ALBERT

Description: Shifts in public attitude that may affect extraterrestrial sample return include increased public participation in the legal and regulatory environment, institutionalized public vigilance, politicization of technological debates and shifts in the nature of public decision-making, and a risk-averse public accustomed to mass media coverage that focuses on hazards and disasters. The ice-minus recombinant DNA experiment is used as an example of the effects of public opinion on scientific experimentation.

Description: As scientists and mission planners develop planetary protection requirements for future Mars sample return missions, they must recognize the socio-political context in which decisions about the mission will be made and pay careful attention to public concerns about potential back contamination of Earth. To the extent that planetary protection questions are unresolved or unaddressed at the time of an actual mission, they offer convenient footholds for public challenges in both legal and decision making realms, over which NASA will have little direct control. In this paper, two particular non-scientific areas of special concern are discussed in detail: 1) legal issues and 2) the decision making process. Understanding these areas is critical for addressing legitimate public concerns as well as for fulfilling procedural requirements regardless whether sample return evokes public controversy. Legal issues with the potential to complicate future missions include: procedural review under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); uncertainty about institutional control and authority; conflicting regulations and overlapping jurisdictions; questions about international treaty obligations and large scale impacts; uncertanities about the nature of the organism; and constitutional and regulatory concerns about quarantine, public health and safety. In light of these important legal issues, it is critical that NASA consider the role and timing of public involvement in the decision making process as a way of anticipating problem areas and preparing for legitimate public questions and challenges to sample return missions.

Description: This workshop report, long delayed, is the first 21st century contribution to what will likely be a series of reports examining the effects of human exploration on the overall scientific study of Mars. The considerations of human-associated microbial contamination were last studied in a 1990 workshop ("Planetary Protection Issues and Future Mars Missions," NASA CP-10086, 1991), but the timing of that workshop allowed neither a careful examination of the full range of issues, nor an appreciation for the Mars that has been revealed by the Mars Global Surveyor and Mars Pathfinder missions. Future workshops will also have the advantage of Mars Odyssey, the Mars Exploration Rover missions, and ESA's Mars Express, but the Pingree Park workshop reported here had both the NCR's (1992) concern that "Missions carrying humans to Mars will contaminate the planet" and over a decade of careful study of human exploration objectives to guide them and to reconcile. A daunting challenge, and one that is not going to be simple (as the working title of this meeting, "When Ecologies Collide?" might suggest), it is clear that the planetary protection issues will have to be addressed to enable human explorers to safely and competently extend out knowledge about Mars, and its potential as a home for life whether martian or human.

Description: In preparation for missions to Mars that will involve the return of samples, it is necessary to prepare for the safe receiving, handling, testing, distributing, and archiving of martian materials here on Earth. Previous groups and committees have studied selected aspects of sample return activities, but a specific protocol for handling and testing of returned -=1 samples from Mars remained to be developed. To refine the requirements for Mars sample hazard testing and to develop criteria for the subsequent release of sample materials from precautionary containment, NASA Planetary Protection Officer, working in collaboration with CNES, convened a series of workshops to produce a Protocol by which returned martian sample materials could be assessed for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (extant or extinct), while safeguarding the samples from possible terrestrial contamination. The Draft Protocol was then reviewed by an Oversight and Review Committee formed specifically for that purpose and composed of senior scientists. In order to preserve the scientific value of returned martian samples under safe conditions, while avoiding false indications of life within the samples, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is required to allow handling and processing of the Mars samples to prevent their terrestrial contamination while maintaining strict biological containment. It is anticipated that samples will be able to be shipped among appropriate containment facilities wherever necessary, under procedures developed in cooperation with international appropriate institutions. The SRF will need to provide different types of laboratory environments for carrying out, beyond sample description and curation, the various aspects of the protocol: Physical/Chemical analysis, Life Detection testing, and Biohazard testing. The main principle of these tests will be described and the criteria for release will be discussed, as well as the requirements for the SRF and its personnel.