), and Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). The IMPS is tasked with the storage, conditioning, distribution, and combustion of cryogenic liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LO2) propellants to provide first and second stage thrust for achieving orbital velocity. The design, certification, and operation of the associated IMPS hardware have produced many lessons learned over the course of the Space Shuttle Program (SSP). A subset of these items will be discussed in this paper for consideration when designing, building, and operating future spacecraft propulsion systems. This paper will focus on lessons learned related to Orbiter MPS and is the first of a planned series to address the subject matter.

Beschreibung: Extrusion of the polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) pilot seal used in the monomethylhydrazine (fuel) valve of the Orbiter Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) thrusters has been implicated in numerous on-orbit thruster failures and on-ground valve failures. Two extrusion mechanisms have been proposed, one or both may be occurring. The first mechanism is attributed to thermal expansion mismatch between adjacent PTFE and metal parts used in the fuel valve, and is referred to as thermal extrusion. The second mechanism is attributed to nitrogen tetroxide (oxidizer) leakage from the adjacent oxidizer valve on the same thruster during ground turnaround, and is referred to as oxidizer-induced extrusion. Model calculations of PTFE pilot seal in an exact pilot valve configuration show that extrusion can be caused by differential thermal expansion, without the intervening influence of oxidizer. Experimental data on semitrapped PTFE and TFM (modified PTFE) specimens simulating a fuel pilot valve configuration show that thermal extrusion 1) is incremental and irreversible, 2) increases with the size of the thermal excursion, 3) decreases with successive thermal cycling, and 4) is accompanied by gap formation. Both PTFE and TFM exhibit a higher affinity for oxidizer than fuel. The property changes associated with oxidizer uptake may explain why oxidizer seals do not exhibit extrusion. Impression replicas of fuel pilot seals removed from the Orbiter fleet show two types of extrusion: extrusion of the entire seal (loaded extrusion), or extrusion of non-sealing surface (unloaded extrusion). Both extrusion types may arise from differences in service history, rather than in failure mechanism. The plausibility oxidizer-induced extrusion was evaluated. Preliminary calculations suggest that enough energy, heat, or gas may be liberated under certain operational scenarios to cause catastrophic extrusion. However, given the lack of supporting data, conclusions implicating oxidizer leakage as a factor in extrusion must be made with caution.

Beschreibung: The Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) is NASA's next generation spacecraft for human exploration of deep space. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for the design, development, qualification and integration of the vehicle. A key component of the Orion Crew Module (CM) is the Propulsion Reaction Control System, a highflow hydrazine system used during reentry to orient the vehicle for landing. The system consists of a completely redundant helium (GHe) pressurization system and hydrazine fuel system with monopropellant thrusters. The propulsion system has been designed, integrated, and qualification tested in support of the Orion program's first orbital flight test, Exploration Flight Test One (EFT1), scheduled for 2014. A subset of the development challenges and lessons learned from this first flight test campaign will be discussed in this paper for consideration when designing future spacecraft propulsion systems. The CONOPS and human rating requirements of the CM propulsion system are unique when compared with a typical satellite propulsion reaction control system. The system requires a high maximum fuel flow rate. It must operate at both vacuum and sea level atmospheric pressure conditions. In order to meet Orion's human rating requirements, multiple parts of the system must be redundant, and capable of functioning after spacecraft system fault events.