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  • Journals
  • Articles  (31,795)
  • 2005-2009  (31,795)
  • Economics  (31,795)
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  • Books  (75)
  • Journals
  • Articles  (31,795)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Property Rights Protection of Biotechnology Innovations (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Protection of intellectual property embedded in self-replicating biological innovations, such as genetically modified seed, presents two problems for the innovator: the need for copy protection of intellectual property and price competition between new seed and reproduced seed. We consider three regimes in two periods with asymmetric information: short-term contracts, biotechnological protection, and long-term contracts. We find that piracy imposes more intense competition for seed sales than does durability alone. Technology protection systems yield highest firm profit and long-term contracts outperform short-term contracts. Farmers prefer, in order, long-term, short-term, and biotechnical protection. Depending on monitoring cost, long-term contracts may be socially preferred to short-term contracts, with both preferred to biotechnical protection.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00083.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at Drouot (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies multi-unit ascending (English) auctions with a buyer's option. The buyer's option gives the winner of an auction the right to purchase any number of units at the winning price. We develop a theoretical model and derive the optimal strategies for the bidders. The model predicts various behavioral implications (e.g., the winner never exercises the option, the price declines…) that are tested using a unique data set on wine auctions held at the Paris-based auction house Drouot. We also analyze why the buyer's option is used. Estimating the model in a structural econometric way, and using counterfactual comparisons, we find that the buyer's option does not affect the seller's revenue (relative to a system where the units are auctioned sequentially without the option). Drouot, however, saves a lot of time with the option and this effect represents a considerable amount of money. The time-saving effect seems thus to be the primary purpose of the buyer's option.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00084.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An Econometric Analysis of Brand-Level Strategic Pricing Between Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo. (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate market structure and strategic pricing for leading brands sold by Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo. in the context of a flexible demand specification (i.e., nonlinear AIDS) and structural price equations. Our flexible and generalized approach does not rely upon the often used ad hoc linear approximations to demand and profit-maximizing first-order conditions, and the assumption of Nash-Bertrand competition. We estimate a conjectural variation model and test for different brand-level pure strategy games. This approach of modeling market competition using the nonlinear Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation method provides insights into the nature of imperfect competition and the extent of market power. We find no support for a Nash-Bertrand or Stackelberg Leadership equilibrium in the brand-level pricing game. Results also provide insights into the unique positioning of PepsiCo.'s Mountain Dew brand.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00087.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Strategic investment models, though popular in the theoretical literature, have rarely been tested empirically. This paper develops a model of strategic investment in inpatient procedure markets, which are well-suited to empirical tests of this behavior. Potential entrants are easy to identify in such markets, enabling the researcher to accurately estimate the entry threat faced by different incumbents. I derive straightforward empirical tests of entry deterrence from a model of patient demand, procedure quality, and differentiated product competition. Using hospital data on electrophysiological studies, an invasive cardiac procedure, I find evidence of entry-deterring investment. These findings suggest that competitive motivations play a role in treatment decisions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00072.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Competing for the Public Through the News Media (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Interest groups seek to influence economic activity through public and private politics. Public politics takes place in the arena of public institutions, whereas private politics takes place outside public institutions often in the arena of public sentiment. Private politics refers to action by interest groups directed at private parties, as in the case of an activist group launching a campaign against a firm. This paper presents a model of informational competition between an activist and an industry, where both interest groups seek to influence public sentiment and do so by advocating their positions through the news media. Citizen consumers make both a private consumption decision and a collective choice on the regulation of a product that has an externality associated with it. In the absence of the news organization, the collective choice is not to regulate. The activist and the industry obtain private, hard information on the seriousness of the externality and provide favorable information to the news media and may conceal unfavorable information. The news media can conduct investigative journalism to obtain its own information, and based on that information and the information it has received from its sources, provides a news report to the public. Because of its role in society, the media has an incentive to bias its report, and the direction of bias is toward regulation. Its bias serves to mitigate both market failure by decreasing demand and a government failure by shifting votes in favor of regulation. The activist then has incentive to conceal information unfavorable to its interests, whereas the industry fully reveals its information.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00044.x
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00038.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Disintegration (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: With economies of scale, a vertically integrated firm can lower its upstream cost by supplying downstream competitors. The competitors may strategically choose not to purchase from the integrated firm, unless the latter's price for the intermediate good is sufficiently lower than those of alternative suppliers. In a simple model of dynamic scale economies through learning by doing, equilibrium vertical disintegration occurs if and only if total industry profit is higher under vertical separation than under integration. The model bridges a logical gap in George Stigler's classic theory on vertical organization, and sheds light on the widely observed phenomenon of vertical disintegration.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2005.00040.x
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effects of Competition on Variation in the Quality and Cost of Medical Care (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We estimate the effects of hospital competition on the level of and the variation in quality of care and hospital expenditures for elderly Medicare beneficiaries with heart attack. We compare competition's effects on more-severely ill patients, whom we assume value quality more highly, to the effects on less-severely ill, low-valuation patients. We find that low-valuation patients in competitive markets receive less intensive treatment than in uncompetitive markets, but have statistically similar health outcomes. In contrast, high-valuation patients in competitive markets receive more intensive treatment than in uncompetitive markets, and have significantly better health outcomes. Because this competition-induced increase in variation in expenditures is, on net, expenditure-decreasing and outcome-beneficial, we conclude that it is welfare-enhancing. These findings are inconsistent with conventional models of vertical differentiation, although they can be accommodated by more recent models.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00074.x
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    How to Regulate Heterogeneous Hospitals? (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In many areas of health care financing, there is controversy over the sources of cost variability and about the respective roles of inefficiency versus legitimate heterogeneity. This paper proposes a payment system that creates incentives to increase hospital efficiency when hospitals are heterogeneous, without reducing the quality of care. We consider an extension of Shleifer's yardstick competition model and apply an econometric approach to identify and evaluate observable and unobservable sources of cost heterogeneity. Moral hazard can be seen as the result of two components: long-term moral hazard (hospital management can be permanently inefficient) and transitory moral hazard. The latter is linked to the manager's transitory cost-reducing effort. For instance, he or she can be more or less rigorous each year when bargaining prices for supplies delivered to the hospital by outside firms. The use of a three-dimensional nested database makes it possible to identify transitory moral hazard and to estimate its effect on hospital cost variability. Econometric estimates are performed on a sample of 7,314 stays for acute myocardial infarction observed in 36 French public hospitals over the period 1994–1997. We obtain two alternative payment systems. The first takes all unobservable hospital heterogeneity into account, provided that it is time invariant, whereas the second ignores unobservable heterogeneity. Simulations show that substantial budget savings—at least 20%—can be expected from the implementation of such payment rules. The first method of payment has the great advantage of reimbursing high-quality care. It leads to substantial potential savings because it provides incentives to reduce costs linked to transitory moral hazard, whose influence on cost variability is far from negligible. This payment rule could be extended to other areas of health care financing, such as Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost to calculate Medicare Managed Care reimbursements in the United States.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00075.x
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Prescription Drug Advertising on Doctor Visits (2005)
    350 Main Street , Malden , MA 02148 , USA , and PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road , Oxford OX4 2XG , UK . : Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 14 (2005), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The dramatic increase of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs created intensive debates on its effects on patient and doctor behaviors. Combining 1994–2000 DTCA data with the 1995–2000 National Ambulatory Medical Care Surveys, we examine the effect of DTCA on doctor visits. Consistent with the proponents' claim, we find that higher DTCA expenditures are associated with increased doctor visits, especially after the Food and Drug Administration clarified DTCA rules in August 1997. After 1997, every $28 increase in DTCA leads to one drug visit within 12 months. We also find that the market-expanding effect is similar across demographic groups.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00079.x
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