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  • 2015-2019  (4)
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  • 1
    Publication Date: 2018-03-06
    Description: Kleptoparasitism (food stealing) is a significant behavior for animals that forage in social groups as it permits some individuals to obtain resources while avoiding the costs of searching for their own food. Evolutionary game theory has been used to model kleptoparasitism, with a series of differential equation-based compartmental models providing significant theoretical insights into behavior in kleptoparasitic populations. In this paper, we apply this compartmental modeling approach to kleptoparasitic behavior in a real foraging population of urban gulls ( Laridae ). Field data was collected on kleptoparasitism and a model developed that incorporated the same kleptoparasitic and defensive strategies available to the study population. Two analyses were conducted: 1) An assessment of whether the density of each behavior in the population was at an equilibrium. 2) An investigation of whether individual foragers were using Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in the correct environmental conditions. The results showed the density of different behaviors in the population could be at an equilibrium at plausible values for handling time and fight duration. Individual foragers used aggressive kleptoparasitic strategies effectively in the correct environmental conditions but some individuals in those same conditions failed to defend food items. This was attributed to the population being composed of 3 species that differed in competitive ability. These competitive differences influenced the strategies that individuals were able to use. Rather than gulls making poor behavioral decisions these results suggest a more complex 3-species model is required to describe the behavior of this population.
    Print ISSN: 1045-2249
    Electronic ISSN: 1465-7279
    Topics: Biology
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  • 2
    Publication Date: 2018-03-06
    Description: Following from Part I of this article, which introduced the notion of decision-modelling for investor–state arbitration, Part II of the article uses the game theoretic notions developed in Part I to explore the question of why a relatively large fraction of investor–state disputes proceed to arbitration tribunals. Likely explanations are advanced. The detailed mathematical model derived in Part I of the article is then used to analyse 31 cases where an investor–state dispute has been judged by an arbitration tribunal. Auxiliary mathematics are developed to identify the relevant averages and variances, which are then calculated from the full data set. Three sample cases are analysed in greater detail, with the model results being compared against the actual awards. It is concluded that applying the mathematical model of the international arbitration process developed in Part I together with the data analysis laid out in Part II will provide useful insight and guidance to both parties involved or likely to be involved in a dispute between investor and state.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Electronic ISSN: 1470-840X
    Topics: Mathematics , Law
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  • 3
    Publication Date: 2018-03-06
    Description: This article uses game theory to investigate investor–state dispute settlement and related dispute resolution strategies through international arbitration. When deciding whether either to bring or to defend a claim rather than pursue settlement, investors and states will select strategies to maximize their respective payoffs, either by securing compensation or successfully defeating a claim for compensation. This article develops a model decision-making strategy for claimant investors and defendant states based on the observed patterns of outcomes in actual investment treaty arbitration awards. Embedding the problem in the context of utility and hence risk-aversion, it will offer a general solution for the arbitration ‘game’. Four regions will be identified in the settlement space consisting of the respondent offer against claimant success probability. It will be shown that no settlement is possible in three of these four regions. The go-no-go probability of claimant victory below which it would not be reasonable for a potential claimant to proceed will be quantified. An algorithm is developed for calculating the settlement sum that the respondent may offer with a reasonable expectation of acceptance by the claimant.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Electronic ISSN: 1470-840X
    Topics: Mathematics , Law
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  • 4
    Publication Date: 2015-05-01
    Print ISSN: 0012-365X
    Electronic ISSN: 1872-681X
    Topics: Mathematics
    Published by Elsevier
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