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  • Articles  (71)
  • Springer  (71)
  • American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
  • 1985-1989  (71)
  • Philosophy  (71)
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  • Articles  (71)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On maximal intermediate logics with the disjunction property (1986)
    Springer
    Studia logica 45 (1986), S. 69-75 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract For intermediate logics, there is obtained in the paper an algebraic equivalent of the disjunction propertyDP. It is proved that the logic of finite binary trees is not maximal among intermediate logics withDP. Introduced is a logicND, which has the only maximal extension withDP, namely, the logicML of finite problems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01881550
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Definability and Quantifier Elimination for J 3-theories (1987)
    Springer
    Studia logica 46 (1987), S. 37-54 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The Joint Non-Trivialization Theorem, two Definability Theorems and the generalized Quantifier Elimination Theorem are proved for J 3-theories. These theories are three-valued with more than one distinguished truth-value, reflect certain aspects of model type logics and can. be paraconsistent. J 3-theories were introduced in the author's doctoral dissertation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00396904
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A representation theorem for languages with generalized quantifiers through back-and-forth methods (1988)
    Springer
    Studia logica 47 (1988), S. 401-411 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract We obtain in this paper a representation of the formulae of extensions ofL ωω by generalized quantifiers through functors between categories of first-order structures and partial isomorphisms. The main tool in the proofs is the back-and-forth technique. As a corollary we obtain the Caicedo's version of Fraïssés theorem characterizing elementary equivalence for such languages. We also discuss informally some geometrical interpretations of our results.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00671569
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Definability theorems in normal extensions of the probability logic (1989)
    Springer
    Studia logica 48 (1989), S. 495-507 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Three variants of Beth's definability theorem are considered. Let L be any normal extension of the provability logic G. It is proved that the first variant B1 holds in L iff L possesses Craig's interpolation property. If L is consistent, then the statement B2 holds in L iff L = G + {□0}. Finally, the variant B3 holds in any normal extension of G.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00370203
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Is there an ‘us’ in ‘justification’? (1985)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 62 (1985), S. 63-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00485386
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Conditions versus transference: A reply to Ehring (1985)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 63 (1985), S. 249-257 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00485369
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Visual space from the perspective of possible world semantics II (1985)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 64 (1985), S. 241-270 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00486040
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Maxwell and materialism (1986)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 66 (1986), S. 505-514 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In a recent article, Grover Maxwell presents a case for a kind of mind-brain identity theory which he claims precludes materialism. His case is based on some views about meaning which I find plausible. However, I will argue that, by adopting certain assumptions about the nature of sensory experience, and extending some of Maxwell's views about meaning in a plausible way, the issue of a materialistic identity theory is reopened. Ultimately, I will agree that such a theory is not true, but more is needed to show this than Maxwell gives us. But the question of materialism is not thereby closed, because it has become axiomatic these days that materialism does not require an identity theory. So I will go on to consider if all forms of materialism have been ruled out by Maxwell's theory, as extended by me. I will end with a tentative affirmative answer but also with a proposal which, if it can be worked out, would reverse the decision.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00414064
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Curse of the qualia (1986)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 68 (1986), S. 333-368 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist1 holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist2 holds (1) and (3) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00413837
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    From absolute to local mathematics (1986)
    Springer
    Synthese 〈Dordrecht〉 69 (1986), S. 409-426 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0964
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Natural Sciences in General , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00413980
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