ISSN:
1432-1270
Schlagwort(e):
Key words: Symmetric game, stable core, lower boundary, specified vectors
Quelle:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Thema:
Mathematik
,
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Notizen:
Abstract. Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known. In this paper we answer affirmatively the necessity for symmetric games. We also prove its equivalence to n specified vectors being imputations and also to the convexity of the lower boundary of the set of all acceptable pay-off vectors of the game. In this paper we establish the equivalence of a condition given by Shapley to the newly evolved condition, thereby give an alternate proof to Shapley’s condition.
Materialart:
Digitale Medien
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050002
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