ISSN:
1434-4750
Keywords:
Key words: Voluntary provision of public goods, Stackelberg games JEL classification: H 41
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract. We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00013685
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