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  • 1
    Monograph available for loan
    Monograph available for loan
    Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press
    Call number: PIK P 113-16-90315
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: VI, 281 Seiten , Diagramme
    ISBN: 9780262034647 (hardcover)
    Series Statement: CESifo seminar series
    Language: English
    Location: A 18 - must be ordered
    Branch Library: PIK Library
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK and Boston, USA : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Bulletin of economic research 55 (2003), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-8586
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro–Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers’ efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non–shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 13 (1999), S. 125-141 
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: hiring subsidy ; pollution tax ; unemployment
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We study an economy with free firm entry and unemployment due to firm-worker bargaining over each firm's surplus, and where firms cause pollution that can be reduced by initial investments. An uncompensated increase in the pollution tax reduces pollution but increases unemployment, implying a tradeoff between the two. When tax revenues are used to subsidize either firms' hiring or investments, employment may also increase, creating a ‘double dividend’ from the pollution tax. A pollution tax increase used to subsidize current employment is always less effective than a hiring subsidy, and is totally ineffective when subsidies equal pollution tax revenues for each individual firm. We show that the (hypothetical) pollution tax implementing the first-best solution exceeds the Pigouvian tax. The second-best tax exceeds this first-best tax when we have a double dividend, and is below it when we do not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 63 (1996), S. 151-173 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: efficiency wages ; business cycles ; unemployment ; JEL classification ; E32 ; J23 ; J41 ; J64
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We study a model of worker moral hazard with identical workers and where sectoral prices are subject to stochastic shocks. When firms are short-run maximizers, employment is shown to be distorted downward relative to the case of certain prices, and more so the higher is the current price. This implies that employment is relatively insensitive to sectoral output-price changes, and that average employment and output are reduced when price volatility increases. When firms can commit to future employment levels, employment is greater in low-demand states (implying “labor hoarding”), and thus even less sensitive to shocks, while average employment is less distorted downward by uncertainty. The model gives a new explanation of how increased sector-specific volatility can lead to output losses, and of the possibility of negative comovements of unemployment and turnover.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 53 (1991), S. 161-184 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We explore the possibility for self-enforcing long-term contracts between a risk averse union and a risk neutral firm, when these have the option to strike an efficient bargian at every stage, and the state of the world is variable. It is shown that any long-term efficient wage agreement satisfying individual rationality constraints involves a more even income stream to the workers (except for the case when the discount rate is high) and can be implemented by a Subgame-perfect equilibrium (by the threat of returning to short-term bargaining). Moreover, any such constrained efficient agreement can be supported by the threat of triggering agreements which themselves are constrained efficient, i.e., it can be implemented by a Renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 4 (1994), S. 495-509 
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: Environmental accidents ; moral hazard ; environmental policy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We study optimal government policy when firms' operations involve a risk of a large environmental accident, firms do not have sufficient assets to cover such costs, and the risk is affected by firms' efforts which are unobservable to outsiders. When firms' profits and government revenues have equal weights in the social welfare function, a first best can be implemented and requires that the firm be subsidized heavily when operating with no accident, and all its assets confiscated in the event of an accident. With a lower weight on firm profits the solution is always second best, with lower subsidies to the firm, and a firm effort lower than at the first-best solution. When firm investments affect both the required accident-preventing effort for given risk and the work effort required for a given output, the first best never involves specific investment subsidies, while a second-best solution generally always does.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 2 (1992), S. 91-106 
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: Contingent valuation ; environmental goods ; willingness to pay
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The study seeks to determine the maximum willingness to pay (MWTP) among a random sample of Norwegians, for membership in the largest environmentalist association in Norway, Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV). The study includes three stages: (1) a contingent valuation study, testing hypothetical MWTP; (2) those whose stated MWTP is at or above the current membership fee are then asked to pay this fee; (3) those individuals who do not pay in stage 2 are interviewed, and asked to consider revising their MWTP statement. The study is seemingly the first of its kind in comparing hypothetical and actual MWTP by typing valuation of a public good (the environment) to the value of a private good (membership of the NNV). The results show a rather poor correspondence between hypothetical and actual MWTP, since only 6 out of 64 who stated that they were willing to pay the membership fee in stage 1, actually paid this voluntarily in stage 2. Possible reasons for this discrepancy are discussed, on the basis of data from the telephone interview in stage 3, and on information gathered in stage 1. The data indicate that a substantial part of this discrepancy is due to MWTP being overstated in stage 1, but that other reasons also are important.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Publication Date: 2014-03-01
    Print ISSN: 0140-9883
    Electronic ISSN: 1873-6181
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Published by Elsevier
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  • 9
    Publication Date: 2011-03-01
    Print ISSN: 0140-9883
    Electronic ISSN: 1873-6181
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Published by Elsevier
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  • 10
    Publication Date: 2010-03-01
    Print ISSN: 0140-9883
    Electronic ISSN: 1873-6181
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Published by Elsevier
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