ISSN:
1570-7458
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Biology
Notes:
Conclusion The standard literature on implementation offers a number of variables usually associated with successful policy-making.50 Roughly, the variables can be sorted into three broad categories: the nature of the problem to be solved, the causal theory for problem solution embodied in the statute, and the execution of that statutory solution in practice. These categories will supply a framework helpful in highlighting the empirical similarities across the cases of oblique funding denial discussed above and also for revealing important differences. The similarities will show both the conditions which lead to the use of this particular policy device and the manner of its use; the differences will show the conditions under which it can be used most effectively. Discussion will then turn somewhat more theoretical, inquiring into the legitimacy of funding denial as a political means and the capacity of the state apparatus that employs it. First, the specific social problem addressed in each of the cases of funding denial was relatively intractable. Each involved a matter of moral purpose - how fast is it safe for one to drive? At what age is one responsible enough to drink? What is the extent of one's military obligation? What is meant by the principle of equal respect for all individuals? American government is naturally reluctant to confront such difficult moral decisions and to impose an authoritative determination upon its citizenry. Not surprisingly, therefore, each case of funding denial was the product of a perceived national emergency, accompanied by a dramatic mobilization of public opinion - the energy crisis of 1973; the campaign against drunk driving led by MADD; the sudden presumption of military inadequacy; the civil rights movement, especially the Birmingham marches. The widespread belief that something must be done gave to politicians the incentive to enact policies placing concentrated costs upon some particular population group as a prerequisite for achieving diffuse societal ends. Strong ideological justification remained essential even after initial threshold barriers were overcome. In the speed limit case, for instance, the necessary shift in rationale from energy conservation to traffic safety somewhat weakened the defense for concentrated costs and left the legislation much more vulnerable to challenge and exemption. American politics might well exhibit a general propensity toward particularistic preferences and so-called distributional policies, which award concentrated group benefits and impose diffuse social costs, but there do regularly exist circumstances that help enact policies embodying the exact opposite pattern. A further problem exists, however, when designing a feasible strategy for implementation. In each of the cases considered above, funding denial was adopted because of the perceived insufficiency of the normal, judicial means of coercive implementation - a legislated national 55 M.P.H. speed limit or a direct prohibition against interstate alcohol sales to individuals younger than 21 years old would mandate a significant federal police role and might burden the federal courts; prosecutions under the 1980 Selective Service Act and litigation under the 1954 Brown decision had been deemed incapable of forcing adequate levels of compliance. The alternative next proposed was cash incentives, making it lucrative for the designated actors to adapt their behavior. But, it was found, the political price of Southern school desegregation was not sufficiently counterbalanced by the promise of federally funded technical assistance; the prospect of increased highway aid funds was not enough to induce states to alter their drinking laws. It was then logical for lawmakers to turn to the disincentive power of financial sanctions. Oblique funding denial offered a simple and quite attractive theory of policy cause and effect: by threatening to withhold money from tangentially related concentrated benefits, the target population would be impelled to accept the entailed concentrated costs of social reform. In the two examples using highway funds, the states as intermediaries were constrained to impose policy costs upon certain of their citizens or else face penalties themselves. In the two other examples, the impulsion was applied to the targeted individuals or institutions directly. As a causal theory for solution, however, the funding denial strategy has its own inherent weakness. In all the cases considered, the population designated for enforcement was not the same as the total population whose compliance was needed in order to achieve the social end. For example, the Solomon amendment affected only non-registrant college student aid recipients, a distinct subset of draft law violators. Moreover, all college aid recipients, even if not formally eligible for the draft, were made subject to penalties if they did not sign the specified form. The provision was on one dimension too narrow and on another much too broad, leading to claims of unfair treatment. Similarly, the 21-year-old drinking age affected only a portion of adults who might drink and drive, yet it imposed sweeping limits on all members of a specific age group regardless whether they were drivers or not. The civil rights regulations were applied with inequitable narrowness, for Title VI enforcement affected only the institutions and programs supported by federal grants, and affirmative action under Executive Order 11246 was required only of federal contractors. The 55 M.P.H. speed limit, by contrast, was initially applied with inequitable breadth, uniformly restricting highway speeds irrespective of the type of terrain, the quality of the road or its safety record. Supporters of these provisions often justified them in terms of mere expediency. Chief Justice Burger's defense of the Solomon amendment, that funding denial was a rational tool to encourage compliance among a major group of lawbreakers, was basically the same as the one employed by civil rights advocates on behalf of Title VI. Expediency, nevertheless, is political as well as merely technical. Those who were targeted for the funding denial strategy not only exhibited a certain dependence upon government finance, they also tended to be politically weak. Youths, for example, have been subjected to the strategy both as students and as drivers. This political weakness was further exaggerated by the stigmatization of the victim. Teenage drivers, it was implied, were uniquely irresponsible; college students were unpatriotic; and Southern aid recipients lacked a fundamental respect for the constitution. The exception to the rule was interstate trucking, and thus it is not unexpected that truckers did win some relaxation in the speed limit when first proposed in 1973, and that the portion of the highway regulations that most affect them have recently proved susceptible to attack. Finally, turning to practical execution, it is obvious that federal administrators tend not to want to impose funding sanctions. In all the cases examined, the express legislative intent was to encourage increased voluntary compliance, and ample provision was always made to allow the violator to correct his behavior or to negotiate a compromise in good faith. Moreover, federal grant agencies see their primary function as that of giving away authorized money. Exogenous conditions placed upon the use of such money involved an uncomfortable and often unwanted conflict among agency priorities. The exercise of funding denial interferes with laudable program operations and risks jeopardizing relations with Congress and clients. Counterveiling pressures for vigorous action, from social movements or presidential initiative, have proved fleeting. Thus the actual withholding of authorized dollars has been usually considered somewhat drastic action, to be reserved for dire situations. The Transportation Department, for example, has not yet deducted
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00135869
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