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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions (1979)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 10 (1979), S. 293-309 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A necessary and sufficient condition is established in terms of restrictions on individual preferences for a class of democratic systems to be Nash-stable: that there is no one in the society who can profitably misrepresent his preferences. It is shown that only a very strong similarity of preferences can eliminate the incentive for individuals to misreveal their preferences. Since individual preferences in actual practice are not likely to be so similar, the result in this paper shows that strategic misrevelation of preferences by individuals remains a disturbing possibility under this class of democratic rules.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00126344
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