ISSN:
1432-5217
Keywords:
Key words: Stochastic games
;
countable state space
;
sensitive optimality
;
unbounded payoffs
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract. We consider stochastic games with countable state spaces and unbounded immediate payoff functions. Our assumptions on the transition structure of the game are based on a recent work by Meyn and Tweedie [19] on computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains. The main results in this paper concern the existence of sensitive optimal strategies in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. By sensitive optimality we mean overtaking or 1-optimality. We also provide a new Nash equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with denumerable state spaces.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001860050035