ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • 1995-1999  (2)
Collection
Publisher
Years
Year
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 97 (1998), S. 107-120 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 82 (1995), S. 53-67 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Federal income tax inforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper we apply the Weingast/Moran model to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, we model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. We find that the interstate differences in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...