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  • 1985-1989  (6)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games (1989)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 18 (1989), S. 111-117 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Consider a society with a finite number,n, of individuals who have to choose an alternative from a setA in them-dimensional Euclidean space IR m . Assuming that the preference relation overA of every individual is convex and continuous, Greenberg (1979) showed some that if the set of winning coalitions (i.e. those that have the veto power) consists of all coalitions with more thanmn/m + 1 individuals the core of the induced game is nonempty. Greenberg and Weber (1984) have strengthened this result by showing that the induced game is in fact balanced. On the other hand Le Breton (1987), Schofield (1984a) and Strnad (1985) have generalized Greenberg's theorem to arbitrary voting games. The purpose of this note is to show that however the induced game is not generally balanced.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01248498
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Topological aggregation of inequality preorders (1985)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 2 (1985), S. 119-129 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract An inequality preorder is defined as a complete preorder on a simplex which satisfies the properties of continuity and strict Schur-convexity (the mathematical equivalent of Dalton's “principle of transfers”). The paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual inequality preorders into a collective one if we are interested in continuous anonymous aggregation rules that respect unanimity. The aggregation problem is studied within a topological framework introduced by Chichilnisky.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00437312
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games (1987)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 4 (1987), S. 287-294 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The local core of voting games is investigated from a genericity point of view. There exist preference profiles for which it is empty and there exist preference profiles for which the local core and its complement are both dense in the set of alternatives. Furthermore the subset of profiles having an empty local core is dense in the whole set of profiles. Some remarks on the choice of the topology are provided.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00286869
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the core of voting games (1987)
    Springer
    Social choice and welfare 4 (1987), S. 295-305 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-217X
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyse a special class of cooperative games called voting games in the cases where the set of alternatives is finite or a convex and compact subset of an Euclidean space. In a first part we provide a complete classification of these games according to the non-emptiness of the core. Then in a second part we prove that the set of continuous preference profiles having a core is small from a topological point of view. The contribution of the paper is mainly a simplification of the existing proofs and the introduction of a suitable topology to formulate the second question.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00286870
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games (1988)
    Springer
    Journal of optimization theory and applications 59 (1988), S. 71-97 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-2878
    Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium ; sequential games ; dynamic programming
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by Başar and Haurie (1984), is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00939867
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  • 6
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    Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games (1988)
    Springer
    Details
    Publication Date: 1988-10-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3239
    Electronic ISSN: 1573-2878
    Topics: Mathematics
    Published by Springer
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