Electronic Resource
Springer
Economic theory
9 (1997), S. 441-451
ISSN:
1432-0479
Keywords:
D50
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Summary This paper models the information acquisition process in an intertemporal rational expectations framework. It demonstrates that equilibria do not generally exist in intertemporal economies in which agents are assumed to know the state-contingent price path and the information acquisition process is endogenous. In addition, an example of a fully revealing equilibrium in which agents pay a strictly positive amount for information is provided. Finally, we also show that it is possible for an equilibrium to exist in which agents choose to purchase information even if all agents, including the agents who purchased the information, are made strictly worse off by the purchase.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01213848
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