Abstract
The paper investigates two classes of non-zero-sum two-person games on the unit square, where the payoff function of Player 1 is convex or concave in the first variable. It is shown that this assumption together with the boundedness of payoff functions imply the existence of ɛ-Nash equilibria consisting of two probability measures concentrated at most at two points each.
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This research project No. 211589101 was supported by KBN Grant under contract 664/2/91.
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Radzik, T. Nash equilibria of discontinuous non-zero-sum two-person games. Int J Game Theory 21, 429–437 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240157
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240157