ALBERT

Description: In September 2003, NASA signed a nonexclusive license agreement with Armor Forensics, a subsidiary of Armor Holdings, Inc., for the laser scaling device under the Innovative Partnerships Program. Coupled with a measuring program, also developed by NASA, the unit provides crime scene investigators with the ability to shoot photographs at scale without having to physically enter the scene, analyzing details such as bloodspatter patterns and graffiti. This ability keeps the scene's components intact and pristine for the collection of information and evidence. The laser scaling device elegantly solved a pressing problem for NASA's shuttle operations team and also provided industry with a useful tool. For NASA, the laser scaling device is still used to measure divots or damage to the shuttle's external tank and other structures around the launchpad. When the invention also met similar needs within industry, the Innovative Partnerships Program provided information to Armor Forensics for licensing and marketing the laser scaling device. Jeff Kohler, technology transfer agent at Kennedy, added, "We also invited a representative from the FBI's special photography unit to Kennedy to meet with Armor Forensics and the innovator. Eventually the FBI ended up purchasing some units. Armor Forensics is also beginning to receive interest from DoD [Department of Defense] for use in military crime scene investigations overseas."

Description: The topics covered include: The Summer of Hydrogen; Leading Your Leaders; Dawn: Cooperation, not Control; Best Buy: Planning for Disaster The Astronaut Glove Challenge: Big Innovation from a (Very) Small Team; Using the Space Glove to Teach Spatial Thinking; The Power of Story; Interview with Jay O'Callahan; Learning from Space Entrepreneurs; Featured Invention: Laser Scaling Device; Reaching for the APEX at Ames; The Project Manager Who Saved His Country; Choosing and Developing the Right Leadership Styles for Projects; and The Costs of Knowledge.

Description: In 2004 NASA began implementation of the first phases of a new space exploration policy. This implementation effort included the development of a new human-carrying spacecraft, known as Orion; the Altair lunar lander; and two new launch vehicles, the Ares I and Ares V rockets.collectively called the Constellation System (described in Chapter 5 of this report). The Altair lunar lander, which is in the very preliminary concept stage, is not discussed in detail in the report. In 2007 NASA asked the National Research Council (NRC) to evaluate the science opportunities enabled by the Constellation System. To do so, the NRC established the Committee on Science Opportunities Enabled by NASA's Constellation System. In general, the committee interpreted "Constellation-enabled" broadly, to include not only mission concepts that required Constellation, but also those that could be significantly enhanced by Constellation. The committee intends this report to be a general overview of the topic of science missions that might be enabled by Constellation, a sort of textbook introduction to the subject. The mission concepts that are reviewed in this report should serve as general examples of kinds of missions, and the committee s evaluation should not be construed as an endorsement of the specific teams that developed the mission concepts or of their proposals. Additionally, NASA has a well-developed process for establishing scientific priorities by asking the NRC to conduct a "decadal survey" for a particular discipline. Any scientific mission that eventually uses the Constellation System will have to be properly evaluated by means of this decadal survey process. The committee was impressed with the scientific potential of many of the proposals that it evaluated. However, the committee notes that the Constellation System has been justified by NASA and selected in order to enable human exploration beyond low Earth orbit.not to enable science missions. Virtually all of the science mission concepts that could take advantage of Constellation s unique capabilities are likely to be prohibitively expensive. Several times in the past NASA has begun ambitious space science missions that ultimately proved too expensive for the agency to pursue. Examples include the Voyager-Mars mission and the Prometheus program and its Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter spacecraft (both examples are discussed in Chapter 1). Finding: The scientific missions reviewed by the committee as appropriate for launch on an Ares V vehicle fall, with few exceptions, into the "flagship" class of missions. The preliminary cost estimates, based on mission concepts that at this time are not very detailed, indicate that the costs of many of the missions analyzed will be above $5 billion (in current dollars). The Ares V costs are not included in these estimates. All of the costs discussed in this report are presented in current-year (2008) dollars, not accounting for potential inflation that could occur between now and the decade in which these missions might be pursued. In general, preliminary cost estimates for proposed missions are, for many reasons, significantly lower than the final costs. Given the large cost estimates for many of the missions assessed in this report, the potentially large impacts on NASA's budget by many of these missions are readily apparent.

Description: Usually stories have elements of risk, trouble, challenge, adventure. These elements are universal because they're part of life. A story gets exciting when someone takes a risk. With risk there's tension and with tension there's energy, and the energy draws us into who the story. NASA's work involves great risk. Sometimes, as with Challenger and Columbia, the result is tragedy. I had a sense the astronauts were invulnerable. They were so well trained, and the engineers behind them were superb. Nothing was going to go wrong. That's one of the reasons the Challenger crew's death moved people so deeply. Christa McAuliffe was not an engineer; she was a teacher and she died, and the whole space enterprise became very human. The Challenger lifted off and in seventy-three seconds the Space Shuttle disintegrated. Seventy-three seconds. That's a day I'll remember, like the day of Kennedy's death. The danger was there, but we were lulled into thinking the space flight was routine. My firm: job would be to talk with MAS people-scientists, engineers, astronauts. I'm sure that underneath the whole NASA enterprise there is a sense of wonder. Perhaps science and myth are coming together in NASA. The myths of old were often stories about the sun, the stars, and the moon. Now with NASA, we're going out there. NASA is turning our eyes heavenward just as the ancients did.

Description: The challenge of extending students' skills in spatial thinking to astronomical scales was the central focus of our K-8 curriculum development. When the project's lead teacher requested a curriculum that cumulatively built on each prior year's learning in a spiral fashion, I knew exactly what the school was asking for. Second and third graders began by noticing the cyclical patters that the sun, moon, and stars make in the sky. Fourth graders explored the phases of the moon by taking turns modeling and sketching them in their classroom and then comparing them to the real sky. Sixth !graders used real telescopes to observe a moving model of our solar system and walked a scale model of the planets' orbits. The curriculum is designed to expand students' capacity to visualize space in a hierarchical fashion that asks them to imagine themselves from a broader number of spatial perspectives through hands-on activities. The "situational awareness" Peter's story describes is a hallmark of high-performance engineering and innovation. Keeping in mind the potential outcomes of multiple paths of pursuit from multiple perspectives while keeping track of their relative merits and performance requirements is a demanding spatial task. What made it possible for Peter to transform the failure of his first glove into triumph was the mental space in which that failure provided exactly the information needed for a new breakthrough. In at least two cases, Peter could immediately "see" the full implications of what his hands were telling him. He tells the story of how putting his hands in a Phase VI astronaut glove instantly transformed his understanding of the glove challenge. Six months into his development, the failure of circumferentially wrapped cords to produce a sufficiently flexible glove again forced him to abandon his assumptions. His situational awareness was so clear and compelling it became a gut-level response. Peter's finely developed spatial skills enabled him to almost instinctively focus his full energy on a carefully constructed set of experiments. The finger's ability to sense pressure, force, and work gave him the immediate feedback required to solve this one central problem. Once properly understood, his failure quickly led to the magical "Aha!" moment of discovery; the rest is history. Just as children need opportunities to develop hands-on understanding, engineers need to explore new possibilities through incremental hands-on failure. High-performance innovation is all about learning to make maximum use of thinking spatially to direct this process. Peter Homer's glove also reminds us that efficient engineering decisions need to be made as close to the hardware as possible. Whether we're doing hands-on education or hands-on engineering, it is when we trust in our ability to "feel our way" through failure that we reach our highest potential.

Description: Many measurements were taken by test engineers from Hamilton Sundstrand, the prime contractor for the current EVA suit. Because the raw measurements needed to be converted to torques and combined into a final score, it was impossible to keep track of who was ahead in this phase. The final comfort and dexterity test was performed in a depressurized glove box to simulate real on-orbit conditions. Each competitor was required to exercise the glove through a defined set of finger, thumb, and wrist motions without any sign of abrasion or bruising of the competitor's hand. I learned a lot about arm fatigue! This was a pass-fail event, and both of the remaining competitors came through intact. After taking what seemed like an eternity to tally the final scores, the judges announced that I had won the competition. My glove was the only one to have achieved lower finger-bending torques than the Phase VI glove. Looking back, I see three sources of the success of this project that I believe also operate in other programs where small teams have broken new ground in aerospace technologies. These are awareness, failure, and trust. By remaining aware of the big picture, continuously asking myself, "Am I converging on a solution?" and "Am I converging fast enough?" I was able to see that my original design was not going to succeed, leading to the decision to start over. I was also aware that, had I lingered over this choice or taken time to analyze it, I would not have been ready on the first day of competition. Failure forced me to look outside conventional thinking and opened the door to innovation. Choosing to make incremental failures enabled me to rapidly climb the learning curve. Trusting my "gut" feelings-which are really an internalized accumulation of experiences-and my newly acquired skills allowed me to devise new technologies rapidly and complete both gloves just in time. Awareness, failure, and trust are intertwined: failure provides experiences that inform awareness and provide decision-making opportunities that build trust among team members and managers while opening minds to new pathways for development. All three are necessary for teams-large or small-to achieve big innovation.

Description: The early days of rocketry and space exploration in the United States were marked by incredibly rapid progress: a seemingly endless parade of firsts. Not coincidentally, this period also saw more than its fair share of failure, especially in the infamous "kaputnik" days prior to the successful launch of Explorer. Without a standard canon of known quantities to turn to, the early pioneers of rocketry and space flight were forced to dream up new ideas that ranged from the elegant to the bizarre and to accept the fact that the price of radical progress is occasional failure. Nowadays, rapid prototyping and testing have slowed, as we rely more and more on the extensive knowledge pined by our predecessors and on the embarrassment of riches modern engineers get from computational modeling and computer assisted design. In many cases, this leads to much improved or phenomenally more efficient designs. It also, however, fosters a culture so terrified of failure that we over-engineer and overanalyze everything, often tweaking designs for decades before a new system takes flight. (This is not a problem unique to rockets; the same phenomenon seems to have occurred in high-performance jets.) This is one reason why it was possible for President Kennedy to dream of the completion of the Mercury and Gemini missions and a successful landing on the moon in under a decade, while returning to the moon may take nearly twice as long. Lacking access to the tremendous computational resources of the national space program-and, just as importantly, removed from the harsh judgment of public shareholders or congressional appropriations committees-the hungry entrepreneurs who compete for our prizes tend not to display such fear of failure. Instead, most of them follow a rapid "build, test, fly" program. They are willing to throw a handful of concepts against the wall and see what sticks. They often go from drawing on the back of a napkin to firing engines or even flying vehicles in a matter of weeks or months, learning valuable lessons along the way. Indeed, our teams have repeatedly learned many of the most valuable lessons after only a few moments of working with real hardware-lessons that could never have been learned from a CAD drawing, like finding the failure modes of different welding practices or tracking down the interference between an onboard camera and a GPS unit. As Paul Breed, the leader of a Northrop Grumman Lunar Lander Challenge team (playfully called Unreasonable Rocket), is fond of saying, "In computer simulations the plumbing never leaks. In real life, it always does."

Description: Space-borne radio sounding is considered to be the gold standard for electron-density (N(sub e)) measurements compared to other techniques even under low-density conditions, such as N(sub e) 〈 1/cu cm, when other techniques are known to experience difficulties. These reliable measurements are not restricted to in-situ N(sub e) determinations since a spaceborne sounder can provide vertical N(sub e) profiles (N(sub e)(h)) from the spacecraft altitude to the altitude of maximum N(sub e). Near-conjunction studies involving the International Satellites for Ionospheric Studies (ISIS) satellites in the topside ionosphere and Dynamics Explorer 2 (DE 2) near the altitude of the F-region peak density have verified that, even at the greatest distance from the sounder, the ISIS-derived N(sub e)(h) profiles agree with the DE-2 Langmuir-probe measurements to within about 30% over a density range of more than two decades. Space-borne sounders can also provide N(sub e) profiles along the magnetic-field B, by inverting echoes that are ducted along field-aligned irregularities (FAI), and can provide information about the terrain beneath the satellite by examining surface reflections in the frequency range above the ionospheric penetration frequency. Many nations have launched rocket and satellite radio sounders in geospace over more than 4 decades and there have been sounders on space-probes and in orbit around other planets. Here we will summarize some of the lessons learned from these accomplishments by analyzing data from radio sounders on the Alouette and ISIS satellites and the OEDIPUS and other rockets in the terrestrial ionosphere, the IMAGE satellite in the terrestrial magnetosphere, the Ulysses space probe in Jupiter's 10 plasma torus and the MARSIS satellite in orbit around Mars. The emphasis will be on information deduced concerning (1) fundamental plasma processes and gradients in N, and B in the vicinity of the sounders from sounder-stimulated plasma resonances and short-range echoes involving ion as well as electron motions, (2) the importance of the antenna orientation relative to B for the detection of different plasma resonances, (3) sounder-stimulated plasma phenomena, including FAI, when special plasma conditions are satisfied, (4) the minimum power required for long-range echoes, as indicated by echoes from frequency components of the transmitted pulse and by multiple ducted echoes, and (5) the terrain beneath the satellite from surface reflections. Knowledge of these results should enable the optimum design of a future sounder to satisfy specific science requirements with minimal spacecraft resources.

Description: Topics covered include: Methods of Helium Injection and Removal for Heat Transfer Augmentation; The ESA Large Space Simulator Mechanical Ground Support Equipment for Spacecraft Testing; Temperature Stability and Control Requirements for Thermal Vacuum/Thermal Balance Testing of the Aquarius Radiometer; The Liquid Nitrogen System for Chamber A: A Change from Original Forced Flow Design to a Natural Flow (Thermo Siphon) System; Return to Mercury: A Comparison of Solar Simulation and Flight Data for the MESSENGER Spacecraft; Floating Pressure Conversion and Equipment Upgrades of Two 3.5kw, 20k, Helium Refrigerators; Affect of Air Leakage into a Thermal-Vacuum Chamber on Helium Refrigeration Heat Load; Special ISO Class 6 Cleanroom for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Project; A State-of-the-Art Contamination Effects Research and Test Facility Martian Dust Simulator; Cleanroom Design Practices and Their Influence on Particle Counts; Extra Terrestrial Environmental Chamber Design; Contamination Sources Effects Analysis (CSEA) - A Tool to Balance Cost/Schedule While Managing Facility Availability; SES and Acoustics at GSFC; HST Super Lightweight Interchangeable Carrier (SLIC) Static Test; Virtual Shaker Testing: Simulation Technology Improves Vibration Test Performance; Estimating Shock Spectra: Extensions beyond GEVS; Structural Dynamic Analysis of a Spacecraft Multi-DOF Shaker Table; Direct Field Acoustic Testing; Manufacture of Cryoshroud Surfaces for Space Simulation Chambers; The New LOTIS Test Facility; Thermal Vacuum Control Systems Options for Test Facilities; Extremely High Vacuum Chamber for Low Outgassing Processing at NASA Goddard; Precision Cleaning - Path to Premier; The New Anechoic Shielded Chambers Designed for Space and Commercial Applications at LIT; Extraction of Thermal Performance Values from Samples in the Lunar Dust Adhesion Bell Jar; Thermal (Silicon Diode) Data Acquisition System; Aquarius's Instrument Science Data System (ISDS) Automated to Acquire, Process, Trend Data and Produce Radiometric System Assessment Reports; Exhaustive Thresholds and Resistance Checkpoints; Reconfigurable HIL Testing of Earth Satellites; FPGA Control System for the Automated Test of MicroShutters; Ongoing Capabilities and Developments of Re-Entry Plasma Ground Tests at EADS-ASTRIUM; Operationally Responsive Space Standard Bus Battery Thermal Balance Testing and Heat Dissipation Analysis; Galileo - The Serial-Production AIT Challenge; The Space Systems Environmental Test Facility Database (SSETFD), Website Development Status; Simulated Reentry Heating by Torching; Micro-Vibration Measurements on Thermally Loaded Multi-Layer Insulation Samples in Vacuum; High Temperature Life Testing of 80Ni-20Cr Wire in a Simulated Mars Atmosphere for the Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) Instrument Suit Gas Processing System (GPS) Carbon Dioxide Scrubber; The Planning and Implementation of Test Facility Improvements; and Development of a Silicon Carbide Molecular Beam Nozzle for Simulation Planetary Flybys and Low-Earth Orbit.

Description: The Community Coordinated Modeling Center (CCMC) is a US inter-agency activity aiming at research in support of the generation of advanced space weather models. As one of its main functions. the CCMC provides to researchers the use of space science models, even if they are not model owners themselves. The second focus of CCMC activities is on validation and verification of space weather models. and on the transition of appropriate models to space weather forecast centers. As part of the latter activity. the CCMC develops real-time simulation systems that stress models through routine execution. A by-product of these real-time calculations is the ability to derive model products, which may be useful for space weather operators. After consultations with NOA/SEC and with AFWA, CCMC has developed a set of tools as a first step to make real-time model output useful to forecast centers. In this presentation, we will discuss the motivation for this activity, the actions taken so far, and options for future tools from model output.