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  • Articles  (10,410)
  • Springer  (10,410)
  • 2000-2004  (5,855)
  • 1980-1984  (4,555)
  • Economics  (10,410)
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  • Articles  (10,410)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Production of Goods in Excess of Demand: A Generalization of Self-Protection (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 51-63 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: reserve goods ; self-protection ; insurance
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider a risk-averse firm producing a limited number of goods that can be defective. The firm must determine its level of production before knowing which goods will be defective. Such is the case, for example, for a producer of telecommunications satellites. The problem under scrutiny can be interpreted as a generalization of self-protection for more than two states of nature. In our model, the firm determines jointly its level of production and its demand for insurance. It is shown that, under reasonable assumptions, the two strategies are complements.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008797407679
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Background Risk, Demand for Insurance, and Choquet Expected Utility Preferences (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 7-28 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: demand for insurance ; background risk ; nonexpected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article deals with demand for insurance with a background risk in a nonprobabilized uncertainty framework, where preferences are represented by a nonadditive model of decision making. The Choquet expected utility model that we use generalizes expected utility and allows for a separation of the attitude towards uncertainty and the attitude towards wealth. When the insurable and the background risk are comonotone, the impact of the background risk on the demand for insurance is related to the attitude towards wealth. In contrast, when the two risks are anticomonotone, the attitude towards uncertainty is determinant. In this case, some of the resulting behaviors cannot be explained by the standard expected utility model.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008730106771
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Financial Markets for Unknown Risks if Beliefs Differ (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 29-49 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: individual risk ; collective risk ; unknown risk ; financial markets ; mutual insurance contracts ; Arrow securities
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider a general equilibrium model with individual and collective risks. The article builds on a contribution by Chichilnisky and Heal, who show that contingent Arrow–Debreu equilibria can also be supported in economies with Arrow securities and mutual insurance contracts. However, they show this to be true in general only if beliefs are identical, a very restrictive assumption in the context of unknown risks. Moreover, they claim complete insurance in equilibrium to be impossible if beliefs are different. We show that even with different beliefs, firstly, complete insurance is possible in each statistical state, and secondly, contingent equilibrium can still be supported in economies with insurance and securities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008745423609
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Editor's Note (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 5-5 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008742818028
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 65-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: asymmetric information ; insurance markets ; value of information ; multidimensional signaling ; informed principal
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008749524517
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Arbitrage and Viability in Insurance Markets (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 81-99 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: arbitrage ; viability ; insurance pricing ; constrained trade ; transaction costs ; market incompleteness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Insurance markets are subject to transaction costs and constraints on portfolio holdings. Therefore, unlike the frictionless asset markets case, viability is not equivalent to absence of arbitrage possibilities. We use the concept of unbounded arbitrage to characterize viable prices on a complete and an incomplete insurance market. In the complete market, there is an insurance contract for every possible event. In the incomplete market, risk can be insured through proportional and excess of loss like insurance contracts. We show how the the structure of viable prices is affected by the portfolio constraints, the transaction costs, and the structure of marketed contracts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008701608588
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Genetic Screening and Price Discrimination in Insurance Markets (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 103-130 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: insurance ; genetic information ; discrimination
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Basing insurance prices on the results of an imperfect screening test to identify risk types can reduce or increase aggregate discrimination across insureds. We present a powerful and general new framework of analysis to examine this issue, drawing upon recent work which uses decomposable inequality indices to measure vertical and horizontal inequity in taxation. We find that, whilst improved test performance inevitably reduces vertical discrimination (in the average prices faced by different risk types), even very accurate tests can lead to substantial horizontal discrimination (within risk types) and enhanced overall discrimination. These conclusions are shown to be robust to a range of different value judgements about how to aggregate individual discriminatory effects and to be particularly relevant to the case of genetic screening.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008745627439
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exclusions and the Demand for Property Insurance (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 131-139 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: background risk ; property insurance ; upper limit ; exclusion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper examines property insurance contracts in which consumers choose the upper limit on coverage. Exclusions are of two types, and both reduce the demand for insurance of the included perils. A practical implication is that an insurer can raise the demand for fire insurance by offering an earthquake rider, and profit from the rider even when the premia are ceded in such a way that the rider does not raise profit directly. The results do not require assumptions about correlations between included and excluded losses, which is interesting because correlations are decisive in most of the other literature on background risk.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008710311509
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Yaari's Dual Theory of Risk (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 141-157 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: adverse selection ; nonexpected utility ; Yaari's dual theory ; separating equilibrium ; pooling equilibrium
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Under Yaari's dual theory of risk, we determine the equilibrium separating contracts for high and low risks in a competitive insurance market, in which risks are defined only by their expected losses, that is, a high risk is a risk that has a greater expected loss than a low risk. Also, we determine the pooling equilibrium contract when insurers are assumed non-myopic. Expected utility theory generally predicts that optimal insurance indemnity payments are nonlinear functions of the underlying loss due to the nonlinearity of agents' utility functions. Under Yaari's dual theory, we show that under mild technical conditions the indemnity payment is a piecewise linear function of the loss, a common property of insurance coverages.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008762312418
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation (2000)
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 25 (2000), S. 159-178 
    Details
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: fraud bureau ; ex post moral hazard ; asymmetric information ; insurance
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The study of insurance fraud and its remedy is a hot topic of research, mainly because the problem of insurance fraud is so widespread. In the United States many state governments have setup agencies to combat fraud. These Insurance Fraud Bureaus (IFB) are typically established to gather information about potential fraudulent claims, and to advise prosecuting officers on the nature of each offense. This paper presents the conditions under which more fraud will be observed in an economy where an IFB conducts all audits than in an economy where each insurance company is responsible for its own investigation. Even if fraud increases, policyholders may be better off than in economy lacking an IFB. One unambiguous case where policyholders are always better is when the IFB conducts every investigation at a cost that is equal to the industry's average.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008766413327
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