ALBERT

Description: This paper presents an analysis and critique of Roger Penrose’s epistemological, methodological, and ontological positions. The analysis is relevant not only because Penrose is an influential scientist, but also because of the particular traits of his thought. These traits are directly connected with his background and approach to science: (1) ontological and epistemological realism, (2) mathematical Platonism, (3) emphasis on the continuities of science, (4) epistemological inclusiveness and essential openness of science, (5) the role of common sense, (6) emphasis on the connection between science, ethics, and philosophy. The paper articulates Penrose’s position and criticizes some of its possible shortcomings. It contributes to the perception of science as an open activity, as illustrated in Penrose’s particular approach, and provides an interesting case-study that can contribute to understanding how epistemological and ontological positions are connected with particular scientific practices.

Description: This paper presents a theory of scientific study which is regarded as a social learning process of (working) scientific knowledge creation, revision, application, monitoring (e.g., confirmation) and dissemination (e.g., publication) with the aim of securing good quality, general, objective, testable and complete scientific knowledge of the domain. The theory stipulates the aim of scientific study that forms the basis of its principles. It also makes seven assumptions about scientific study and defines the major participating entities (i.e., scientists, scientific knowledge and enabling technical knowledge). It extends a recent process model of scientific study into a detailed interaction model as this process model already addresses many issues of philosophy of science. The detailed interaction model of scientific study provides a common template of scientific activities for developing logical (data) models in different scientific disciplines (for physical database implementation), or alternatively for developing (domain) ontologies of different scientific disciplines. Differences between research and scientific studies are discussed, and a possible way to develop a scientific theory of scientific study is described.

Description: The notion of feedback has been exploited with considerable success in scientific and technological fields as well as in the sciences of man and society. Its use in philosophical, cultural and educational contexts, however, is still rather meagre, even if some notable attempts can be found in the literature. This paper shows that the feedback concept can help learn and understand some classical philosophical theories. In particular, attention focuses on Fichte’s doctrine of science, usually presented in obscure terms following its inventor’s style, and on the vulgate version of Hegel’s dialectic. Also a classic problem of linguistics concerning the meaning of sentences in partially unknown languages is interpreted with the aid of feedback diagrams. Even if the analysis is only qualitative, it is believed that it may serve as a useful tool for thought for both students and researchers.

Description: “Freedom” is a phenomenon in the natural world. This phenomenon—and indirectly the question of free will—is explored using a variety of systems-theoretic ideas. It is argued that freedom can emerge only in systems that are partially determined and partially random, and that freedom is a matter of degree. The paper considers types of freedom and their conditions of possibility in simple living systems and in complex living systems that have modeling (cognitive) subsystems. In simple living systems, types of freedom include independence from fixed materiality, internal rather than external determination, activeness that is unblocked and holistic, and the capacity to choose or alter environmental constraint. In complex living systems, there is freedom in satisfaction of lower level needs that allows higher potentials to be realized. Several types of freedom also manifest in the modeling subsystems of these complex systems: in the transcending of automatism in subjective experience, in reason as instrument for passion yet also in reason ruling over passion, in independence from informational colonization by the environment, and in mobility of attention. Considering the wide range of freedoms in simple and complex living systems allows a panoramic view of this diverse and important natural phenomenon.

Description: Big historians are attempting to construct a general holistic narrative of human origins enabling an approach to studying the emergence of complexity, the relation between evolutionary processes, and the modern context of human experience and actions. In this paper I attempt to explore the past and future of cosmic evolution within a big historical foundation characterized by physical, biological, and cultural eras of change. From this analysis I offer a model of the human future that includes an addition and/or reinterpretation of technological singularity theory with a new theory of biocultural evolution focused on the potential birth of technological life: the theory of atechnogenesis. Furthermore, I explore the potential deep futures of technological life and extrapolate towards two hypothetical versions of an ‘Omega Civilization’: expansion and compression.

Description: Our purpose in this essay is to introduce new concepts (dynamic architecture and dynamic ecological organism-niche unity, among other) in a wide and recursive view of the systemic consequences of the following biological facts that I (Maturana in Biology of cognition, 1970 , Unity and diversity of man. Le Seuil, Paris, 1978 ; Maturana and Varela in Autopoiesis and cognition: the realization of the living. D. Riedel Publishing Co, Boston, 1980 , El Árbol del Conocimiento: Las Bases Biológicas del Conocer Humano, 1a Edición. Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1984 ; Maturana and Mpodozis in Rev Chil Hist Nat 73:261–310, 2000 ) and we (Maturana and Dávila in Habitar humano: en seis ensayos de biología-cultural. Juan Carlos Sáez Editorial, Chile, 2008 ) have presented that can be resumed as: (1) that as living systems we human beings are molecular autopoietic system; (2) that living systems live only as long as they find themselves in a medium that provides them with all the conditions that make the realization of their living possible, that is, in the continuous conservation of their relation of adaptation to the circumstances in which they find themselves; (3) that as a living system exists only in a relation of adaptation with the medium that operates as its ecological niche, its reproduction necessarily occurs as a process of systemic duplication or multiplication of the ecological organism-niche unity that it integrates; (4) that the worlds of doings that we generate as languaging beings in our conversations, explanations, reflections and theories are part of our ecological niche; and (5) that we human beings as living beings that exist in languaging, are biological–cultural beings in which our cultural and our biological manners of existences can be distinguished but cannot be separated. Of the systemic consequences of these biological facts that we consider in this essay, we wish to mention two as the principal: (1) that the diversification of manners of living produced in biological evolution is the result of differential survival in a changing medium through the conservation of adaptation, and not through competitive survival of the best; and (2) that we in our living as languaging human beings (observers) are the epistemological fundament of all that we do and know as such.

Description: In some sense, both ontological and epistemological problems related to individuation have been the focal issues in the philosophy of mathematics ever since Frege. However, such an interest becomes manifest in the rise of structuralism as one of the most promising positions in recent philosophy of mathematics. The most recent controversy between Keränen and Shapiro seems to be the culmination of this phenomenon. Rather than taking sides, in this paper, I propose to critically examine some common assumptions shared by both parties. In particular, I shall focus on their assumptions on (1) haecceity as an individual essence, (2) haecceity as a property, (3) the classification of properties, and thereby (4) the search for the principle of individuation in terms of properties. I shall argue that all these assumptions are mistaken and ungrounded from Scotus’ point of view. Further, I will fathom what consequences would follow, if we reject each of these assumptions.

Description: To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on procedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones.

Description: The aim of science is the explanation of complicated systems by reducing it to simple subsystems. According to a millennia-old imagination this will be attained by dividing matter into smaller and smaller pieces of it. The popular superstition that smallness implies simplicity seems to be ineradicable. However, since the beginning of quantum theory it would be possible to realize that the circumstances in nature are exactly the other way round. The idea “smaller becomes simpler” is useful only down to the atoms of chemistry. Planck’s formula shows that smaller extensions are related to larger energies. That more and more energy should result in simpler and simpler structures, this does not only sound absurd, it is absurd. A reduction to really simple structures leads one to smallest energies and, thus, to utmost extended quantum systems. The simplest quantum structure, referred to as quantum bit, has a two-dimensional state space, and it establishes a cosmological structure. Taking many of such quantum bits allows also for the construction of localized particles. The non-localized fraction of quantum bits can appear as “dark matter”.

Description: The underdetermination thesis poses a threat to rational choice of scientific theories. We discuss two arguments for the thesis. One draws its strength from deductivism together with the existence thesis, and the other is defended on the basis of the failure of a reliable inductive method. We adopt a partially subjective/objective pragmatic Bayesian epistemology of science framework, and reject both arguments for the thesis. Thus, in science we are able to reinstate rational choice called into question by the underdetermination thesis.

Description: In a previous essay we demonstrated that quantum mechanical formalism is incompatible with some necessary principles of the mechanism conception still dominant in the physicist’s community. In this paper we show, based on recent empirical evidence in quantum physics, the inevitability of abandoning the old mechanism conception and to construct a new one in which physical reality is seen as a representation which refers to relations established through operations made by us in a world that we are determining. This change is profound and radical, with immediate consequences on both Ontology and Epistemology. This work is our contribution to try to make more concrete how this new conception of the world might be.

Description: The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events.

Description: Aharonov and Bohm (Phys Rev 115:485–491, 1959 ) showed that, far from being merely a mathematical tool, the vector potential \(A\) can have a microphysical effect even when irrotational, in which case the magnetic field is null. Still, at first sight there is something weird about this situation. Do we have to admit a new force? I argue that there is no paradox in the potentials-formulation of electrodynamics, for it shows that, while “ \(\nabla \times A = 0\) ” represents a vanishing magnetic field, it alters the motion of charged matter dragged by the electric field.

Description: When creating theory to understand or implement change at the social and/or organizational level, it is generally accepted that part of the theory building process includes a process of abstraction. While the process of abstraction is well understood, it is not so well understood how abstractions “fit” together to enable the creation of better theory. Starting with a few simple ideas, this paper explores one way we work with abstractions. This exploration challenges the traditionally held importance of abstracting concepts from experience. That traditional focus has been one-sided—pushing science toward the discovery of data without the balancing process that occurs with the integration of the data. Without such balance, the sciences have been pushed toward fragmentation. Instead, in the present paper, new emphasis is placed on the relationship between abstract concepts. Specifically, this paper suggests that a better theory is one that is constructed of concepts that exist on a similar level of abstraction. Suggestions are made for quantifying this claim and using the insights to enable scholars and practitioners to create more effective theory.

Description: How can thought experiments lead to new empirical knowledge if they do not make use of empirical information? This puzzle has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science. It arises in conceptual metaphor research as well and is especially important for the clarification of its empirical foundations. The aim of the paper is to suggest a possible solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research. The solution rests on the application of a novel metatheoretical framework that conceives of linguistic theorizing as a process of plausible argumentation. The central idea of the solution is that through the dynamic feedback mechanism of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of information, thought experiments in conceptual metaphor research may indirectly supply the process of plausible argumentation with empirical knowledge.

Description: In this paper, I discuss the concept of complexity. I show that the principle of natural selection as acting on complexity gives a solution to the problem of reconciling the seemingly contradictory notion of generally increasing complexity and the observation that most species don’t follow such a trend. I suggest the process of evolution to be illustrated by means of a schematic diagram of complexity versus time, interpreted as a form of the Tree of Life. The suggested model implies that complexity is cumulatively increasing, giving evolution a direction, an arrow of time, thus also implying that the latest emerging species will be the one with the highest level of complexity. Since the human species is the last species evolved in the evolutionary process seen at large, this means that we are the species with the highest complexity. The model implies that the human species constitutes an integral part of organic evolution, yet rendering us the exclusive status as the species of the highest complexity.

Description: This final reply responds to Honohan’s invitation to articulate the Arendtian tone of the key-note paper. It spells out the philosophical intuition that the political life of citizens, at least potentially, is capable of making visible what makes human life worthwhile and fully meaningful, and the philosophical curiosity to see whether traces of this deep political awareness can be retrieved in dialogues with volunteers. In response to Dekker’s critical doubts, this final reply clarifies the central stakes of Claes’s paper. The core argument was not to show that the biographical model of meaningfulness is the prevailing approach of meaning in/of volunteering, but to assess the potentials and limits of the model’s interpretive power. Moreover, the paper argues for an alternative, existential model of meaningfulness. This approach refers to deep experiences of meaning that emerge from the practice of volunteering and that shift into powerful political experiences of hope, and a lived sense of equality.

Description: In this comment-response Mikael Lindfelt makes some suggestions to how one could develop the argument for wit(h)nessing as experiencing meaningfulness in life as put forward by Nicole Note and Emilie Van Deale. While being positive to the main phenomenological approach, and especially the dialectical relational aspect of the phenomenological argument, Lindfelt uses Alain Badiou’s talk of Event in trying both to develop the phenomenological argument and to point out some idealistic tendencies in the line of the argument. Lindfelt suggests that the aspect of uniqueness in the relational experience of the other should be taken to more radically than suggested by Note and Van Deale. By pointing out the dialectical fragility of the Event of wit(h)nessing Lindfelt is arguing for that the concept of respect could be more utilized in arguing for the experience of meaning seen as a gift.

Description: One important role of belief systems is to allow us to represent information about a certain domain of inquiry. This paper presents a formal framework to accommodate such information representation. Three cognitive models to represent information are discussed: conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors in Conceptual spaces: the geometry of thought . MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000 ), state-spaces (van Fraassen in Quantum mechanics: an empiricist view . Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 ), and the problem spaces familiar from artificial intelligence. After indicating their weakness to deal with partial information, it is argued that an alternative, formulated in terms of partial structures (da Costa and French in Science and partial truth . Oxford University Press, New York, 2003 ), can be provided which not only captures the positive features of these models, but also accommodates the partiality of information ubiquitous in science and mathematics.

Description: This introductory article starts by describing the genesis of this special issue and the interconnection of its topics. The editors offer a variety of reading entries into the key-note articles and responses. The article reconstructs the research interests underpinning the idea of integrating meaningfulness, volunteers and citizenship. It highlights the explicit interdisciplinary design of the special issue, and shows how the key-note authors, and their respondents, weave connections between meaningfulness, volunteering and citizenship. And, finally, the editors bring the background understandings of the key-note papers to the foreground, and reconstruct a non-intentional meta-level discussion on two fundamental concepts and their interplay: self and world.

Description: This article argues, firstly, that voluntary civic practices are not doomed to fall prey to a Big Society rhetoric and a cynical politics of cuts in social spending. It all depends on how these civic practices are promoted and what kind of civic discourse is communicated through the channels of social media and public opinion. Secondly, the author highlights the political importance of connecting meaningfulness with citizenship.

Description: This paper draws on an in-depth phenomenological analysis of some interviews taken from volunteers, inviting them to reflect on their lived experiences of meaningfulness in the context of volunteering and citizenship. It is found that while some testimonies reinforce the standard conceptions of meaningfulness, other testimonies vary from it. The main challenge of this contribution consists in phenomenologically describing this alternative picture of meaningfulness, depicted as the event of wit(h)nessing. In a final part, the authors consider how volunteering is at times especially prone to further experiences of wit(h)nessing.

Description: Human language has the characteristic of being open and in some cases polysemic. The word “infinite” is used often in common speech and more frequently in literary language, but rarely with its precise meaning. In this way the concepts can be used in a vague way but an argument can still be structured so that the central idea is understood and is shared with to the partners. At the same time no precise definition is given to the concepts used and each partner makes his own reading of the text based on previous experience and cultural background. In a language dictionary the first meaning of “infinite” agrees with the etymology: what has no end. We apply the word infinite most often and incorrectly as a synonym for “very large” or something that we do not perceive its completion. In this context, the infinite mentioned in dictionaries refers to the idea or notion of the “immeasurably large” although this is open to what the individual’s means by “immeasurably great.” Based on this linguistic imprecision, the authors present a non Cantorian theory of the potential and actual infinite. For this we have introduced a new concept: the homogon that is the whole set that does not fall within the definition of sets established by Cantor.

Description: The use of mathematics in economics has been widely discussed. The philosophical discussion on what mathematics is remains unsettled on why it can be applied to the study of the real world. We propose to get back to some philosophical conceptions that lead to a language-like role for the mathematical analysis of economic phenomena and present some problems of interest that can be better examined in this light. Category theory provides the appropriate tools for these analytical approach.

Description: In 1975, two experimental groups have independently observed the \(4\pi \) -symmetry of neutrons’ spin, when passing through a static magnetic field, using a three-blade interferometer made from a single perfect Si-crystal (analogous to the Mach Zehnder interferometer of light optics). In this article, we provide a complete analysis of the experiment, both from a theoretical and conceptual point of view. Firstly, we solve the Schrödinger equation in the weak potential approximation, to obtain the amplitude of the refracted and forward refracted beams, produced by the passage of neutrons through one of the three plates of the LLL interferometer. Secondly, we analyze their passage through a static magnetic field region. This allows us to find explicit expressions for the intensities of the four beams exiting the interferometer, two of which will be interfering and show a typical \(4\pi \) -symmetry, when the strength of the magnetic field is varied. In the last part of the article, we provide a conceptual analysis of the experiment, showing that a neutron’s phase change, when passing through the magnetic field, is due to a longitudinal Stern–Gerlach effect, and not to a Larmor precession. We also emphasize that these experiments do not prove the observability of the sign change of the wave function, when a neutron is \(2\pi \) rotated, but strongly indicate that the latter, like any other elementary “particle,” would be a genuinely non-spatial entity.

Description: Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the existence of their correlata (measurement outcomes), and having justified the distinction between a domain in which outcome-indicating events occur and a domain whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events, it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference between the manifested world and its manifestation. A single, intrinsically undifferentiated Being manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations. This atemporal process implies a new kind of causality and sheds new light on the mysterious nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Unlike other realist interpretations, which proceed from an evolving-states formulation, the present interpretation proceeds from Feynman’s formulation of the theory, and it introduces a new interpretive principle, replacing the collapse postulate and the eigenvalue–eigenstate link of evolving-states formulations. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it warrants the claim that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are identical in the strong sense of numerical identical. They are the aforementioned intrinsically undifferentiated Being, which manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations.

Description: Over the past few decades the notion of symmetry has played a major role in physics and in the philosophy of physics. Philosophers have used symmetry to discuss the ontology and seeming objectivity of the laws of physics. We introduce several notions of symmetry in mathematics and explain how they can also be used in resolving different problems in the philosophy of mathematics. We use symmetry to discuss the objectivity of mathematics, the role of mathematical objects, the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics and the relationship of mathematics to physics.

Description: Very large databases are a major opportunity for science and data analytics is a remarkable new field of investigation in computer science. The effectiveness of these tools is used to support a “philosophy” against the scientific method as developed throughout history. According to this view, computer-discovered correlations should replace understanding and guide prediction and action. Consequently, there will be no need to give scientific meaning to phenomena, by proposing, say, causal relations, since regularities in very large databases are enough: “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves”. The “end of science” is proclaimed. Using classical results from ergodic theory, Ramsey theory and algorithmic information theory, we show that this “philosophy” is wrong. For example, we prove that very large databases have to contain arbitrary correlations. These correlations appear only due to the size, not the nature, of data. They can be found in “randomly” generated, large enough databases, which—as we will prove—implies that most correlations are spurious. Too much information tends to behave like very little information. The scientific method can be enriched by computer mining in immense databases, but not replaced by it.

Description: Axiomatization is uncommon outside mathematics, partly for being often viewed as embalming, partly because the best-known axiomatizations have serious shortcomings, and partly because it has had only one eminent champion, namely David Hilbert (Math Ann 78:405–415, 1918 ). The aims of this paper are (a) to describe what will be called dual axiomatics , for it concerns not just the formalism, but also the meaning (reference and sense) of the key concepts; and (b) to suggest that every instance of dual axiomatics presupposes some philosophical view or other. To illustrate these points, a theory of solidarity will be crafted and axiomatized, and certain controversies in both classical and quantum physics, as well as in the philosophy of mind, will be briefly discussed. The upshot of this paper is that dual axiomatics, unlike the purely formal axiomatics favored by the structuralists school, is not a luxury but a tool helping resolve some scientific controversies.

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉The Vitruvian Man of Leonardo da Vinci is one of the most famous and most studied drawings over the world as well as one of the most reproduced ones, e.g. in coins (Italian euros), space suit patches (NASA), books and movies. The aim of the present work is to discuss the Vitruvian Man as a figurative representation of the Leonardo’s scientific method. Our analysis is based on scientific elements both present in the drawing and provided by Leonardo in his approach to this drawing. Our thesis is that the square symbolizes the measurable physical world and that the man inscribed within the square refers to the physics measurement process based on the operational definition of quantities, including the measurement unit system and the quantities conversion factors. Therefore, the measurement process is fundamental for the Leonardo’s approach to the scientific knowledge, albeit, the drawing also suggests that this latter does not correspond with the true knowledge. The circle, which has a different center with respect to the square, symbolizes the truth, to which the man inscribed in the square yearns, without ever achieving it, the truth being reachable only by the man inscribed within the circle.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉We present a novel approach to represent ecological systems using reaction networks, and show how a particular framework called chemical organization theory (COT) sheds new light on the longstanding complexity–stability debate. Namely, COT provides a novel conceptual landscape plenty of analytic tools to explore the interplay between structure and stability of ecological systems. Given a large set of species and their interactions, COT identifies, in a computationally feasible way, each and every sub-collection of species that is closed and self-maintaining. These sub-collections, called organizations, correspond to the groups of species that can survive together (co-exist) in the long-term. Thus, the set of organizations contains all the stable regimes that can possibly happen in the dynamics of the ecological system. From here, we propose to conceive the notion of stability from the properties of the organizations, and thus apply the vast knowledge on the stability of reaction networks to the complexity–stability debate. As an example of the potential of COT to introduce new mathematical tools, we show that the set of organizations can be equipped with suitable joint and meet operators, and that for certain ecological systems the organizational structure is a non-boolean lattice, providing in this way an unexpected connection between logico-algebraic structures, popular in the foundations of quantum theory, and ecology.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉In the aftermath of the modern science world scientists are still searching for some kind of ontological and epistemological common ground. In this paper I try to show that we, by the aid of Michael Polanyi’s concepts of knowledge, of personal as well as objective knowledge, and his descriptions of the tacit dimensions in the process of knowing, can take some substantial steps toward a better understanding of the contemporary scientific conduct.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉In this paper, we reject commonly accepted views on fundamentality in science, either based on bottom-up construction or top-down reduction to isolate the alleged 〈em〉fundamental entities〈/em〉. We do not introduce any new scientific methodology, but rather describe the current scientific methodology and show how it entails an inherent search for foundations of science. This is achieved by phrasing (minimal sets of) metaphysical assumptions into falsifiable statements and define as fundamental those that survive empirical tests. The ones that are falsified are rejected, and the corresponding philosophical concept is demolished as a prejudice. Furthermore, we show the application of this criterion in concrete examples of the search for fundamentality in quantum physics and biophysics.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉The philosophical problem of 〈em〉personal identity〈/em〉 has been widely discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. The disputes over identity throughout time abound in references to thought experiments, excluding any connection to practical problems or to scientific knowledge and biotechnological practices. Nevertheless, some real cases challenge the pure metaphysical formulation of the problem and also show how science has an indubitable impact on the issue of identity. I will discuss the case of approximately 500 children who were 〈em〉appropriated〈/em〉 during the most recent Argentinian dictatorship (1976–1983), as well as their 〈em〉restitution〈/em〉 thanks to 〈em〉Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo〈/em〉’s fight and certain genetics outcomes. I will examine an alleged notion of 〈em〉genetic identity〈/em〉 thought to have stemmed from the restitution phenomenon; and I will argue against some criticisms to that notion departing from contemporary philosophy of biology and philosophy of science. Particularly, I will discuss if a genetic stance of personal individual identity can be considered as supported by contemporary biological knowledge; and if a pluralistic perspective on scientific practice that appraises the role of values allows us to maintain the reference to DNA regarding identity but overcoming aforementioned criticisms.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Continuity as appears to us immediately by intuition (in the flow of time and in motion) differs from its current formalization, the 〈em〉arithmetical continuum〈/em〉 or equivalently the set of real numbers used in modern mathematical analysis. Motivated by the known mathematical and physical problems arising from this formalization of the continuum, our aim in this paper is twofold. Firstly, by interpreting Chaitin’s variant of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem as an inherent uncertainty or fuzziness of the arithmetical continuum, a formal set-theoretic entropy is assigned to the arithmetical continuum. Secondly, by analyzing Noether’s theorem on symmetries and conserved quantities, we argue that whenever the four dimensional space-time continuum containing a single, stationary, asymptotically flat black hole is modeled by the arithmetical continuum in the mathematical formulation of general relativity, the hidden set-theoretic entropy of this latter structure reveals itself as the entropy of the black hole (proportional to the area of its “instantaneous” event horizon), indicating that this apparently physical quantity might have a pure set-theoretic origin, too.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉This paper refers to a subjective approach to Ecosystems, referred to as Impure Systems to capture a set of fundamental properties. There are four main phenomenological components: directionality, intensity, connection energy and volume. A fundamental question in this approach to Impure Systems is the intensity or forces of a relation. Concepts as the system volume, and propose a system thermodynamic theory based in the Law of Zipf and the temperature of information are introduced. It hints at the possibility of adapting the fractal theory by introducing the fractal dimension of the system.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Early 20th century philosopher Henri Bergson posited an initial push that propelled the diversity of life forward into a varied, novel future: The 〈em〉élan vital〈/em〉, a necessary force or impulse that animated life’s progress and development. His idea had largely been abandoned by mid-century. Even so, much of the conceptual and explanatory work this impulse targeted is yet in want of an explanation. In particular, Bergson’s derelict ideas on evolution addressed three areas that have once again become relevant in the effort to unite evolutionary genetics, biological development, and ecological context (often shortened to evo/devo/eco): (1) the purposeful nature of individual organisms and their parts; (2) the integrative, holistic, non-linear emergent dynamics seen in evolutionary processes; and (3) how genuine novelty emerges into the universe (Ellegren and Galtier in Nat Rev Genet 17(7):422, 〈span〉2016〈/span〉; Simondon et al. in On the mode of existence of technical objects. Univocal series, Univocal Publishing LLC, Minneapolis, 〈span〉2017〈/span〉; Bang, in: Winther-Lindqvist, Bang, Valsiner (eds) Nothingness: philosophical insights into psychology, Transaction Publishers, Somerset, 〈span〉2016〈/span〉; Moreno and Mossio in Biological autonomy: a philosophical and theoretical enquiry. History, philosophy and theory of the life sciences, Springer, Dordrecht, 〈span〉2015〈/span〉). In this paper I argue that Bergson’s ideas may yet be relevant to these questions, and his work warrants a reexamination in light of current problems in evolutionary biology. This is not a call to ‘return’ to Bergson, nevertheless his notions about complexity suggest ways of looking at current biological problems in ways that offer a heuristic insight worth entertaining. Bergson’s Nobel Prize-winning book, 〈em〉Creative Evolution〈/em〉, provided a strikingly prescient early 20th century framework for understanding how Darwinian evolution acts as an engine for generating new forms (Bergson in Creative evolution (M. Vaughan, trans., vol. 231), University Press of America, Lanham, Bergson 〈span〉1911〈/span〉).〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉When two bodies collide with each other, they change their motion. Many physics textbooks explain that the change in motion is 〈em〉caused〈/em〉 by the force or impulse exerted on the body during the collision. This is not the whole story, I argue, in case the bodies are 〈em〉rigid〈/em〉. In this case, the change in motion cannot be causally explained solely by how the bodies are configured before and during the collision but instead should be explained partly by what happens after the collision. That is, the collision between rigid bodies should better be interpreted as a case of 〈em〉retrocausation〈/em〉 where the future causally affects the past or present. This retrocausal interpretation of the collision does not suffer a general problem raised against retrocausation, known as the 〈em〉bilking〈/em〉 argument. And how the influence of the cause propagates backward in time to the effect in the collision is no more mysterious than how a body moves continuously in classical mechanics or how the future affects the past in proposed retrocausal models for the EPR thought experiment in quantum mechanics.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉The aim of the paper is to argue for the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed by ancient authors to Thales. These results are late ascriptions and so it is difficult to say anything certain about them on 〈em〉philological grounds〈/em〉. I will seek characteristic features of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales by comparing them with Galilean physics. This might seem at a first sight a rather unusual move. Nevertheless, I suggest viewing the process of turning geometry into an axiomatic-deductive science as a 〈em〉process of idealization in mathematics〈/em〉 that is parallel to the process of idealization in physics. In Kvasz (Acta Phys Slovaca 62:519–614, 2012) I offered an epistemological reconstruction of the process of idealization in physics during the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. In the present paper I try to employ these epistemological insights in the 〈em〉process of idealization in physics〈/em〉 and propose a reconstruction of the cognitive unity of the mathematical results ascribed to Thales, who can, on the basis of these ascriptions, be seen as one of the initiators of idealization in mathematics.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉I investigate the construction of the mathematical concept of quaternion from a methodological and heuristic viewpoint to examine what we can learn from it for the study of the advancement of mathematical knowledge. I will look, in particular, at the 〈em〉inferential microstructures〈/em〉 that shape this construction, that is, the study of both the very first, 〈em〉ampliative〈/em〉 inferential steps, and their tentative outcomes—i.e. small ‘structures’ such as provisional entities and relations. I discuss how this paradigmatic case study supports the recent approaches to problem-solving and philosophy of mathematics, and how it suggests refinements of them. In more detail, I argue that the inferential micro-structures enable us to shed more light on the informal, heuristic side of mathematical practice, and its inferential and rational procedures. I show how they enable the generation of a problem, the construction of its conditions of solvability, the search for a hypothesis to solve it, and how these processes are representation-sensitive. On this base, I argue that: 〈/p〉 〈ol〉 〈li〉 〈p〉the recent development of the philosophy of mathematics was right in moving 〈em〉from〈/em〉 Lakatos’ initial investigation of the formal side of a mathematical proof 〈em〉to〈/em〉 the investigation of the semi-formal (or informal), heuristic side of the mathematical practice as a way of understanding mathematical knowledge and its advancement.〈/p〉 〈/li〉 〈li〉 〈p〉The investigation of mathematical practice and discovery can be improved by a finer-grained study of the inferential micro-structures that are built during mathematical problem-solving.〈/p〉 〈/li〉 〈/ol〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Discovery of temporal association patterns, temporal association rules from temporal databases is extensively studied by academic research community and applied in various industrial applications. Temporal association pattern discovery is extended to similarity based temporal association pattern discovery from time-stamped transaction datasets by researchers Yoo and Sashi Sekhar. They introduced methods for pruning through distance bounds, and have also introduced SEQUENTIAL and SPAMINE algorithms for pattern mining that are based on snapshot data scan and lattice data scan strategies respectively. Our previous research introduced algorithms G-SPAMINE, MASTER, Z-SPAMINE for time profiled association pattern discovery. These algorithms applied distance measures SRIHASS, ASTRA, and KRISHNA SUDARSANA for similarity computations. SEQUENTIAL, SPAMINE, G-SPAMINE, MASTER, Z-SPAMINE approaches are all based on snapshot and lattice database scan strategies and prunes temporal itemsets by making use of lower bound, upper bound support time sequences and upper-lower distance bound, lower bound distance values. The major limitation of all these algorithms is their inevitability to eliminate dataset scanning process for knowing true supports of itemsets and essential need to have dataset available in memory. To eliminate the requirement of retaining dataset in main memory, algorithms VRKSHA and GANDIVA are two pioneering research contributions that introduced tree structure for time profiled temporal association mining. VRKSHA is based on snapshot tree scan technique while GANDIVA is a lattice tree scan based approach. VRKSHA and GANDIVA both apply Euclidean distance function, but they do not estimate support and distance bounds. This research introduces the pioneering work ULTIMATE that uses a novel tree structure. The tree is generated using similarity measure ASTRA. ULTIMATE uses support bound and distance bound computations for pruning temporal patterns. Experiment results showed that ULTIMATE outperforms SEQUENTIAL, SPAMINE, G-SPAMINE, MASTER, VRKSHA, GANDIVA algorithms.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉In recent years, Nietzsche’s views on (natural) science attracted a considerable amount of scholarly attention. Overall, his attitude towards science tends to be one of suspicion, or ambivalence at least. My article addresses the “Nietzsche and science” theme from a slightly different perspective, raising a somewhat different type of question, more pragmatic if you like, namely: how to be a Nietzschean philosopher of science today? What would the methodological contours of a Nietzschean approach to present-day research areas (such as neuroscience, astrophysics, synthetic biology or climate studies) amount to? In other words, my paper reflects a shift of focus from author studies to extrapolation. The design of my article is as follows. I will start with the question (already widely discussed in the expert literature) to what extent Friedrich Nietzsche (a classical philologist by training) managed to familiarise himself with the natural sciences of his epoch. Subsequently, I will outline some basic methodological and conceptual ingredients of Nietzsche’s philosophy of science, focussing on core issues such as “genealogy”, “interpretation”, “enhancement” and “truth”. Next, I will elucidate Nietzsche’s genealogical methodology with the help of three case studies (three representative samples if you will) taken from Nietzsche’s writings and dealing with physiology, astronomy and neuro-psychology respectively. Finally, I will present the methodological contours of a Nietzschean understanding of contemporary technoscience.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉In order to solve a system of nonlinear rate equations one can try to use some soliton methods. The procedure involves three steps: (1) find a ‘Lax representation’ where all the kinetic variables are combined into a single matrix 〈span〉 〈span〉\(\rho\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉, all the kinetic constants are encoded in a matrix 〈em〉H〈/em〉; (2) find a Darboux–Bäcklund dressing transformation for the Lax representation 〈span〉 〈span〉\(i{{\dot{\rho }}}=[H,f(\rho )]\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉, where 〈em〉f〈/em〉 models a time-dependent environment; (3) find a class of seed solutions 〈span〉 〈span〉\(\rho =\rho [0]\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉 that lead, via a nontrivial chain of dressings 〈span〉 〈span〉\(\rho [0]\rightarrow \rho [1]\rightarrow \rho [2]\rightarrow \dots\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉 to new solutions, difficult to find by other methods. The latter step is not a trivial one since a non-soliton method has to be employed to find an appropriate initial 〈span〉 〈span〉\(\rho [0]\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉. Procedures that lead to a correct 〈span〉 〈span〉\(\rho [0]\)〈/span〉 〈/span〉 have been discussed in the literature only for a limited class of 〈em〉H〈/em〉 and 〈em〉f〈/em〉. Here, we develop a formalism that works for practically any 〈em〉H〈/em〉, and any explicitly time-dependent 〈em〉f〈/em〉. As a result, we are able to find exact solutions to a system of equations describing an arbitrary number of species interacting through (auto)catalytic feedbacks, with general time dependent parameters characterizing the nonlinearity. Explicit examples involve up to 42 interacting species.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Text document classification and clustering is an important learning task which fits to both data mining and machine learning areas. The learning task throws several challenges when it is required to process high dimensional text documents. Word distribution in text documents plays a very key role in learning process. Research related to high dimensional text document classification and clustering is usually limited to application of traditional distance functions and most of the research contributions in the existing literature did not consider the word distribution in documents. In this research, we propose a novel similarity function for feature pattern clustering and high dimensional text classification. The similarity function proposed is used to carry supervised learning based dimensionality reduction. The important feature of this work is that the word distribution before and after dimensionality reduction is the same. Experiment results prove the proposed approach achieves dimensionality reduction, retains the word distribution and obtained better classification accuracies compared to other measures.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉In this full review paper, the recent emerging trends in Computing Structures, Software Science, and System Applications have been reviewed and explored to address the recent topics and contributions in the era of the Software and Computing fields. This includes a set of rigorously reviewed world-class manuscripts addressing and detailing state-of-the-art, framework, implemented approaches and techniques research projects in the areas of Software Technology & Automation, Networking, Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Big Data and E-learning. Based on this systematic review, we have put some recommendations and suggestions for researchers, practitioners and scholars to improve their research quality in this area.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Detecting Intrusions and anomalies is becoming much more challenging with new attacks popping out over a period of time. Achieving better accuracies by applying benchmark classifier algorithms used for identifying intrusions and anomalies have several hidden data mining challenges. Although neglected by many research findings, one of the most important and biggest challenges is the similarity or membership computation. Another challenge that cannot be simply neglected is the number of features that attributes to dimensionality. This research aims to come up with a new membership function to carry similarity computation that can be helpful for addressing feature dimensionality issues. In principle, this work is aimed at introducing a novel membership function that can help to achieve better classification accuracies and eventually lead to better intrusion and anomaly detection. Experiments are performed on KDD dataset with 41 attributes and also KDD dataset with 19 attributes. Recent approaches CANN and CLAPP have showed new approaches for intrusion detection. The proposed classifier is named as UTTAMA. UTTAMA performed better to both CANN and CLAPP approaches w.r.t overall classifier accuracy. Another promising outcome achieved using UTTAMA is the U2R and R2L attack accuracies. The importance of proposed approach is that the accuracy achieved using proposed approach outperforms CLAPP, CANN, SVM, KNN and other existing classifiers.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉We critically examine the claim that identity is a fundamental concept. According to those putting forward this thesis, there are four related reasons that can be called upon to ground the fundamental character of identity: (1) identity is presupposed in every conceptual system; (2) identity is required to characterize individuality; (3) identity cannot be defined; (4) the intelligibility of quantification requires identity. We address each of these points and argue that none of them advances compelling reasons to hold that identity is fundamental; in fact, most of the tasks that seem to require identity may be performed without identity. So, in the end, identity may not be a fundamental concept after all.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉The history and philosophy of science are destined to play a fundamental role in an epoch marked by a major scientific revolution. This ongoing revolution, principally affecting mathematics and physics, entails a profound upheaval of our conception of space, space–time, and, consequently, of natural laws themselves. Briefly, this revolution can be summarized by the following two trends: (1) by the search for a unified theory of the four fundamental forces of nature, which are known, as of now, as gravity, electromagnetism, and strong and weak nuclear forces; (2) by the search for new mathematical concepts capable of elucidating and therefore explaining such a relationship. In fact, the first search is essentially dependent on the second; that is to say, that in order for a new theory of physics to come to light, the development of a deeper geometric theory capable of explaining the structure of space–time on a quantum scale appears to be necessary. On careful consideration, we notice that both of these developments converge in the direction of a unitary and fundamental tendency of modern science—which is the geometrization of theoretical physics and of natural sciences. This new emergent situation carries within it a profound conceptual change, affecting the way in which relations are conceived of, first and foremost, between mathematics and physics. This new paradigm can be summed up by the intimately interdependent points: (1) the immense variety of physical phenomena and of natural forms follows from the equally infinite variety of geometric and topological objects that can be made out in space and from which space is made up; (2) the second point, which ensues from the former one and which is of great historical and epistemological significance, is that mathematics is involved in rather than applied to phenomena. In other words, phenomena are effects that emerge from the geometrical structure of space–time. There is no doubt that this new conception of the relationship between the universe of mathematical ideas and objects and the world of natural phenomena is the true scientific revolution of our century, of great conceptual importance, and consequently, capable of changing our view of science and of nature at one and the same time. It is all at once of a scientific, philosophical and aesthetic order.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉Demodulating harmful nodes and diminishing the energy waste in sensor nodes can prolong the lifespan of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). In this study, a genetic algorithm (GA) and an adaptive neuro fuzzy inference system were used to diminish the energy waste of sensors. Weighted trust evaluation was applied to search for harmful nodes in the network to prolong the lifespan of WSNs. A low-energy adaptive clustering hierarchy method was used to analyze the results. It was discovered that searching for harmful nodes with GA-ANFIS using weighted trust evaluation significantly increased the lifespan of WSNs. For evaluation of the proposed method we used the mean of energy of all sensors against of the round, data packets received in base station, minimum energy versus rounds and number of alive sensors versus rounds. Also, in this paper we compared the proposed method results with LEACH, LEACH-DT, Random, SIF and GA-Fuzzy methods. As results the proposed method has high life time than other methods. A representation of the overall system was implemented using MATLAB software.〈/p〉

Description: 〈h3〉Abstract〈/h3〉 〈p〉This paper considers non-standard analysis and a recently introduced computational methodology based on the notion of ① (this symbol is called 〈em〉grossone〈/em〉). The latter approach was developed with the intention to allow one to work with infinities and infinitesimals numerically in a unique computational framework and in all the situations requiring these notions. Non-standard analysis is a classical purely symbolic technique that works with ultrafilters, external and internal sets, standard and non-standard numbers, etc. In its turn, the ①-based methodology does not use any of these notions and proposes a more physical treatment of mathematical objects separating the objects from tools used to study them. It both offers a possibility to create new numerical methods using infinities and infinitesimals in floating-point computations and allows one to study certain mathematical objects dealing with infinity more accurately than it is done traditionally. In these notes, we explain that even though both methodologies deal with infinities and infinitesimals, they are independent and represent two different philosophies of Mathematics that are not in a conflict. It is proved that texts (Gutman et al. in Found Sci 22(3):539–555, 〈span〉2017〈/span〉; Gutman and Kutateladze in Sib Math J 49(5):835–841, 〈span〉2008〈/span〉; Kutateladze in J Appl Ind Math 5(1):73–75, 〈span〉2011〈/span〉) asserting that the ①-based methodology is a part of non-standard analysis unfortunately contain several logical fallacies. Their attempt to show that the ①-based methodology can be formalized within non-standard analysis is similar to trying to show that constructivism can be reduced to the traditional Mathematics.〈/p〉

Description: The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role of abstraction and idealization in Galileo’s scientific inquiries into the law of free falling motion, and their importance in the history of science. Because there is no consensus on the use of the terms “abstraction” and “idealization” in the literature, it is necessary to distinguish between them at the outset. This paper will argue (1) for the importance of abstraction and idealization in physics and the theories and laws of physics constructed with abduction from observations and (2) that these theoretical laws of physics should be tested with deduction and induction thorough quasi-idealized entities rather than empirical results in the everyday world. Galileo’s work is linked to thought experiments in natural science. Galileo, using thought experiments based on idealization, persuaded others that what had been proven true for a ball on an inclined plane would be equally true for a ball falling through a vacuum.

Description: In the Reality we know, we cannot say if something is infinite whether we are doing Physics, Biology, Sociology or Economics. This means we have to be careful using this concept. Infinite structures do not exist in the physical world as far as we know. So what do mathematicians mean when they assert the existence of ω (the mathematical symbol for the set of all integers)? There is no universally accepted philosophy of mathematics but the most common belief is that mathematics touches on another worldly absolute truth. Many mathematicians believe that mathematics involves a special perception of an idealized world of absolute truth. This comes in part from the recognition that our knowledge of the physical world is imperfect and falls short of what we can apprehend with mathematical thinking. The objective of this paper is to present an epistemological rather than an historical vision of the mathematical concept of infinity that examines the dialectic between the actual and potential infinity.

Description: In this review I argue that Puech draws on two important currents in modern thought: the criticism of the ontological and social priority of conflict, and the rehabilitation of praxis vis-à-vis theoria. Still, his plea for a non-confrontational art of living leaves important questions unanswered. What is the problem exactly? What does exactly count as (non)confrontational? What is non-confrontation exactly meant to solve? What is the antiposition here? And: how does this new (or rather: old) art of living relate to the political and ethical varieties of Technology Assessment?

Description: I wholeheartedly sympathize conceptually with Coeckelbergh’s paper. The dialectical relationship between vulnerability and technology constitutes the core of Hegel’s Master and Slave (the primal scene of contemporary philosophy). Yet, the empirical dimension is underdeveloped and Coeckelbergh’s ideas could profit from exposure to case studies. Building on a movie/novel ( Limitless ) devoted to vulnerability coping and living with ICT, I challenge the claim that modern heroism entails overcoming vulnerability with the help of enhancement and computers.

Description: In this reply I try to show that, contrary to Milberry’s apparent assertion, the general intellect of the multitude does not have the explanatory robustness she accredits to it (following both Virno and the Hardt and Negri of the Empire trilogy). Digital network technologies are currently overwhelmingly effective in proletarianizing and disempowering the cognitariat and only an active technopolitics of deproletarianization could reverse this hegemonic situation. In my response to Verbeek, I attempt to correct his misinterpretation (shared by Milberry) of the Stieglerian approach as being dialectical in nature and show that, far from reinstating the humanist dichotomy between human beings and technologies, my analysis assumes their original , albeit fundamentally ambiguous and even ‘uncanny’ [ unheimlich ] interconnection. I conclude with pointing out some implications of this view for a ‘really realistic’ political theory of technology.

Description: This essay shows that a sharp distinction between ethics and aesthetics is unfruitful for thinking about how to live well with technologies, and in particular for understanding and evaluating how we cope with human existential vulnerability, which is crucially mediated by the development and use of technologies such as electronic ICTs. It is argued that vulnerability coping is a matter of ethics and art: it requires developing a kind of art and techne in the sense that it always involves technologies and specific styles of experiencing and dealing with vulnerability, which depend on social and cultural context. It is suggested that we try to find better, perhaps less modern styles of coping with our vulnerability, recognize limits to our attempts to “design” our new forms, and explore what kinds of technologies we need for this project.

Description: This reply to Gunkel and Zwart further reflects on, and responds to, the following main points: the Heideggerian character of my view and the potential link to Kafka (Gunkel), the suggestion that we should become hackers (Gunkel), the interpretation of my approach in terms of the Hegelian Master–Slave dialectic (Zwart), the lack of an empirical dimension (Zwart), and the claim that I think that modern heroism entails overcoming vulnerability (Zwart). I acknowledge Heideggerian influence, reflect on what it could mean to think about living with ICTs (information and communication technologies) as a kind of hacking, comment on the Hegelian interpretation of my approach and its application to human–technology relations, bring novels and films into the discussion (Houellebecq, DeLillo/Cronenberg), and clarify that contemporary works of fiction are not necessarily entirely modern and that it has been a central claim here and in my book that although modern thinking and practice attempts to overcome vulnerability with the help of technologies, this is not successful, or it is illusory.

Description: Realism and surrealism claim, respectively, that a scientific theory is successful because it is true, and because the world operates as if it is true. Lyons (Philosophy of Science 70(5):891–901, 2003 ) criticizes realism and argues that surrealism is superior to realism. I reply that Lyons’s criticisms against realism fail. I also attempt to establish the following two claims: (1) Realism and surrealism lead to a useful prescription and a useless prescription, respectively, on how to make an unsuccessful theory successful. (2) Realism and surrealism give the credit for the success of a theory to an appropriate factor and to an inappropriate factor, respectively. Finally, I point out that surrealism is vulnerable to my pessimistic induction (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014a ) against antirealism.

Description: It is argued that a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible and useful. Current interpretations, from “Copenhagen” to “many worlds” are critically revisited. The difficulties for intuitive models of quantum physics are pointed out and possible solutions proposed. In particular the existence of discrete states, the quantum jumps, the alleged lack of objective properties, measurement theory, the probabilistic character of quantum physics, the wave–particle duality and the Bell inequalities are analyzed. The sketch of a realistic picture of the quantum world is presented. It rests upon the assumption that quantum mechanics is a stochastic theory whose randomness derives from the existence of vacuum fields. They correspond to the vacuum fluctuations of quantum field theory, but taken as real rather than virtual.

Description: ‘The art of living with ICTs (information and communication technologies)’ today not only means finding new ways to cope, interact and create new lifestyles on the basis of the new digital (network) technologies individually , as ‘consumer-citizens’. It also means inventing new modes of living, producing and, not in the least place, struggling collectively , as workers and producers. As the so-called digital revolution unfolds in the context of a neoliberal cognitive and consumerist capitalism, its ‘innovations’ are predominantly employed to modulate and control both production processes and consumer behavior in view of the overall goal of extracting surplus value. Today, the digital networks overwhelmingly destroy social autonomy, instead engendering increasing social heteronomy and proletarianization. Yet it is these very networks themselves, as technical pharmaka in the sense of French ‘technophilosopher’ Bernard Stiegler, that can be employed as no other to struggle against this tendency. This paper briefly explores this possibility by reflecting upon current diagnoses of our ‘technological situation’ by some exemplary post-operaist Marxists from a Stieglerian, pharmacological perspective.

Description: Marc Van den Bosche suggests that Heidegger’s conceptions of Gestell and Gelassenheit , taken together with his analysis of Nietzschean Nihilism (interpreted especially by Wolfgang Schirmacher), depicts our era in a way that “supplements” Andrew Feenberg and Don Ihde’s work. Weaving these sources together, he sees the possibility of our becoming (quoting Schirmacher) “technicians” that “live, in a released way, within the groundless.” Here, I raise some questions about whether the author has really fitted all these sources together and argue that his idea of becoming post-modern “technicians” appears to require that we first practice a very un-Heideggerian kind of “renunciation.”

Description: The neo-liberal reform of the university has had a huge impact on higher education and promises still more changes in the future. Many of these changes have had a negative impact on academic careers, values, and the educational experience. Educational technology plays an important role in the defense of neo-liberal reform, less through actual accomplishment than as a rhetorical justification for supposed “progress.” This paper outlines the main claims and consequences of this rhetorical strategy and its actual effects on the university to date.

Description: In my reply to the commentaries by Babette Babich and Robert C. Scharff I make a distinction between critical remarks and additions that are relevant for my view on philosophy for substantive reasons and others that relate to a style or way of philosophizing. My reply to Scharff concerns the latter. I continue to defend an updated version of Heidegger’s thinking about technology, which I bring together with elements from the work of Don Ihde and Andrew Feenberg. I read all this from the perspective of a neo-pragmatist way of philosophizing, explicitly inspired by Richard Rorty.

Description: Several trends in contemporary philosophy have revived the question of the good life. This article addresses the more elaborate notion of an “art of living” in the specific context of the technosphere on the basis of recent works in philosophy of technology. It also brings ideas from Asian philosophy and from Buddhism in particular into the discussion. The focus is on the notion of non-confrontation, which could lead to a decisive change in the methods and scope of technology assessment within the humanities. The art of living in the technosphere emerges as an existential virtuosity that pertains to practical wisdom.

Description: This essay takes an epistemological perspective on the question of the ‘art of living with technology.’ Such an approach is needed as our everyday notion and understanding of technology keep being framed in the old categories of instrumentalism and essentialism—notwithstanding philosophy of technology’s substantial attempts, in recent times, to bridge the stark dichotomy between those two viewpoints. Here, the persistent dichotomous thinking still characterizing our everyday involvement with technology is traced back to the epistemological distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract.’ Those terms are often contrasted, and a tendency can be found, in the literature as well as in popular discourse, to either conceptually favor one of both or let them collapse into each other. The current essay makes a plea, in an exploratory manner, and on the basis of insights hailing from among others Gregory Bateson and Alfred Korzybski, to not choose either one of those options, but to practice ourselves in navigating ladders of abstraction.

Description: In this article we seek to lay bare a couple of potential conceptual and methodological issues that, we believe, are implicitly present in contemporary philosophy of technology (PhilTech). At stake are (1) the sustained pertinence of and need for coping strategies as to ‘how to live with technology (in everyday life)’ notwithstanding PhilTech’s advancement in its non-essentialist analysis of ‘technology’ as such; (2) the issue of whether ‘living with technology’ is a technological affair or not (or both); and (3) the tightly related question concerning the status of the methodological bedrock of contemporary PhilTech, the ‘empirical turn.’ These matters are approached from the perspective of the philosophical notion of the ‘art of living,’ and our argumentation is developed both as a context for and on the basis of the contributions to the special issue ‘The Art of Living with Technology.’

Description: Abraham Robinson’s framework for modern infinitesimals was developed half a century ago. It enables a re-evaluation of the procedures of the pioneers of mathematical analysis. Their procedures have been often viewed through the lens of the success of the Weierstrassian foundations. We propose a view without passing through the lens, by means of proxies for such procedures in the modern theory of infinitesimals. The real accomplishments of calculus and analysis had been based primarily on the elaboration of novel techniques for solving problems rather than a quest for ultimate foundations. It may be hopeless to interpret historical foundations in terms of a punctiform continuum, but arguably it is possible to interpret historical techniques and procedures in terms of modern ones. Our proposed formalisations do not mean that Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy were pre-Robinsonians, but rather indicate that Robinson’s framework is more helpful in understanding their procedures than a Weierstrassian framework.

Description: We consider processes of emergence within the conceptual framework of the Information Loss principle and the concepts of (1) systems conserving information; (2) systems compressing information; and (3) systems amplifying information. We deal with the supposed incompatibility between emergence and computability tout - court . We distinguish between computational emergence, when computation acquires properties, and emergent computation, when computation emerges as a property. The focus is on emergence processes occurring within computational processes. Violations of Turing-computability such as non-explicitness and incompleteness are intended to represent partially the properties of phenomenological emergence, such as logical openness, given by the observer’s cognitive role; structural dynamics where change regards rules rather than only values; and multi-modelling where multiple non-equivalent models are required to model such structural dynamics. In this way, we validate, from an epistemological viewpoint, models and simulations of phenomenological emergence where the sequence of events constitutes the natural, analogical non-Turing computation which a cognitive complex system can reproduce through learning. Reproducibility through learning is different from Turing-like computational iteration. This paper aims to open a new, non-reductionist understanding of the conceptual relationship between emergence and computability.

Description: This comment is analysing the last section of a paper by Piotr Blaszczyk, Mikhail G. Katz, and David Sherry on alleged misconceptions committed by historians of mathematics regarding the history of analysis, published in this journal in the first issue of 2013. Since this section abounds of wrong attributions and denouncing statements regarding my research and a key publication, the comment serves to rectify them and to recall some minimal methodological requirements for historical research.

Description: In this paper I provide a brief history of the emerging science of conceptual systems, explain some methodologies, their sources of data, and the understandings that they have generated. I also provide suggestions for extending the science-based research in a variety of directions. Essentially, I am opening a conversation that asks how this line of research might be extended to gain new insights—and eventually develop more useful and generally accepted methods for creating and evaluating theory. This effort will support our ability to generate theory that is more effective in practical application as well as accelerating the development of theory to support advances in other sciences.

Description: When Johann and Daniel Bernoulli founded fluid dynamics they encountered several problems. To go beyond the vision of Newtonian particles, a new set of images was needed in order to deal with the spatial extensibility and lack of form of fluids. I point to evidence that analogy was an essential abductive strategy in the creation of this imagery. But its heuristic behavior is complex: analogy can provide an initial model or proto-model that establishes the starting point of a theoretical process, but it can play other roles as well. The historical genesis analyzed here shows that the participation of analogy in physicists’ creativity is not so restricted and that its richness opens up the field for very different roles and strategies in model-based discovery processes. Analogies can crop up intermittently in the evolution of a theory; and they can cooperate with images, extreme case reasoning and thought experiments, and even activate these processes at origin. Although it may seem that the contributions of analogy are generative in the sense of helping to discover new aspects of reality, we must stress the evaluative function that sometimes is performed by analogical reasoning in order to gain confidence. The study of the Bernoulli’s genesis of the foundations of fluid dynamics generates interesting hypotheses about the multiple roles that analogy can play in scientific model-based reasoning.

Description: I offer an analysis of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and its relevancy for the scientific endeavour. I submit that the world is not, and cannot be, rational—only some brained beings are. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth nor a physical law. It is just a guiding metanomological hypothesis justified a posteriori by its success in helping us to unveil the mechanisms that operate in Nature.

Description: The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model (world) of arithmetical theories. It may be interpreted as showing that it is impossible to construct fact-arithmetic. The importance of this conclusion arises in the context of cognitive science. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which is called hyper-slingshot . The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that the former are formulated in the semantic meta-language of mathematical theories without the use of the iota-operator or the lambda-operator as the abstractor, whereas the latter require for their expression at least one of these non-standard term-operators. Hyper-slingshots implement simpler language tools in comparison with those used in conventional slingshots.

Description: The small, the tiny, and the infinitesimal (to quote Paramedic) have been the object of both fascination and vilification for millenia. One of the most vitriolic reviews in mathematics was that written by Errett Bishop about Keisler’s book Elementary Calculus: an Infinitesimal Approach . In this skit we investigate both the argument itself, and some of its roots in Bishop George Berkeley’s criticism of Leibnizian and Newtonian Calculus. We also explore some of the consequences to students for whom the infinitesimal approach is congenial. The casual mathematical reader may be satisfied to read the text of the five act play, whereas the others may wish to delve into the 130 footnotes, some of which contain elucidation of the mathematics or comments on the history.

Description: Reality contains information (significant) that becomes significances in the mind of the observer. Language is the human instrument to understand reality. But is it possible to attain this reality? Is there an absolute reality, as certain philosophical schools tell us? The reality that we perceive, is it just a fragmented reality of which we are part? The work that the authors present is an attempt to address this question from an epistemological, linguistic and logical-mathematical point of view.

Description: We investigate indeterminism in physical observations. For this, we introduce a distinction between genuinely indeterministic ( creation-1 and discovery-1 ) observational processes, and fully deterministic ( creation-2 and discovery-2 ) observational processes, which we analyze by drawing a parallel between the localization properties of microscopic entities, like electrons, and the lateralization properties of macroscopic entities, like simple elastic bands. We show that by removing the randomness incorporated in certain of our observational processes, acquiring over them a better control, we also alter these processes in such a radical way that in the end they do not correspond anymore to the observation of the same property. We thus conclude that a certain amount of indeterminism must be accepted and welcomed in our physical observations, as we cannot get rid of it without also diminishing our discriminative power. We also provide in our analysis some elements of clarification regarding the non-spatial nature of microscopic entities, which we illustrate by using an analogy with the process of objectification of human concepts. Finally, the important notion of relational properties is properly defined, and the role played by indeterminism in their characterization clarified.

Description: This is a response to a claim by Sven Ove Hansson to the effect that Poppers dictum that falsification lies at the heart of all pursuit of science has once and for all been falsified by his study of articles published in Nature during the year 2000. We claim that this is based on a misunderstanding of Poppers philosophy of science interpreting it too literally, and that alternative readings of those papers are fully compliant with falsification. We scrutinize Hansson’s arguments as well as giving an overview of Poppers falsification theory.

Description: Some prominent scientists and philosophers have stated openly that moral and political considerations should influence whether we accept or promulgate scientific theories. This widespread view has significantly influenced the development, and public perception, of intelligence research. Theories related to group differences in intelligence are often rejected a priori on explicitly moral grounds. Thus the idea, frequently expressed by commentators on science, that science is “self-correcting”—that hypotheses are simply abandoned when they are undermined by empirical evidence—may not be correct in all contexts. In this paper, documentation spanning from the early 1970s to the present is collected, which reveals the influence of scientists’ moral and political commitments on the study of intelligence. It is suggested that misrepresenting findings in science to achieve desirable social goals will ultimately harm both science and society.

Description: Points of view are a central phenomenon in human cognition. Although the concept of point of view is ambiguous, there exist common elements in different notions. A point of view is a certain way to look at things around us. In conceptual points of view, things are looked at or interpreted through conceptual lenses. Conceptual points of view are important for epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of science. In this article, a new method to formalize conceptual points of view is introduced. It is based on the conceptual space approach, where concepts are regions of multi-dimensional quality spaces. Points of view, as defined in this article, consist of a selection of relevant dimensions, referred to here as determinables, and of a certain supposition, referred to here as a theory, about the subject content. After considering some early efforts to formalize points of view, the notion of conceptual space is defined and explored. One concept of point of view is defined and developed in the framework of conceptual space, and a new logic for points of view is also outlined. The problem of mind–body correlation is discussed as an example of the application of the notion of points of view. To conclude, the meaning and applications of the new concepts and tools developed in the article are discussed.

Description: This paper presents an approach to the belief system based on a computational framework in three levels: first, the logic level with the definition of binary local rules, second, the arithmetic level with the definition of recursive functions and finally the behavioural level with the definition of a recursive construction pattern. Social communication is achieved when different beliefs are expressed, modified, propagated and shared through social nets. This approach is useful to mimic the belief system because the defined functions provide different ways to process the same incoming information as well as a means to propagate it. Our model also provides a means to cross different beliefs so, any incoming information can be processed many times by the same or different functions as it occurs is social nets.

Description: Systems thinking provides insights into how ideas interact and change, and constructivism is an example of this type of systemic approach. In the 1970s constructivism emphasised the development of mathematical and scientific ideas in children. Recently constructivist ideas are applied much more generally. Here I use this approach to consider beliefs and their role in conflicts and the conditions needed for reconciliation. If we look at Reality in terms of how we construct it as a human cognitive process, we recognise two things. First, that we cannot go beyond our senses and thoughts to what exists independently of us, and second, if we construct what we know we have to take responsibility for this. This inevitably focuses our thinking on the relation we have with the physical and social world, we are a part of the universe rather than apart from it. This paper argues that accepting and understanding these limits of human knowing together with our interconnectedness provide opportunities to understand conflicting positions. To resolve conflict, people with opposing viewpoints have to be prepared to understand each other. That is a challenge because our own reality plays a vital role in our lives, for everything from personal survival to social support.

Description: The importance of mathematics in the context of the scientific and technological development of humanity is determined by the possibility of creating mathematical models of the objects studied under the different branches of Science and Technology. The arithmetisation process that took place during the nineteenth century consisted of the quest to discover a new mathematical reality in which the validity of logic would stand as something essential and central. Nevertheless, in contrast to this process, the development of mathematical analysis within a framework that largely involves intuition and geometry is a fact that cannot go unnoticed amongst the mathematics community, as we shall show in this paper through the research made by Bernhard Riemann on complex variables.

Description: The emerging school of thought called “postphenomenology” offers a distinct understanding of the ways that people experience technology usage. This perspective combines insights from the philosophical tradition of phenomenology with commitments to the anti-essentialism and nonfoundationalism of American pragmatism. One of postphenomenology’s central positions is that technologies always remain “multistable,” i.e., subject to different uses and meanings. But I suggest that as this perspective matures, philosophical problems are emerging around the notion of multistability, what I call “the problem of invariance” and “the problem of grounding.” These problems point out things that remain unclear within the postphenomenological framework, such as how it handles structural claims regarding a technology’s various stabilities, and how it grounds its claims. How can postphenomenology make structural claims about technology and yet remain anti-essentializing? And on what epistemological basis does it ground its claims about human-technology relations? The paper concludes with a series of prescriptions that, if followed, enable postphenomenology to make edifying claims about technology, all while avoiding the problems of invariance and grounding, and maintaining its commitments to anti-essentialism and nonfoundationalism.

Description: Recalling the phenomenological and Hegelian bases of the critique of misplaced concreteness, and supplementing these by the contribution of Gregory Bateson, it is possible to say that a contemporary critique of digital media cannot appeal to an irrevocable concreteness nor finally defeat abstraction. Since the digital media complex is characterized by temporal decay, transversality, and singularity, a new departure for a critical theory of digital media must centre on the cultural unconscious (non-dominant translations) and the limit, or edge, of the cultural complex.

Description: The thoughts that Michel Puech formulates on wisdom, technology and the art of living are timely at a moment when social, ecological and economic problems are pressing upon our societies and the speed of technological development seems to overwhelm our ability to integrate and adapt new technologies in our lives and societies. However, he restricts his concept of wisdom too much to a personal endeavor and overestimates the relevance of non-confrontation. I argue that his project can only be of value when it is embedded in a broader societal and political strategy for change.

Description: This brief commentary on Yoni Van Den Eede’s rumination, “Concrete/Abstract,” explores residual conceptual ambiguities and raises questions about information technologies and the felt sense of primacy regarding selves and communities.

Description: In this response to Pieter Lemmens’ post-autonomist evaluation of the liberatory potential of digital network technologies (DNTs), Kate Milberry finds the concept of pharmakon as a diagnostic to uncover what ails the worker in technocapitalism wanting. Through an exploration of Marxian concepts and critical theory of technology, she explores ways to augment political responses to capitalist exploitation in the digital age. Milberry concludes that it is not possible to change the sociotechnical foundation of contemporary life until we fundamentally alter the capitalist social relations concretized in technology. This can only be done through adopting an ethic of care, that is to say: only through love.

Description: This commentary responds to the suggestion that we can humanize online university education through the design decisions we make about it. It offers several reasons why the suggestion may be unrealistic, given that choice in online course design is increasingly narrowed by the prevalence of relatively powerless part-time instructors, student preference for convenient online offerings, and the use of learning management systems. However, if our design decisions are constrained, it becomes all the more important that we engage in critical conversations about what we gain and lose when technology is used to automate or mediate university education.

Description: In this reply I discuss Ellen Rose’s observations on online education as she has practiced it and Evan Selinger’s concerns about the introduction of big data in the university. Both authors are in agreement that neo-liberalism is restructuring the university, but add new considerations to the argument.

Description: Information and communication technology (ICT) has become the great technological fix of our time and not the least in the education system. There seems to be no end to the hype of ICT and the accompanying promises that education will be revolutionized—“smart” pupils will be made and the so-called knowledge society propelled. This master narrative has many co-authors, some of whom have the best intentions and realize the big challenge of educating the world population. In response to the two insightful reviews of my article, I want to question this master narrative further and in doing so make clear where I agree and disagree with the reviewers.

Description: In this contribution the author tries to formulate an approach to the art of living with technology based on Heidegger’s The Principle of Reason , a work often overlooked by contemporary commentators in the philosophy of technology. This approach couples the concept of releasement to insights hailing from Wolfgang Schirmacher concerning Heidegger’s nihilism.

Description: The entanglement of ethics and technology makes it necessary for us to understand and reflect upon our own practices and to question technological hypes. The information and communication technology (ICT) literacy required to navigate the twenty-first century has to do with recognizing our own human limitations, developing critical measures and acknowledging feelings of estrangement, puzzlement as well as sheer wonder of technology. ICT literacy is indeed all about visions of the good life and the art of living in the twenty-first century. The main focus of this paper is to explore and discuss ICT in relation to pupils and teachers and try to understand why and how these technologies are implemented in the school system. This focus not only allows us to better understand how concepts and habits with respect to ICT are shaped in numerous children, but teaches us to acquire an enhanced sensitivity with regard to ICT in the ‘classic’ literacy context of the educational system.

Description: This commentary is an attempt to rethink the ethics of taking care in posthumanist times. It is an effort to combine ethics, posthumanism and psychological theories. I examine how the psychological notion of long-term well-being can serve as an ethical yardstick and how it can be relevant to non-humans.

Description: I agree with my readers on the necessary alliance of personal agency and collective agency . My point is to prioritize the former. The reasons to prioritize the latter were excellent, and it was undoubtedly a sound decision to start with this scenario: political and institutional improvement of the collectives, enlightened by progressive social sciences. My argument for suggesting a different priority—toward personal microactions and their emergent effects—relies on the opinion that we are stuck in a sustainability crisis due to our current approach. In the question “whose agency now ?”, my stress is on “now”.

Description: Responding to the commentaries by Corey Anton and Ian Angus, I outline anew, and so seek to further clarify, the starting points of and motivations behind my reflection about the concrete-abstract distinction and the ways in which this plays out in technology use, seen from an epistemological standpoint. My eventual purpose is to begin to develop, on the basis of the conceptual exercise, guidelines for an emancipatory ‘art of living with technology,’ that circles around the attempt to think beyond the immediate concrete, into the direction of the ‘abstract conditions’ shaping that ‘concrete.’

Description: This paper develops the notion of “the ICT educator’s fallacy” to point to the mistaken assumption that devices introduced into the classroom will have the precise effects on educational experience expected by designers and curriculum developers. This notion allows for an expansion and refinement of the insights into the imperatives of twenty-first century education set out by Søren Riis.

Description: The question that is the subject of this article is not intended to be a sociological or statistical question about the practice of today’s mathematicians, but a philosophical question about the nature of mathematics, and specifically the method of mathematics. Since antiquity, saying that mathematics is problem solving has been an expression of the view that the method of mathematics is the analytic method, while saying that mathematics is theorem proving has been an expression of the view that the method of mathematics is the axiomatic method. In this article it is argued that these two views of the mathematical method are really opposed. In order to answer the question whether mathematics is problem solving or theorem proving, the article retraces the Greek origins of the question and Hilbert’s answer. Then it argues that, by Gödel’s incompleteness results and other reasons, only the view that mathematics is problem solving is tenable.