ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? (1995)
    Springer
    Details
    Publication Date: 1995-06-01
    Print ISSN: 1436-3240
    Electronic ISSN: 1436-3259
    Topics: Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying , Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Geography , Geosciences
    Published by Springer
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 2
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    The density of random close packing of spheres (1969)
    Institute of Physics
    Details
    Publication Date: 1969-06-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3727
    Electronic ISSN: 1361-6463
    Topics: Physics
    Published by Institute of Physics
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    PAPER CURRENT
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? (1995)
    Springer
    Stochastic environmental research and risk assessment 9 (1995), S. 151-170 
    Details
    ISSN: 1436-3259
    Keywords: Environmental regulation ; compliance ; game theory ; whistle-blowing ; reporting system ; water quality management
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying , Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Geography , Geosciences
    Notes: Abstract A formal mathematical model is developed to ascertain the effectiveness of a reporting system for improving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations when reports are costly. To model realistic enforcement problems arising over environmental issues such as compliance to water and air quality standards, a formal enforcement model is constructed using concepts from probability and statistics, non-cooperative game theory, and economics. In order to demonstrate clearly the benefits gained when an environmental agency takes advantage of a reporting system, a formal enforcement model with a costly reporting system is rigorously compared to one with no reporting system. The calculation and comparison of Nash equilibria for a range of values of model parameters indicates under what conditions a reporting system can be truly effective. Overall, it is found that a reporting system, such as whistle-blowing, can be helpful for reducing violations of environmental standards, thereby maintaining better environmental quality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01585604
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence (1994)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 100 (1994), S. 379-412 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper develops an incomplete information model of extended deterrence relationships. It postulates players who are fully informed about the costs of war and all other relevant variables, save for the values their opponents place on the issues at stake, i.e., the pawn. We provide consistent and intuitively satisfying parallel definitions for two types of players, Hard and Soft, in terms of the parameters of our model. We also answer several particular questions about the strategy choices of players in an extended deterrence relationship and, by identifying all the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game model we construct, specify typical behavior patterns. Our most general finding is that an Extended Deterrence Game always has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a rather simple form. A challenger initiates for certain if the pawn is valuable enough to it and never challenges otherwise, Likewise, a defender always resists if the pawn is valuable enough and never resists otherwise. In addition to identifying threshold values for optimal strategic choice, we provide existence conditions for the two distinct types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. This permits us to identify the exact set of conditions associated with bluffing strategies and to develop a theory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for extended deterrence crisis initiation and its resolution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01063909
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Sequential Truel (1975)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 4 (1975), S. 151-174 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The Sequential Truel is a three-person game which generalizes the simple duel. The players' positions are fixed at the vertices of an equilateral triangle, and they fire, in sequence, until there is only one survivor or until each survivor has fired a pre-specified number of times. The rules of the particular game may or may not permit the tactic of abstention, i.e. firing into the air. Several versions of Sequential Truel (with and without abstention) are examined here. It is found that, often, there is a single equilibrium point which can be called the solution of the truel for rational players. Quite frequently, the poorest marksman of the three has the greatest payoff at this equilibrium point.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01780632
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equilibrium points of Infinite Sequential Truels (1977)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 6 (1977), S. 167-180 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Infinite Sequential Truels are studied in the case when the players' duel values are preassigned parameters, rather than functions of the marksmanships. Such truels divide naturally into two classes, one of which includes all Infinite Sequential Truels investigated previously. All equilibrium points of all truels are determined. It is discovered that some truels possess one or several of four equilibrium points never before observed, and that others may possess no equilibrium points at all (in stationary strategies).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01774660
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The simultaneous truel (1971)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 1 (1971), S. 229-242 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The simultaneous truel is a three-person game which is a generalization of the simple duel. The players' positions are fixed and their firing is simultaneous. Each player's only decision is which of his opponents will be his target. The (simultaneous) firing continues until there is at most one survivor or until all survivors have fired a specified number of times. Each player is assumed to be concerned only with his own survival; he is indifferent to the fate of his opponents. These games (parametrized by the maximum possible number of shots by each player) are examined for equilibrium points. It is found that, in many cases, the truel has a unique equilibrium point at which the player who is the poorest marksman has the greatest chance of survival.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01753447
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...