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  • Articles  (52)
  • insurance  (52)
  • Economics  (51)
  • Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying  (1)
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  • Articles  (52)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Information on worker ability - An analysis of investment within the firm
    Amsterdam : Elsevier
    Information Economics and Policy 4 (1989), S. 57-80 
    Details
    ISSN: 0167-6245
    Keywords: Worker ability ; insurance ; investment in information ; labor market contracting ; promotions ; signalling ; task assignments
    Source: Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0167-6245(89)90033-4
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Non-expected utility and the robustness of the classical insurance paradigm (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 9-50 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; risk sharing ; non-expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper uses the tools and techniques of generalized expected utility analysis to explore the robustness of some of the classical basic results in insurance theory to departures from the expected utility hypothesis on agents' risk preferences. The areas explored consist of individual demand for coinsurance and deductible insurance, the structure of Pareto-efficient bilateral insurance contracts, the structure of Pareto-efficient multilateral risk-sharing agreements, and self-insurance and self-protection. Most, though not all, of the basic results in this area are found to be quite robust to dropping the expected utility hypothesis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01098956
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Government action, biases in risk perception, and insurance decisions (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 93-110 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: risk perception ; insurance ; moral hazard ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Biases in risk perception potentially have a large effect on insurance and risk-related behavior. The government can alter these perceptions either through informational programs or controlling the risk. Policies that convey a higher risk level generally have the expected effects on insurance and protective actions, whereas efforts that increase the precision of either the government risk information or private beliefs typically have ambiguous effects. In some cases, the structure of how government policies enter the risk-belief function is consequential. Ascertaining the magnitude of the effects, not simply the direction, also is an important issue. For example, misperceptions have a dramatic effect on the tradeoffs between compensating differentials and the size of the loss but a negligible effect on the tradeoff between compensating differentials and the magnitude of the probability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01098960
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Functional form problems in modeling insurance and gambling (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 135-150 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: non-expected utility ; gambling ; insurance ; functional form problems ; risky activities in the national accounts ; state contingent commodities
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Defining the outputs of the property insurance and gambling sectors of an economy has proved to be a difficult problem for national income accountants. It is well known that the traditional expected-utility model is not consistent with economic agents fully insuring their property. Thus the present paper adapts existing non-expected-utility theories to yield useful measures of output for the property insurance and gambling sectors.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01098962
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Insurance and catastrophes (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 157-175 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: catastrophe ; insurance ; moral hazard ; copayment ; experience rating ; distribution distortion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Catastrophes provide a principal justification for insurance. Traditional conceptions of catastrophes miss three critical elements. (1) Many catastrophes-the liability revolution in the United States, for example-are not bolts from the blue. Rather, they develop over many years and result from human activity. (2) Conventional, experiencedbased models for assessing losses often smudge the distinction, so critical for catastrophes, between probability and magnitude of loss. (3) Normal insurance contracts, with heavy copayments for small losses but little charge at the margin for large ones, perform poorly when the insured can tradeoff probability and size of loss-a phenomenon we label distribution distortion. The structures of optimal insurance contracts are assessed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01258392
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Insurance and catastrophes: The changing role of the liability system (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 177-184 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: catastrophes ; torts ; asbestos ; insurance ; liability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Insurance catastrophes are increasingly the result of actions by human beings rather than nature. Chief among these insurance changes has been the surge in tort liability insurance costs. Unfortunately, the courts have misunderstood the mechanisms for transmitting these costs throughout the economy. A principal deficiency is that the structure of liability has been inconsistent with the courts' assumption that the losses could be borne by consumers or parties other than the insurer.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01258393
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Demand for insurance in a portfolio setting (1995)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 20 (1995), S. 203-211 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; insurable assets ; expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper takes an additional step toward analyzing the demand for insurance in the context of a portfolio model. An investor is endowed with a portfolio containing a risky and riskless asset that can be augmented by purchasing insurance. Here, insurance is paid for by reducing the quantity of the risky insurable asset, holding the quantity of the riskless asset fixed. In the standard insurance demand model, insurance is paid for by reducing the amount of the riskless asset. This distinction leads to a different insurance demand function because the opportunity cost of purchasing insurance is now random.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01258397
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Complete Versus Incomplete Insurance Contracts under Adverse Selection with Multiple Risks (1997)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 22 (1997), S. 81-101 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; adverse selection ; multidimensional screening ; multiple risks ; bundling
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article extends the standard adverse-selection model for competitive insurance markets, which assumes a single source of risk, to the case where individuals are subject to multiple risks. We compare the following market situations—the case where insurers can offer comprehensive policies against all sources or risks (complete contracts) and the case where different risks are covered by separate policies (incomplete contracts). In the latter case, we consider whether the insurer of a particular risk has perfect information regarding an individual's coverage against other sources of risks. The analysis emphasizes the informational role of bundling in multidimensional screening. When the market situation allows bundling, it is shown that in equilibrium the low-risk type with respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain partial coverage against that particular risk.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008659916387
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later (1997)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 22 (1997), S. 73-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; adverse selection ; competitive outcomes
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We are honored to address the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists and will take the opportunity to make some reflections on the rather uneasy relationship between insurance and competition. Economists generally prescribe competition as a solution for markets that do not work well. Competition allocates resources efficiently and encourages innovation and attention to what customers want. Insurance markets differ from most other markets because in insurance markets competition can destroy the market rather than make it work better. One of the dimensions along which insurance companies compete is underwriting—trying to ensure that the risks covered are “good” risks or that if a high risk is insured, the premium charged is at least commensurate with the potential cost. The resulting partitioning of risk limits the amount of insurance that potential insurance customers can buy. In the extreme case, such competitive behavior will destroy the insurance market altogether. A simple model illustrates.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008607915478
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Full Insurance, Bayesian Updated Premiums, and Adverse Selection (1997)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 22 (1997), S. 135-150 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; adverse-selection ; Bayesian learning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz model of adverse selection in a competitive environment, we analyse a “no-claims bonus” type contract (bonus-malus). We show that, under full insurance coverage, if the insurance company applies Bayes's rule to learn about client probability types over time and uses this information in premium calculations for contract renewals, then there exist conditions under which all client types strictly prefer the Bayesian updating contract to the classic Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008668101366
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