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  • 1
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-12-10
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 2
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-10-16
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 3
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-10-15
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 4
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-29
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 5
    facet.materialart.
    Unbekannt
    Oxford University Press
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: The conceptual foundations of burdens of proof are examined, and the unified theory of evidentiary devices derivable from those foundations is explicated. Both the conceptual foundations and the unified theory generated are shown to rest on questionable assumptions about conventional probability theory. The resulting analytical difficulties are analyzed. Inference to the best explanation and the relative plausibility theory are examined as potentially providing the foundation to a superior conceptualization of the burden of proof.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 6
    facet.materialart.
    Unbekannt
    Oxford University Press
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: Since the Human Rights Act 1998, scholars and courts have dedicated considerable attention to the presumption of innocence. A major strand of the ensuing debate has focused on the scope of this safeguard. Many academics have argued in favour of according to the presumption a substantive—as opposed to a procedural—role. In other words, these scholars maintain that the presumption set in art. 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) should have some influence on the definition of criminality. Courts seem sympathetic to this approach, albeit not following it to the full extent. The article, instead, defends a procedural understanding of the presumption of innocence, on the basis of interpretive arguments concerning art. 6(2) ECHR. Besides, it shows that adopting this conception does not entail lowering the protection of the individual before the substantive criminal law.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 7
    facet.materialart.
    Unbekannt
    Oxford University Press
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: In the academic literature, three approaches to rational legal proof are investigated, broadly speaking based, respectively on Bayesian statistics, on scenario construction and on argumentation. In this article, these approaches are discussed in light of a distinction between direct and indirect probabilistic reasoning. Direct probabilistic reasoning directly reasons from evidence to hypotheses, whereas indirect probabilistic reasoning reasons from hypotheses to evidence (and then back to the hypotheses). While statistical and story-based approaches usually model indirect probabilistic reasoning, argumentation-based approaches usually model direct probabilistic reasoning. It has been suggested that all legal probabilistic reasoning should be indirect, but in this article, it is argued that direct probabilistic reasoning has a rational basis and is, moreover, sometimes easier to perform for judges than indirect probabilistic reasoning. Moreover, direct probabilistic reasoning can be analysed in terms of standard probability theory, resulting in an alternative, non-Bayesian use of the terms ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ probability and without the need to estimate unconditional probabilities of the hypotheses.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 8
    facet.materialart.
    Unbekannt
    Oxford University Press
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: Burdens and standards of proof are primarily concerned with minimizing the expected cost of error. This probabilistic goal explains both the levels at which general standards of proof are set, and the general allocation of burdens of proof to the plaintiff or prosecution. Variations from these general positions, achieved through presumptions and affirmative defences, can also be understood as directed towards minimizing expected error costs. This model describes the operation of many presumptions and defences, and also provides a normative basis for criticising presumptions and defences that fail to minimize the expected cost of error. However, it struggles with classes of cases where one side of the dispute faces systemic proof difficulties. Minimizing error costs would lead to an expectation of a serious imbalance in error rates; however, varying the standard of proof to equalize error rates would fail to minimize error costs. This is a genuine dilemma. No solution is offered.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 9
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: Mistakes in evidential reasoning can have severe consequences. Especially, errors in the use of statistics have led to serious miscarriages of justice. Fact-finders and forensic experts make errors in reasoning and fail to communicate effectively. As tools to prevent mistakes, three kinds of methods are available. Argumentative methods analyse the arguments and counterarguments that are presented in court. Narrative methods consider the construction and comparison of scenarios of what may have happened. Probabilistic methods show the connections between the probability of hypothetical events and the evidence. Each of the kinds of methods has provided useful normative maxims for good evidential reasoning. Argumentative and narrative methods are especially helpful for the analysis of qualitative information, but do not come with a formal theory that is as well-established as probability theory. In probabilistic methods, the emphasis is on numeric information, so much so that a standard criticism is that these methods require more numbers than are available. This article offers an integrating perspective on evidential reasoning, combining the strengths of each of the kinds of methods: the adversarial setting of arguments pro and con, the globally coherent perspective provided by scenarios, and the gradual uncertainty of probabilities. In the integrating perspective, arguments and scenarios are interpreted in the quantitative setting of standard probability theory. In this way, the integrated perspective provides a normative framework that bridges the communicative gap between fact-finders and forensic experts. Both qualitative and quantitative information can be used safely, focusing on what is relevant.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
  • 10
    Publikationsdatum: 2014-09-02
    Beschreibung: Although courts have incorporated statistical hypothesis testing into their evaluation of numerical evidence in a variety of cases, they have primarily focused on one aspect of a statistical analysis: whether or not the result is ‘statistically significant’ at the 0.05 or ‘two-standard deviation’ level. The theory underlying hypothesis testing is also concerned with the power of the test to detect a meaningful difference. This article shows that using the insights provided by power calculations should assist courts to better interpret and evaluate the statistical analyses submitted into evidence. In particular, the concept of power should help in assessing whether a sample is too small to provide reliable inferences. On the other hand very large samples can classify minor differences as statistically significant. This occurs when the power of the test at the standard 0.05 level is very high. It will be seen that requiring significance at a more stringent level, e.g. 0.005, which can be determined from a power calculation, often resolves this problem.
    Print ISSN: 1470-8396
    Digitale ISSN: 1470-840X
    Thema: Mathematik , Rechtswissenschaft
    Publiziert von Oxford University Press
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
    BibTip Andere fanden auch interessant ...
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